CHAPTER XI

THE CAPTURE OF ANKING AND REORGANISATION OF THE WAR

At the beginning of 1861 the Taipings were in a strong position. Four great armies were in the field, exclusive of the host led by Shi Ta-k'ai. The Yingwang was in Huipeh, the Chungwang in southern Anhui, where the Shiwang had just effected a junction with him at Huchow, and the two were threatening the imperialists at Anking. The Kanwang had gone to Hunan to recruit those who were coming to join the cause from Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Kweichow.\(^1\) They held the most of Kiangsu and were already intrenched in, or about to make inroads into, Chekiang and Fukien.

The loyalists were practically on the defensive. Tseng Kuo-fan was in Keemun, his brother, Kuo-chüan, outside the walls of Anking. Hu Lin-yi with the northern division of Hupeh troops faced the Yingwang near the Hupeh-Anhui border, and Tso Tsung-tang and Pao Ch'ao were not far from Kingtechen.\(^2\)

The last-named generals were able, during the early part of the year, to free northern Kiangsi once more, particularly the prefectures of Jaochow and Kinkiang. But in western Anhui the imperialists were defeated by

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\(^1\) Lindley, *Ti-Ping Tien-Kuo*, p. 326. Lindley was with the insurgents at this time and should have known their approximate disposition. See *Dispatches*, XII, 69 ff.

\(^2\) *Nien-p'au*, VI, last pages, and VII, 1.
the Yingwang at Hoshan, and this opened the way for him to go through Hupeh, taking the cities of Chi-shui, Hwangchow, Teian, and Shuihchow. In southeastern Kiangsi, likewise, many rebels were still at large. Tsêng, therefore, refused to permit Pao Ch'ao to go to Hupeh, but transferred him to Nanchang, where he could ward off the threat upon Fuchow and Kienehmg.\(^3\)

Tso Tsung-tang left his base, Kingtechen, to advance to Lop'ing, and the rebels moved up and captured Kingtechen on April 9. As yet ignorant of this loss, Tsêng on the tenth moved from Keemun to Hsiuning, whence his forces unsuccessfully launched an attack on Huihchow on April 16. Tsêng was in great peril now, for he held only the three district towns of Keemun, Ihsien, and Hsiuning, and was cut off from his supplies. On April 22 he again made a futile attempt to go forward.\(^4\) But Tso Tsung-tang soon managed to drive off the Shiwang and open the grain roads once more.\(^5\) The Taipings were evidently trying to distract the imperialists from the siege of Anking by attacking here and there at widely separated points, tactics intended to frighten their enemies but only annoying them.

The Yingwang was at this time returning from his raid into Hupeh, intending to attack the besieging army at Anking,\(^6\) which, notwithstanding the various attempted

\(^3\) Nichols', VII, 1; Dispatches, XIII, 31 (March 27).

\(^4\) Nichols', VII, 3b.

\(^5\) Nichols', VII, 3b, 4a; Dispatches, XIII, 36-44 (May 3).

\(^6\) Sir Harry Parkes believed that he was the instrument of turning the Yingwang from his contemplated attack on the Wuhan cities. Meeting him at Hwangchow soon after the capture of that city on February 18, he was informed that the Yingwang felt himself in a position either to draw imperialists off from Anking (he actually writes Nanking, but that may be a misprint or a slip of the pen) or move on Hankow. He added that the Yingwang expressed a little hesitation about attacking a place which the British had just opened up. Parkes says of this: "I commended his caution in this respect, and advised him not to think of moving upon Hankow,
diversions under the four wangs (and Shi Ta-k’ai, if he could still be reckoned as of their number), remained unshaken. Tsêng’s peculiar gift is shown under these difficulties. He had no brilliant strategy to oppose to the Chungwang, but he did keep his head and refuse to recall the besiegers from Anking, which was steadily weakening as he could see from the desperate attempts to draw its besiegers away. Possession of that place was as necessary for him as its loss was dreaded by the Taiping. He likewise realised that he must defend Kiangsi and the provinces of Hupeh and Hunan behind him—his sources of men, money, and munitions. If we are disposed to complain of the exasperating delays resulting from his stubborn adherence to a few fixed ideas and condemn the relative rigidity of his strategy, we must recall the fact that he did not command the resources of a strong central government, but was the victim of decentralisation and of the apathy or resistance of the established officials to his innovations. He cannot be judged by the standards of some other land or age, but by the conditions as he found them. And by these standards he towers above all the men of his day, imperialist and insurgent alike, in his ability to shoulder responsibility and go forward with

as it was impossible for the insurgents to occupy any emporium at which we were established without seriously interfering with our commerce, and it was necessary that their movements should be so ordered as not to clash with ours. In this principle he readily acquiesced and said that two of his leaders who had already pushed beyond Hwangchow should be directed to take a northerly or northwesterly course and go towards Ma-ching or Tihngan instead of towards Hankow.”

