CHAPTER XII
FOREIGNERS AND THE REBELLION

Before considering the final stages of the rebellion, in order to understand more perfectly the relative credit due the foreigners, it is desirable to examine the part played by them in the suppression of the movement.¹

¹ This is undertaken only in order to make clear the character of Tseng’s part in the war. There is need of a careful study of the development of foreign policy and opinion during the decade 1853 to 1863, made from newspapers, official reports, correspondence, and reports of missionaries, both Roman Catholic and Protestant, and from Chinese documents, where such are available. Morse has done this, but chiefly from the first two classes of sources named. The official correspondence of Chinese officials with their government, where it can be had, might throw much light on obscure points. The missionary societies in their archives may possibly have some material not necessarily embodied in their reports.

Yet in its general outlines the story of the gradual transformation of a policy of strict neutrality into one of armed intervention is well known. What I have included in this chapter is therefore no new contribution, but the retelling of a story that has been more fully told in such books as those of Morse, Andrew Wilson, The Ever Victorious Army, Hake, Events in the Taiping Rebellion, Montaldo de Jesus, Historie Shanghai, Williams, The Middle Kingdom, and McClellan, The Story of Shanghai.

In regard to the change of policy that led to intervention, it is necessary to note that there was widespread opposition to aiding the imperialists. This opposition sometimes advocated a continuation of the policy of neutrality and sometimes almost demanded recognition of an intervention in behalf of the insurgents. This pro-Taiping or anti-imperialist sentiment was not confined to notorious filibusters such as “Lin-li” (A. F. Lindley), but was expressed even by members of parliament far removed from the immediate scene of conflict, such as Colonel Sykes, whose letters to various newspapers had a great deal to say against the government. In the collection of letters by Sykes, The Taeping Rebellion in China, 1863, are included letters of Dr. Legge and Rev. Griffith John, both eminent missionaries, depriating the policy of intervention. As late as 1803 in his Cycle of Cathay, p. 141,
There was naturally much wonder on the part of foreign governments when, early in 1853, the Taiping army concluded its long, triumphant march by taking Nanking, there to establish a nation. The Christian basis of the new faith challenged their curiosity. Great Britain, France, and the United States sent expeditions up the Yangtse to ascertain the extent of the power of the Taipings and the nature of their doctrines.

Dr. Martin, the famous American educator, whose name is widely known among Chinese scholars, maintained that he had always regarded the policy of intervention as wrong, and ascribed it to the influence of the French minister under representations of Roman Catholic missionaries who opposed the Protestant form of religion professed by the Taipings. He himself was not unaware of their errors, but considered their very willingness to accept a foreign religion as a seed of hope for China's future, and therefore earnestly advocated their recognition in 1857, North China Herald, June 13 and 20, 1857. It is not possible to dismiss a group of men which contains three such names with a sneer. In this group we also find T. T. Meadows of the British consular service and Commander Lindsey Bray, at least before their government had adopted a pro-imperialist policy.

An equal array of names might be brought forward on the other side, and it is their point of view which was eventually adopted, albeit not without much discussion. If there were soldiers of fortune on one side such were found also on the other. It is only because General Ward's illegitimate "Ever Victorious Army," objected to at first because it broke neutrality, became a recognized instrument shortly afterwards and received official British recognition and a British commander, Colonel Gordon, that the whole enterprise did not suffer the same condemnation meted out to those who furnished arms and sold their services to the Taiping side. In fact, Ward did have to claim Chinese citizenship in order to be free from consular molestation.

These are some of the reasons which make a careful study of the foreign relations of the period desirable in order that we may arrive at conclusions more solidly grounded.

For accounts of these expeditions, (a) that of Sir George Bonham, April-May, 1853, British plenipotentiary, and Captain Fishbourne, accompanied by T. T. Meadows in H. M. S. Hermes, see British and Foreign State Papers, XLIV (1853-1854), and T. T. Meadows, The Chinese and their Rebellions, chapter XVII; (b) the visit of Robert McLane on the Susquehanna, Captain Marshall, see 32 Congress, 2 Senate Executive Document, pp. 22, Part 1; (c) the visit of the French Minister Bourbillon on the Cassini, see the same, p. 92.
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T. T. Meadows, secretary of the British expedition in H. M. S. Hermes, April, 1853, was much impressed with the Taipings, but his superior, Sir George Bonham, who studied translations of their books, was more reserved. He announced to the Taiping government a policy of strict neutrality. In reporting to the British government he expressed the suspicion that the religious tenets of the rebels were mainly a "political engine of power by the chiefs to sway the minds of those whom they are anxious to attach to their cause." His Chinese secretary, Dr. W. H. Medhurst, in his report to Sir George, almost discovers what appears to have been the true origin of the rebellion. Speaking of the curious medley of religious nonsense and political sagacity he says:

The only way to account for the difference, is the supposition that two minds, or different sets of men, have been at work, the one animated by a sincere and humble desire to serve God and to seek His favour through the merits of the only Saviour, and the other desirous of imposing on the credulity of the unthinking many, with the view of elevating themselves to power.

If the insurrection should succeed, he thought that toleration would be secured for Christianity and commercial intercourse possibly encouraged—but with the strict suppression of opium. If there was a chance that the Taipings should prove liberal, he felt certain that the imperial side in the event of victory would be even more exclusive and insolent than before, remembering against them the fact that the Taiping religion was indebted greatly to the West for its ideas. Nevertheless he advocated a policy of neutrality.  

The French minister, who visited Nanking late in 1853, failed to meet the higher officials of the new government

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3 British and Foreign State Papers, XLIV, 508.
4 See chapter III.
5 British and Foreign State Papers, XLIV, 531 f.
and returned with the same point of view, feeling that this movement was not yet far enough along to be regarded as worthy of recognition.

The American commissioner, Robert McLane, reached Nanking in May, 1854. By that time the religious eccentricities had become more pronounced, Yang being honored as the Holy Ghost, and the political assumptions of the Taipings had become more exalted and exclusive. If their communications with Sir George Bonham a year before had seemed arrogant, the letter that awaited Mr. McLane was impossible. After reciting their objections to McLane's letter, because it claimed equality and because it was not accompanied by "precious gifts"—considerations which led them to keep it from the Eastern king—they continue:

If you do, indeed, respect Heaven and recognize the Sovereign, then our celestial court, viewing all under Heaven as one family and uniting all nations as one body, will most assuredly regard your faithful purpose and permit you year by year to bring tribute and annually come to pay court, so that you may become the ministers and people of the celestial Kingdom, forever bathing yourselves in the gracious streams of the Celestial Dynasty, peacefully residing in your own lands, and living quietly, enjoy great glory. This is the sincere desire of us the great ministers. Quickly ought you to conform to and not oppose this mandatory dispatch.

This pronouncement, coupled with their religious vagaries, led Mr. McLane to withhold from them the recognition he was authorised to accord if he found them capable of becoming a true government. After considering their religious extravagances he thus writes of their proposals:

† Foster, American Diplomacy in the Orient, p. 211.
§ 55 Cong., 2 Senate Ex. Doc. 22, Part 1. The whole report is well worth
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When their operations are regarded in a more practical bearing, the case presented for your consideration is not less unsatisfactory than their civil and religious organisation itself. They are composed almost exclusively of the ignorant and unenlightened population of the interior; limited in numbers, not exceeding from fifty to one hundred thousand men, in the field and in the besieged cities throughout that portion of the empire they hold in check or in actual possession; yet the imperialists are quite incapable of resisting them, and still more hopeless is their immediate prospect of recovering the main points that have fallen. . . . Whatever may have been the hopes of the enlightened and civilized nations of the earth in regard to this movement, it is now apparent that they neither profess nor apprehend Christianity, and whatever may be the true judgment to form of their political power, it can no longer be doubted that intercourse cannot be established or maintained on terms of equality.

Their general attitude towards foreigners did not reveal any studied hostility, and in his book Meadows conveys the distinct impression that he found them inclined to be friendly, yet without a sufficient understanding of foreign ideas to accept outsiders as on an equality with themselves. They were also apathetic in the matter of foreign trade and did not reach forth their hands to take Shanghai when it was practically theirs, the Triads having occupied it by a successful stroke within the city.> The occupation of Shanghai by the Triads, 1858-1856, raised several questions, of which two were destined to prove of importance up to the present time. The first was how to deal with the customs duties in the absence of the legal authorities from their places; this was reading. McLane's reasoning is as clear and his observations as keen as those of his British colleague. Despite the more amateur character of the American representatives abroad at this period, they show on the whole much ability and deserve more consideration and respect than they are usually given.

* Morse, International Relations of the Chinese Empire, II, 13 ff.
eventually met by a foreign-controlled custom house out of which the present system arose when the Chinese realised how well the temporary plan worked. The second was the problem of dealing with the refugees within the area reserved for foreigners, which in time led to the growth of a municipality under foreign control, rejecting Chinese rule even over the native population except as a mixed court preserved the theory of Chinese rule. A third question was raised by the approach of the Chinese soldiers too near the settlement, which brought about the battle of Muddy Flat (1854) and several years later furnished a precedent for the doctrine that Shanghai was neutral territory.\textsuperscript{10}

In 1856 the Arrow War and the subsequent negotiation of treaties in the north (1858) altered the foreign situation. Prior to this time foreigners had treaty rights in five seaports only; now the Yangtse was open to navigation and a certain number of cities on that stream had become ports of entry. The ratification of this treaty was delayed until after the British and French, in 1859 and 1860, renewed the war against China in the north and forced their way to Peking after having met and defeated the Mongolian cavalry leader, Senkoliintsin.\textsuperscript{11} The imperial court fled to Jehol, leaving Prince Kung to carry on the necessary negotiations.\textsuperscript{12}

In one sense it is doubtless true that this invasion was a cause of the renewal of Taiping activities in 1858 and 1860. The withdrawal of Senkoliintsin to meet the Allies probably aroused the Nien rebels to new efforts in Honan and Shantung. We know also that Tsêng Kuo-fan was more hard pressed than ever for the means to carry on

\textsuperscript{10} These subjects are developed in Morse, II, chapters I and II; also Montalbo de Jesus, \textit{Historic Shanghai}, and McClellan, \textit{The Story of Shanghai}.

\textsuperscript{11} and \textsuperscript{12} Good accounts of this war may be found in many books, \textit{inter alia}, Williams, \textit{The Middle Kingdom}, and Morse, I.
his operations. On the other hand, it is extremely unlikely that the foreign war had much effect on the fortunes of either side. At least, Tsêng Kuo-fan, who was holding the Taiping rebels in check in the central provinces, and the generals nearer Nanking did not, as far as we can discover, reduce their armies by a single soldier. The aggressions of the British and French in Canton and towards Peking were regarded largely as local affairs.