Whether this acquiescence resulted from politeness or from policy is a point capable of dispute. Parkes adds that the Yingwang suggested joint occupation, he taking Hanyang and the British Hankow and Wuchang. Hanyang with its high hill dominates the other two places, at least in modern warfare, and one can scarcely believe that there was much delicacy of feeling with regard to British commerce, though there might have been fear of the British themselves. Life of Sir Harry Parkes, I, 430 ff. (from a letter to his wife).
unflinching determination and stubborn will to final victory.

He even increased the danger in which he stood, when, late in April, he ordered Pao Ch’ao to hasten to the relief of Tolunga in the region of T’ungeh’en and Hwaining, outposts of Anking. Early in May he set out with a few hundred guards for the outskirts of Anking, leaving behind him Chang Yun-lan to attack Hsiuning, and Chu P’in-lung to guard Keemun. While he was with Pao Ch’ao’s army at Tunglin, the Yingwang made an attack on the imperialists outside Anking, but was repulsed by Yang Tsai-fu from the river, Tolunga in the outposts, and Tsêng Kuo-ch’üan outside the city walls.

At the same time Tso Tsung-tang, advancing from Kingtechen, had driven the rebels under the command of the Shiwang through Kwanghsin into Chekiang, where they captured Kinshwa, an important prefectural city almost due south from Hangchow. To offset this the Chungwang, early in June, started from his base at Juichow, ravished a number of districts in Kiangsi and went on over the border into Hupeh, where he carried destruction over the countryside in the districts of Hsingkuo, Tayeh, Tungshan, and Ts‘ungyang, whither the governor, Hu Lin-yi, was compelled to send a force against him. Other activities of the rebels were easily checked.

All the efforts of the Taiping wangs to divert the imperialists from the siege of Anking failed, and Tsêng Kuo-ch’üan persistently increased the severity of the pressure on them. He knew through intercepted letters that the plight of the defenders was serious. They were almost out of provisions, and a final struggle must soon take place unless swift relief should come to them. The siege might have ended earlier, had it not been for the

7 Niên p'u, VII, 6a; Dispatches, XIII, 68.
8 Dispatches, XIII, 68.
aid the insurgents received from the foreign steamers which were now coming regularly up the river. By the eighth of July the outer defences of the city had all been reduced, whilst Tso Tsung-tang in Kiangsi, Pao Ch’ao to the south, and Hu Lin-yi to the west, were barring the way to the forces of the Shiwang, the Chungwang, and the Yingwang.¹⁰

An imperial mandate, in answer to appeals from Chekiang, ordered Tso Tsung-tang to Chekiang, but Tseng ventured to disregard it, arguing that the rebels from Chekiang who had returned to the Poyang region of Kiangsi were being held in check by General Tso alone. At this critical stage in the siege of Anking, Tso’s removal would destroy the most vital point in the structure of defence. He could not spare men because he and Chang Yun-lan were left alone to take responsibility for the whole area from Jaoehow eastward through Keemun to Huichow, Anhui, and southeastward to Kwanghsin. The moment he parted with any of his all too meager forces he would lack the strength to defend this supremely strategic area. On the same day, for similar reasons he set aside another mandate calling for the transfer of P’eng Yu-Jing to Kwangtung as provincial judge.¹¹

In a last desperate effort to save Anking the Chungwang marched to Nanchang, hoping to draw men away from Anking through fear of losing Kiangsi’s capital. One of the complacent censors now gave the Chungwang aid by reciting the points of danger in Kiangsi, actual or threatened, and urging that Tseng he compelled to take suitable steps to defend that province. It became necessary for Tseng to send in a counter memorial in which he detailed the various rebel invasions and the steps he had taken to counter them. The censorship had

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⁹ Home Letters, June 2 and 4, 1861. ¹⁰ Nic enquiry, VII, 7b, 8a.
¹¹ Nic enquiry, VII, 8; Dispatches, XIII, 72-75.
points of usefulness, but in delicate and dangerous situations like these their childishness and misunderstanding did more harm by far than good. By good fortune the Chungwang, during August, moved to Shuichow, and Pao Ch’ao went to attack him. The Chungwang was pursued as far as Fengch’eng and there met defeat in battle August 29, making it necessary to retreat to Fuchow, and from thence out of the province.