The increased activities of the Nien rebels in the region of northern Anhui are more clearly traceable to the withdrawal of Senkolithsien, and it is possible that this reacted on the Taiping rebels in Anhui. We have seen, and shall see again, that the latter made desperate efforts to cut their way through to Nanking, frustrated almost always by Kwan Wen and Tsêng Kuo-fan. After the Allies had defeated the Chinese near Peking and reached the capital in the summer of 1860 there was a little more danger of Taiping success in that direction, and with indemnities to pay, the imperial government may well have welcomed foreign aid against their internal foes. Prior to that we have small ground for thinking that the foreign war of 1856-1860 crippled the imperial government appreciably against the Táipings. To say that because of this hostility the siege of Nanking was lifted is certainly untenable, since none of the soldiers from central China moved north. In fact, the Allies' campaign in the north did not develop until August, 1860, whereas the Chung-wang had defeated the great camp outside Nanking on May 5, after which he began his depredations in Kiangsu and Chekiang. The Allies were met in August by Sen-kolithsien, who expected to be victorious. After his defeat Tsêng offered to go to the north, but was not permitted to do so. Hence we are safe in rejecting the idea that the Arrow War caused the Taiping vivacity at this period.

13 P'ing-ting Yüeh-fei Chi-luch, IX, 14b.
On June 10 Tsêng was appointed acting viceroy of the Two Kiang, with orders to relieve the pressure on Kiangsu. Since he was unable to leave Anking it was necessary for the governor to manage affairs in that province. From this time are dated two events which led eventually to intervention. Of these, the first was the employment of Frederick T. Ward, probably by Chinese merchants of Shanghai, who, shortly after the capture of Sungkiang by the Chungwang in 1860, promised him 30,000 taels to retake that city. After failing once, Ward employed one hundred Manila-men and white officers, Forrester and Burgevigne, and took the city on July 17. Sungkiang now became Ward’s headquarters, whence he led his force to the attack of Tsingpu. He found this place defended by adventurers in Taiping employ, and failed in his attempt (August, 1860). He was eventually compelled to abandon the effort and return to Sungkiang, where he occupied the next few months in drilling a force of Chinese troops, his expenses being met in a roundabout way by revenues from the Shanghai customs.

The appearance of the Chungwang in Kiangsu threw Shanghai into consternation, for from the interior thousands of refugees came streaming into the settlement; the Chungwang himself reached the outskirts of the

14 Dispatches, XI, 41 f.
16 On this point the foreign writers (except Williams, The Middle Kingdom, who says that it was the taotai) agree that a Chinese firm, "Takee," employed Ward and that the funds came from Chinese merchants. On the contrary, the Chungwang says that the governor employed foreign devils (Autobiography, p. 35), and a small popular Chinese account of operations in Kiangsu (Wu-chung P’ing K’uo Chi, I, 1a) states that the acting provincial treasurer and taotai Wu employed them. Since strict neutrality had been enforced up to that time I surmise that both are right and wrong—the government actually employing the men and furnishing the funds from the customs revenues, but acting through merchants who, presumably, had no connection with officialdom, for fear of foreign complications.
city on the eighteenth of August. The consuls stationed there decided to enforce neutrality and sent word to the Chungwang that he was not to take the city, and eventually he was repelled by the combined British and French official forces.\textsuperscript{17} The Chungwang asserts that the expedition to Shanghai was undertaken on invitation from some "barbarians" living there as well as by imperialists in correspondence with the insurgents. Prevented by inclement weather from making a speedy march into the city, and confronted by the fact that "Governor Hsueh had engaged one or two thousand devils to guard the city and decapitated the whole of the Imperialists who were in correspondence with me," the Chungwang was compelled to withdraw.\textsuperscript{18}

This act of the foreigners, who thus extended the doctrine of neutrality to embrace purely Chinese territory which could be reached by going around the settlements, was actually an abandonment of neutrality in favor of the imperialist side. The pitiable spectacle of desolation and distress at their very gates, and even more, the fear of a failure of supplies for the daily increasing population of Shanghai, led to still further extension of this anti-Taiping neutrality to a thirty-mile radius about Shanghai. Admiral Sir James Hope, returning from Peking, went up the Yangtse, February, 1861, with Harry

\textsuperscript{17} McClellan, \textit{The Story of Shanghai}, p. 49.

\textsuperscript{18} Chungwang, \textit{Autobiography}, pp. 35 f. A. Wilson, p. 66, coupling with this account the statements of Bruce that the rebel attack took them by surprise, believes that Shanghai was kept out of Taiping hands by mere accident. In the case of a \textit{fait accompli} there is question whether the policy of intervention would have been followed. The possession of Shanghai was one of the chief imperialist advantages because of the volume of its trade. Why the Taipings did not take it in 1853 is a mystery, the clue to which will probably be found in the early experience of the Taiping-wang with the Triads in Kwangsi. Had the Taipings but reached forth their hands and secured the revenues, the imperialists would certainly have had a vastly more difficult financial problem and might have lost the war.
Parkes to arrange for the opening of treaty ports conceded in 1860, and stopped at Nanking, where they interviewed some of the chiefs and secured a promise from the T’ienwang that Shanghai should be unmolested for a year. Their report of conditions in the interior and in Nanking was not flattering to either side, but it particularly condemned the Taipings, in whose cities they discovered the utmost misery, whilst those of the imperialists were somewhat better off. Whatever other factors contributed to the decision to aid the imperialists, this trip up to Hankow must be set down as one of the most important.

No longer bound by the T’ienwang’s promise of the year before, the Taipings once more resolved to attempt the capture of Shanghai in 1862. After securing Hangchow they intimated that a move on Shanghai would follow, and plots were discovered both in the city and the settlement for helping them. Foreigners also lent aid by smuggling arms, ammunition, and opium. Just as the consuls of Western powers had hitherto failed to put down Ward and his type of adventurers who helped the imperialists, so now they failed to prevent foreign aid from reaching the Taipings. The rebels passed Woomung on January 13, thirty thousand strong; another group attacked Ward at Sungkiang. After defeating the latter at Sungkiang, Ward brought his seven hundred Chinese to Shanghai, where he gave aid to Admiral Hope, who led about the same number of French and British sailors and marines, and defeated the Taiping army at Kaochiao, across the river between Shanghai and Woomung. In this and other operations around

10 A. Wilson, p. 71.
20 Descriptions in S. Lane-Poole, *Life of Sir Harry Parkes*, I, 419 ff.
22 Morse, II, 73.
23 *Ibid.* (From *North China Herald*, February 7, 1862.)
Shanghai Ward’s little army received much praise for its skill and valor.

The British now openly reversed their policy of neutrality, and, after negotiations with the French and Chinese in Peking, adopted the suggestion of Admiral Hope, seconded by Admiral Protet, that the Taipings be kept out of the territory embraced within a thirty-mile radius from Shanghai.\(^\text{24}\) Ward’s force was now as highly regarded as it had been condemned but a few months earlier.\(^\text{25}\) The combined Anglo-French and “Ever Victorious Army” attacked and captured a number of small towns and villages in the limits assigned. About May 1, successful attacks were made on Kiating; on May 12, Tsingpu fell to Ward’s little force. Later, however, the defence of these two places became impossible because the Chungwang occupied Kiating and invested Tsingpu, from which place Ward was able to extricate himself only through aid from Admiral Hope. A general retirement was made to Shanghai (June 14).\(^\text{26}\) General Ward was now authorised to increase his force to a maximum of six thousand men.\(^\text{27}\) From Sungkiang he retook Tsingpu in August, but the great heat and the pestilence at Shanghai prevented much activity among foreign troops.

We already know what was Tsêng’s opinion regarding the use of foreign aid beyond the treaty ports. After the retirement of the combined foreign contingents from Kiating and Tsingpu in May, rumors were current that Indian troops were to be brought to Shanghai, and an inquiry was addressed to Tsêng Kuo-fan from Peking as to his position regarding such a move. Tsêng’s reply

\(^{24}\) Montaldo de Jesus, pp. 136 ff.
\(^{25}\) Correspondence between Bruce and Hope and letter of Gen. Michel to Bruce. *Further Papers Relating to the Rebellion in China*, 1862, pp. 8, 10, 21.
\(^{26}\) Montaldo de Jesus, pp. 136 ff.
\(^{27}\) Morse, II, 77.
is worth quoting *in extenso*. After stating that he had written to Tso Tsung-tang, who did not desire large numbers of foreign soldiers and wished no Indian soldiers at all, and Li Hung-chang, who gave a rather evasive answer to the effect that he had discussed the matter with Admiral Hope, in the course of which the latter told him that reinforcements were coming but said nothing about troops from India, Tseng goes on to say:

Your servant has discovered that the westerners by temperament love to win, and are unwilling to be appeased for the slightest angry glance or outburst. Ever since the defeat at Kia-tung and Tsingpu, because they are ashamed to face the ridicule of the [long-]haired rebels, and fear the contempt of the Imperial Court, they have repeatedly stated that their recruiting of forces and advancing once more is a part of their original plan. Now [we know that] for a long time England and France have regarded the enlistment of armies as a matter of common public enterprise, and the expense of their upkeep rests on the taxation of the whole body of merchants, thus precluding the possibility that one man should become the master. The disgrace of retreating from Kia-tung and Tsingpu is not so serious as to call for the sudden arousing of public anger. For this the rulers of their countries have no need to put forth strenuous efforts nor their merchants to bear additional taxes. The number of their soldiers does not seem to be very great for us to perceive and understand their noble generosity.

Since, however, there are certain rumours afloat, the question might properly be taken up by the Tsungli Yamen with the ministers at the capital to ascertain their truth. This done, it should express [to the ministers] its high appreciation, but at the same time point out the dangers [of this proposal] and remonstrate with them.

China’s rebels are, in their origin, China’s own children, and China’s forces should certainly be sufficient to quell her own small disturbances. Meanwhile, not to mention the fact that we have, during the spring and summer of the present year, won back more than twenty cities and pacified the Yangtse River for
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a thousand 里 so that the rebels cannot hold out much longer, the machinery is erected whereby Kiangsu is to be pacified. If, through the force of circumstances, that machinery is not suitable, and the power of the rebels should not be weakened, let China bear her own burden. With the emperor lies the way of self-reliance—not to become fearful through the rise of difficulties and beg aid from foreign countries. Why should we, lightly borrowing soldiers, leave a legacy of ridicule to future generations? This is what I mean by saying, express your high appreciation and thank them.

The Yuch rebels who wander about on the byways were originally but vagabond robbers; the affair at Tsingpuu and Kiating is likewise but a trifling circumstance. Should England recruit Indian soldiers with the desire of getting revenge, bring together a large number and win, it would not prove her prowess; if she brought over only a small number and failed it would be a cause of ridicule. Thus uselessly to cause Indian soldiers to drain England’s resources and trample Chinese soil would neither bring credit to the rulers above nor profit to the merchants below. Far better at once to decide on withdrawing their soldiers, thus causing Sungkiang and Shanghai to avoid endless regret and England and France to reap unending profit. This is what I mean by saying, point out the dangers and remonstrate with them.

If the Tsingli Yamen finds that in their negotiations with the ministers the latter are not inclined to give favourable consideration to these arguments, then employ other methods without limit. [Tell them for example] that now as before, when the question of using foreign soldiers was referred to your servant, he is without men to detach for cooperating with them, and would thus be despised everywhere. With the most earnest arguments it should clearly present our case, doing its utmost to find some way of carrying its point, and most carefully guarding against a lack of resources in [suggesting] plans.

The language of foreigners cannot be understood, their customs are different. If they should come to our aid and we should show suspicion of them or dislike them too deeply, it would certainly lead to our incurring their just anger. If [on the con-
trary], we should make sincere efforts to act in harmony with 
them, I still fear that in their hearts they will conceal a purpose 
that spells disaster for us. Consider such cases as the burning of 
boats at Hankow—disagreement over a few words, a dispute, 
bloodshed, and then at once all resources are bent for mutual 
destruction.

Your servant is first and last unwilling to coöperate with 
them in this attack, and moreover, after careful consideration, 
believes that to join with them now and later break with them 
would not be so good a policy as to deliberate first and [perhaps] 
later enter into [such an arrangement]. If they should come to 
the vicinity of our camp without a previous understanding there 
would certainly be occasion for friction. Wherefore your servant 
must again implore that you give instruction to the Boards 
amid the tangled circumstances of the hour, to be honest in their 
words and sincere in their actions. As they go into this [diplomatic] struggle if they are successful, let them be modest, and 
if worsted let them come to each others' aid. Above all, let them 
depart themselves modestly and particularly avoid giving oc-
casion for putting their opponents on their guard. For our 
policy looks to the concentrating of all our resources on the 
Kwang rebels, nor should we plant another root of bitterness to 
send forth the branches of a great hostility. . . .

Meanwhile at Ningpo the British and French warships 
bombarded the city, captured it, and delivered it to the 
imperialists, under the leadership of Captain Roderick 
Dew and Lieutenant Kenny (May 6). This led to the 
adoption at Ningpo of a policy similar to that at Shang-
hai, and aid was furnished for the recapture of some 
small towns near that city. Ward came with his men to 
this region and received a fatal wound in the attack upon 
Tzeki, September 21. Not only the "Ever Victorious 
Army," but contingents from the British and French

28 Nieup'h, VIII, 16a; Dispatches, 27-30 (July 18, 1862). There is noth-
ing in this reply to show whether or no he had any special aversion to 
Indian soldiers.

29 Morse, II, 78.
war vessels and another Chinese force of fifteen hundred men under French training took part in this attack.\textsuperscript{30} Ward’s remains were received with high honor at Sung-kiang, where he was buried, and to this day a memorial temple marks the site of his tomb. He was an a\textsuperscript{1}xe man, and though there are many who believe that he cherished a design to carve out for himself an empire in China,\textsuperscript{31} no one begrudges him his laurels. Without him the work of Gordon would not have been possible, nor the organisation of the Franco-Chinese force to which we have just alluded. This force, which ultimately reached a total of about twenty-five hundred, was first placed under A. E. Le Brethon and Giquel. They helped Tso Tsung-tang in the recapture of Shangyu (November 28),\textsuperscript{32} Dew likewise participating, and (early in 1863) of Shaoshing, which was abandoned by the rebels because of their operations outside.\textsuperscript{33} When Le Brethon was killed in the capture of Shangyu, the command passed to Tardiff de Moidrey, who was likewise killed a little later and was replaced by Ensign Paul d’Aiguebelle.\textsuperscript{34}

The “Ever Victorious Army,” having lost its first commander, was temporarily led by an American, Edward Forrester. He refused to become the permanent commander and yielded the position to Henry Burgevine, another American.

Almost at this moment the terrible forty-six-day attack on Tsêng Kuo-ch’üan began, following a pestilence in the camp which made resistance doubly hard. The

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid. Also Hake, The Taeping Rebellion, pp. 220 f.
\textsuperscript{31} Wilson, The Ever Victorious Army, p. 91. Also for opinions mentioned consult Morse, II, 56 f., 79, notes.
\textsuperscript{32} Morse, II, 79.

\textsuperscript{33} Wilson, pp. 114-116; Morse, p. 79; Cordier, Relations de la Chine avec les Puissances occidentales, pp. 215-218. Cordier’s account is partly from P. Giquel in Revue des Deux Mondes, June 15, 1864.
\textsuperscript{34} Cordier, ibid.
various generals who might have been summoned to the aid of General Tsêng were held back by strategic considerations and Ch'ên Hsueh-ch'i alone was available. On the plea that the campaigns in Kiangsu would suffer by his withdrawal, the younger Tsêng declined the aid of General Ch'ên, though his critics suspect that he was jealous of his own prestige. This refusal was embarrassing to Tsêng Kuo-fan, who had already applied for his help. Yet he made the most of it and wrote to Li Hung-chang not to send Ch'ên, or if he had already done so, to allow him to fight one or two battles and then return.  

Li Hung-chang then offered Burgevine and the small force already known as the "Ever Victorious Army." At first Tsêng declined its aid, but finally agreed to receive it on two conditions: first, that this force should not be stationed too near the Chinese force, but should fight at Hsiakwan or Kiu-fu Island below the city, or at some point above; and second, that if Nanking should be captured, Burgevine's men were not to loot promiscuously, but all the booty was to be brought together, half to be forwarded to Peking and half to be divided among the various troops. Burgevine's force might be permitted a double share. In any event a clear-cut agreement was necessary to prevent future dissensions and misunderstandings among the armies.  

In a letter to Kuo-ch'iian, Tsêng advised making the best of these men when they arrived, not permitting them, however, to come into close contact with the other troops. "Burgevine's command," he adds, "are called 'foreign soldiers' but in reality they are Kwangtung and Ningpo men. They are disdainful, extravagant, utterly coarse, and their maintenance is very expensive. Your army should under no circumstances be in the same place with them. At every point within the

25 Miscellaneous Correspondence, XX, 7b, 8b.
26 Miscellaneous Letters, XX, 8b, 9a.
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lines the ‘host’ army ought to be stronger than the ‘guest’ army, and everything should be under your control with a single command. Then nothing subverting will come about. This is most strictly enjoined upon you. If you write to Shanghai you should have this clearly explained to them.\(^{35}\)

The negotiations with Burgevine were prolonged. On November 17 Tsêng wrote that he had received the points of the compact with Burgevine, but was beginning to feel a little doubt as to whether he would actually come or not. Meanwhile the imperialists sustained fearful punishment, but on November 26 General Tsêng won a victory which relieved the siege and compelled the rebels to retire north of the river. But it did not allay the anxiety of the senior Tsêng, who feared that his brother might be lured away from his base. Just before the attack which drove away the Chungwang, Tsêng had gone so far as to urge his brother to retire from Nanking—a slight setback at Ningkuo having convinced him that the imperialists up the Yangtse were in a parlous position. Were Ningkuo to fall, a general retirement to Wuhu or Kianghukwan was almost inevitable, and if both Pao Ch’ao, with his weakened force, and Tsêng Kuo-ch’üan, who was only for the moment out of danger, should fail and suffer defeat, the whole cause would go down in ruin. Urgent letters on December 4, 5, 6, and 7 pleaded with Tsêng Kuo-ch’üan not to hazard the entire cause by remaining at a point so perilous.\(^{36}\) The younger brother, though hard pressed, felt so much confidence in his strength that he disregarded his brother’s appeals, and the need for retirement gradually passed away. The siege itself came to an end late in November, but only after the middle of

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\(^{35}\) Letter of November 8, 1862.

\(^{36}\) Letters of November 17 to December 7.
December was certainty reached that it would not be renewed.

The causes for Burgevine’s failure to come to Nanking during this supreme crisis are variously given, one of them being arrears in pay. Of his sincerity we cannot be too sure in the light of his later career. It is obvious from the account given above that the Chinese army desired his presence, if at all only when the imperial cause was in desperate straits during November. His repeated delays on one pretext or another did not bring relief when it was needed, and the final withdrawal of steamers when Burgevine actually contemplated starting was not an act of bad faith on the Chinese side, but the natural thing to do when the need for his aid had passed.

As shown in the letter of Tseng quoted above, the “Ever Victorious Army” was far from popular among the Chinese, and in view of the definite abandonment of neutrality by the foreign powers they, too, desired a change in its character. The Chinese regarded it as too costly, resented its interference in civil government at Sungkiang, its quarrelsome personnel, and its overbearing conduct towards other Chinese.

On the second of January, 1863, these troops mutinied because of arrears in pay. Word came from Shanghai that the money would be forwarded in two days, on the strength of which Burgevine pacified the men. But at the appointed time no money arrived, and Burgevine went to Shanghai to secure it in person. There he was told that the money had not been promised at that date. He therefore proceeded to the house of “Takee,” where, after having insulted and struck the proprietor, he seized the money and returned to Sungkiang. This brought about his dismissal from the service, and the appointment, subject to Sir Frederick Bruce, first of Captain Holland and later of Captain Gordon, who transformed the army into
a well-disciplined force, after having quelled a number of
mutinies, generally led by adventurers who resented the
change in commanders.39 Tsêng was so angered at this
action of Burgevine’s that he suggested in a letter to Li
Hung-chang a joint memorial to the throne urging the
execution of Burgevine for wounding the taotai Ouyang.40
Tsêng’s account of this episode differs somewhat from
that given above from foreign sources. He says:

Burgeonine, the foreign general of the “Ever Victorious
Army,” had decided in the middle decade of the ninth moon to
come to the rescue of Nanking, but repeatedly postponed the date
of starting, at last, however, appointing the tenth of December
as the time of departure. Chen Wu-chao had gone ahead with
two steamers to gather his forces at Chinkiang, but Burgevine,
on the pretext that the pay of his army was in arrears, did not
come into the Yangtse. On the third of January41 in Sungkiang
the gates were closed and a mutiny occurred, and on the 4th
with several tens of the armed brigade [i.e., those armed with
foreign guns] he came to Shanghai, broke into the premises of
Ouyang, wounded his relatives, seized more than $40,000, and
departed. Such trampling on rights and running amok without
the slightest regard to the law not merely renders it impossible
for China to use its strength to attack rebels, but is something
that foreign countries openly detest. Li Hung-chang should
clearly explain the case to the minister in Peking and together
with him inflict the severest punishment.42

We are now in a position to understand Li Hung-
chang’s implacable hatred for this man whom he per-
sistently refused to reinstate, even after Burgevine had
gone to Peking and secured the support of the British
and American ministers there.43 The withdrawing of

30 Hake, pp. 226-234.
39 Miscellaneous Letters, XX, 34b.
41 There is a discrepancy in dates here, foreign accounts giving the
second.
42 Dispatches, XVII, 52n.
43 Burgevine’s case is given in Hake, pp. 230 f. There he clearly reveals
steamers, when Burgevine was actually ready to start for Nanking, and even the withholding of pay from a force that was so uncontrollable are not hard to understand.

The agreement for the services of Colonel Charles George Gordon, made with the aid of General Stavely to go into effect as soon as the British government should consent, provided for a maximum army of three thousand men. While this consent was being awaited, trouble arose through the desire of Ward's old followers to have Burgevine continued as their commander, and by the failure of Holland at Taitsang which he attacked in vain on February 15. Another failure under Major Brennan at Fushan turned Li Hung-chang's support into dissatisfaction which almost caused him to suppress this force altogether.

Fortunately the required permission now arrived and Gordon took over the command March 25, 1863. This event marked the adoption of a complete pro-imperial programme, for Gordon not only operated outside the thirty-mile limit, but was an officer of the British army detached with his government's consent for this task.

Gordon's campaigns opened with an effort to relieve Chiangshu. His 2,250 men were giving aid to an imperial force of 6,000, and together they drove off the enemy on April 7. Thence he repaired to Taitsang to rescue Li Hang-chang, brother of the governor, who had been taken treacherously by the Taipings when they lured him into the city under pretence of surrendering it. Although he could oppose but 2,600 men to the 10,000 of the enemy, he

an unwillingness to serve under the governor. It is still hard to understand what he expected the authorities to do with an independent force that would not take orders. Wilson believes the quarrel arose over Chinese claims for credit in a battle with the Muwang, November, 1862.

"But with much protest by the British general. The reduction did not take effect at once.

Morse, 11, 92 f.; Wilson, p. 127.
successfully attacked the city April 30 and May 1.\textsuperscript{46} Disaffection on the part of Burgevine's partisans in the army necessitated a return to Sungkiang, where Gordon reorganised the force, making a number of changes among the officers. With this new group Gordon marched forth to the siege of K'unshan (Quinsan) and arrived before the walls on May 27. His force now amounted to 600 artillerymen and 2,300 infantry.\textsuperscript{47} The use of his "amphibious steamer," \textit{Hyson}, greatly accelerated the capture of this city which, with the help of General Ch'en, fell on June 1.\textsuperscript{48} Ch'en's claim for a great share of the credit, the fact that Gordon had ignored Ch'en's strategic suggestions, and the latter's jealousy over the successes achieved by the \textit{Hyson} and by Gordon's strategy in taking the city, brought about serious friction between them, the rupture becoming so deep that Governor Li and Sir Halliday Macartney had to intervene. Trouble also arose because of the determination of Gordon to make K'unshan his base instead of Sungkiang, bringing on a mutiny repressed by stern measures.\textsuperscript{49} From this time more formal army discipline prevailed than had been the case heretofore. But this was not accomplished without a third mutiny, which was settled by compromise.\textsuperscript{50}

Many causes now conspired to lead Gordon to resign his command: friction with his men and with General Ch'en, the tardy settlement of legitimate claims,\textsuperscript{51} and

\textsuperscript{46} Morse, II, 94 f.; Wilson, pp. 150 f. The author finds in this incident at Taitsang the cause and justification for the murder of the surrendered \textit{wangs} at Soochow by order of Li Hung-chang.

\textsuperscript{47} Morse, II, 95; Wilson, p. 158.

\textsuperscript{48} Wilson, pp. 159-182. Chinese sources give the date as May 31.

\textsuperscript{49} Hake, pp. 260-282; Wilson, pp. 164 f.

\textsuperscript{50} Wilson, pp. 166 ff.

\textsuperscript{51} Here a study of the financial situation of the governor is necessary. With claims from Ts'ang Kuo-fan and his own men, did apathy or poverty lead him to spar for time? Hake states that Gordon actually resigned July 25 and publishes his letter to Li Hung-chang.
the advice of friends. When he was about to leave for Shanghai (August 8) he learned that Burgevine had started with three hundred men to join the Taipings at Soochow with the eventual hope of winning for himself an empire. The general opinion at Shanghai was that the K'unshan force would go over to their beloved Burgevine and make the situation serious. Gordon therefore resolved to continue his work.

Meanwhile the little army had pushed on from K'unshan towards Soochow. On July 29 it aided in the capture of Wujiang, an outpost in the defence of Soochow; followed August 25 by the capture of Taihu-hsien, at the tip of the peninsula that extends into the lake. A detachment took Kiangyin about September 30, and the combined forces were now ready to advance on Soochow.

This important center was held by the Muvang (T'an Shao-kwang), the favorite officer of the Chungwang (the latter being absent in Nanking, endeavoring to persuade the Tienwang to flee from Nanking and establish himself elsewhere), and several other wangs and generals. From his Autobiography it seems clear that the Chungwang expected them to go over to the enemy, but realised that he himself could never join them in such a move, since he was one of the original Kwangsi men against whom the imperialists were especially severe. So he said to them in parting: "The present time is not one that will admit of my detaining you, if you have conceived any plans of your own." Their reply denied harboring any intentions of going over, but their actions gave the lie to their words. It was a part of their plot, which the Chungwang did not foresee, to slay the Muvang.

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They therefore entered into communications with General Ch’en looking to the surrender of the city of Soochow, and agreed to put the Muwang out of the way as a part of the compact—refusing to permit the Chungwang to suffer such a fate at their hands. The city was delivered over on December 6, 1863. The Nawang, who conducted the negotiations, was promised a military commission of the second grade.\footnote{Taiping T’ien-huo Yeh Shi, XIX, 6 f.}

When the wangs came out of the city to meet Li Hung-chang all these stipulations were disregarded and they were treacherously put to death. Since Gordon had been a witness to the terms of surrender he considered the execution of the surrendered wangs an unjustifiable act of treachery and became so angry at the governor that he set out with the Hysun and some troops to capture and shoot him. Fortunately Li Hung-chang could not be found, and after reflecting for a few weeks Gordon continued to serve.\footnote{This incident is one of the most celebrated in the story of Gordon’s career. Tseng Kuo-fan gave his unqualified approval to Li Hung-chang’s action, for he recorded in his diary: ‘‘Li Shao-ch’üan, when he killed the eight wangs who surrendered at Soochow, showed that his eye was clear and his hand heavy.’’ Excerpts from Diary, II, 38. Wilson, as noted above (note 46), believed that this was in consideration of the treachery by the wangs at Taitsung where his brother was captured. The story is given in detail by Boulger, Life of Sir Halliday Macartney, pp. 92-122. Hake, p. 303, gives Li’s and Ch’en’s reasons for the treachery. Li seems to have become frightened because of the great number of men who were to come over and because he was in arrears in his payment to the soldiers, and feared a mutiny unless his men were permitted to plunder. General Ch’en feared that the Nawang would supplant him in Li Hung-chang’s esteem. Morse, II, 100 f., practically agrees with Boulger, depending onfiles of}
chow towards Ch’angchow, in the capture of which, May 11, Gordon and his men played a leading part. At the same time the French were giving valuable aid in Chekiang, Hangchow falling before their assaults and those of Tso Tsung-tang’s men March 31, and, after the fall of Nanking, Huchow on August 18. But when this, the last action of the Franco-Chinese force took place, the “Ever Victorious Army” was no longer in existence, because it had been mustered out of service on May 31, 1864.

In attempting to estimate the place of the army in the suppression of the rebellion we must bear in mind how many important cities were captured through the brilliant strategy of the American, British, and French officers. Without their aid the campaign would doubtless have suffered delays, and difficulties and even dangers might have confronted the imperial cause which were thus obviated. The members were certainly better armed and better drilled than those of the purely Chinese forces cooperating with them. Their intervention added to that of foreign soldiers and sailors saved Shanghai from falling into Taiping hands and this in turn gave Li Hung-chang the revenues to pay his men. When we consider all the facts we cannot deny that their aid was most useful if not indeed vital.

Yet it would be rash to assert or assume that “Chinese” Gordon put down the Taiping Rebellion. He never

the North China Herald and proclamation of Li Hung-chang February 14, 1864. This incident, which shows Gordon to have been a man of honor, also shows him to have been saved with great difficulty from a fateful act which would have meant the destruction of his force and have placed him in the position of an outlaw. In none of the accounts, Chinese or foreign, have I found any confirmation of the statement that Gordon personally pledged his word that the lives of the wangs would be saved, though the terms of surrender certainly implied such a pledge from General Ch’en.

58 Journal North China Branch Royal Asiatic Society, December, 1864, p. 120.

59 Morse, II, chronology, XXV.
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commanded a force of more than three thousand men. He was always strengthened by large Chinese armies to whom a share of the praise is due for the victories which their absence might have turned into defeats. And above all, the less spectacular but no less important work of the vast forces placed by Tsêng Kuo-fan and his generals in Anhui, Kiangsi, and about the Heavenly Capital itself, was causing the Taipings increasing anxiety, while beyond, in Hupêh and Honan, were other forces preventing the Nien and Taipings from joining hands.

It seems fair, therefore, to accept very literally the estimate of the chief historian of this army,60 who, in quoting some of the eulogistic and even flattering accounts of Gordon’s work, says:

I have said so much against Colonel Gordon’s own wishes, because so much has been said on the subject and must be repeated here in order to explain the actual course of recent events in China; but when we come to look carefully at the sweeping statement that it was Colonel Gordon who put an end to the Tai-ping Rebellion, truth compels me to pause. Though perhaps, Li, Futai, in the dispatch quoted above, takes a good deal too much credit to himself for his share in the operations in Kiangsoo, yet there is no doubt that Gordon and his force, unaided, could not have cleared the province. While the brunt of the fighting fell on him, he required Imperialists to hold the places which he took; and their forces under General Ching and others, fought along with him so as greatly to contribute to his success. And it must be remembered, which is of far more importance, that it was the Imperialist victories of Tseng Kuo-fan and his generals which drove the Tai-pings into the seaboard districts of Kiangsoo and Chekiang. The Imperialists appear to have calculated upon the Allies preserving for them the cities of Shanghai and Ningpo. Had they not done so, they would probably have adopted a different course. Our countrymen, alarmed at the proximity of the Rebels to their

60 Wilson, pp. 257 ff.
rich trading settlements, seemed to have imagined that this betokened a general triumph of the Tai-ping cause in China, but nothing could have been further from the real state of the case. There is no doubt that, had the Tai-pings been allowed to take Shanghai and Ningpo, and so obtain Foreign steamers, arms, and recruits to almost an indefinite extent, they would have given an immense deal more trouble than they did to the Chinese Government; but to have allowed them to do so, would have been to ignore our own treaty obligations to that Government. Hence the Imperialists had a two-fold reason for making no great efforts to prevent the advance of the Rebels towards these two consular ports. They calculated that both our interests and our duty would lead us to hold these ports against the Tai-pings, and they calculated rightly. What they might have done in other circumstances is a matter of speculation; but it is quite clear, judged both by the situation and by the results, that their allowing the Tai-pings to advance as these did was no proof whatever of their inability to deal with the Rebellion in their own slow and systematic way.

Yet in another way the attitude of the Western powers was a decisive factor, for their determination to withhold recognition from the Taiping Government in 1853 and 1854 was of service to the imperial cause. Had one of the stamp of T’ienteh or Feng Yun-shan been in Nanking it is conceivable that recognition would have been accorded. In a negative way, then, we may grant that by leaving China alone to subdue her rebels, instead of aiding the Taipings, the cause of the Manchus had its chance to triumph, and the active aid rendered towards the end of the war made assurance doubly sure.