This was the final attempt to relieve Anking, which fell, after nearly two years of siege, September 5, 1861. The same evening Tseng wrote to his brother:

Koh Shing has arrived and I have received the joyous message and learned that today at the Mao hour (5-7 a.m.) Anking was re-taken. Opportunity it happens that the sun and moon rise together and the five planets are strung together. The Board of Astronomy memorialised the Throne in the fifth moon that it portended unusual fortune. Anking’s capture duly fulfills this. There is probable hope for the nation’s renewal. Just now the silver at hand does not amount to quite six thousand taels. I should like to distribute ten thousand taels in rewards to the officers and men. Can my brother find some way to arrange for the needed four thousand there?

Two days later T’ungleh’eng was captured by Tolunga, and on the ninth Ch’iehchow by Yang Tsai-fu’s water forces. Hupeh and Kiangsi were now quickly pacified and the retreating rebels were thrown back into the three provinces they controlled, Anhui, Kiangsu, and Chekiang. To those captured at Anking and T’ungleh’eng death was meted out, some twenty thousand being massacred at Anking and half that number at T’ungleh’eng.

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12 Dispatches, XIV, 1-4.  
13 Nienp’u, VII, 9b, 11a.  
14 Home Letters, September 5, 1861. The Chinese always regarded the grouping of sun, moon and the five planets as a fortunate omen, and noted such occurrences in their annals and histories.  
15 Nienp’u, VII, 10; Dispatches, XIV, 18 ff.  
16 Ta Shih Chi, II, 6a.
The exultation with which the capture of Anking filled Tsêng’s heart was offset by news of the death of Hu Lin-yi, governor of Hupeh and Tsêng’s faithful friend and powerful support in the trials of the past seven years. He had depended in no small measure on the eminent services and wise counsels of this able man, whom some rank as Tsêng’s equal in all respects. During the same month the emperor also passed away.

Many were the honors distributed among the successful leaders about Anking. Li Shou-i received appointment to the governorship of Hupeh in place of Hu Lin-yi, and P’eng Yu-ling became governor of Anhui. Pao Ch’ao, originally of the military service, now received a full generalship. Chang Yun-lan was appointed provincial judge in Fukien, but was eventually permitted to remain with Tsêng, who could ill spare him. To Tsêng himself was awarded the title “Junior Guardian of the Heir Apparent.” Kuo-ch’üan was given the title of provincial judge with rank as provincial treasurer, and the right to wear a yellow jacket. Their younger brother was promoted to the rank of a magistrate in an independent subprefecture without examination and the right to wear a one-eyed peacock feather. The brother who had fallen at San-Ho was granted the rare honor, for one so young, of a posthumous name, Chung-lich.17

Anking now became the base of operations for the imperialists and the headquarters of Tsêng Kuo-fan. Five great strategic centers remained in Taiping hands: Wuhu and Nanking along the Yangtse, Lüchow in central Anhui north of Anking, Ningk’ou to the south of Nanking and a key to that city as well as to the province of Chekiang, and Soochow, the capital of Kiangsu.18

Not long after the fall of Anking, Tsêng Kuo-ch’üan

17 *Nüen-p’u*, VII, 11b, 12.
18 *Dispatches*, XIV, 9-11 (August 23, 1861).
with about twenty thousand men started down the river in the direction of Nanking, but feeling that he was not strong enough to take that great Taiping center, he returned to Anking, where he secured permission to return to Hunan to recruit an additional six thousand men. During his absence on this errand the redoubtable Chung-wang again made a raid in Chekiang in October and managed to extend the insurgent power by the capture of the important cities of Shaohsiing and Chuchoow. The danger of again losing Hangchow was very great. Indeed, this entire region was a source of supplies of grain to the imperial side which they could ill afford to lose and Tsêng was moved at once to send Tso Tsung-tang to Chekiang.\footnote{Nieup’u, VII, 14b.}

The unchecked ravages of the Chungwang became so alarming to the people of Chekiang and Kiangsu that a delegation from the officials and gentry of Shanghai arrived in Anking by steamer on November 18, 1861, “begging with tears” that the viceroy send them aid. They reasoned that Kiangsu had abundance of man power in their militia, that weapons and boats were available, and that internal communication by the numberless waterways was particularly good. There was imminent danger of losing it all, for at the moment only three important cities in that region were still in imperialist hands, Chinkiang and Shanghai in Kiangsu, and Huchow in northern Chekiang.

Tsêng told them that an immediate campaign was an impossibility there, but that in the spring of 1862 Li Hung-chang, whom he had already recommended as governor of the province of Kiangsu, would be ready with the army he was recruiting and training in Anhui, and would probably be sent to their aid.\footnote{Ibid., VII, 15a.} Through the necessities brought about by these new complications, Tsêng eventually adopted the plan of establishing three military
areas, in which the objective should be to surround the rebels on all sides and gradually close in on Nanking, which should be besieged by his brother, Kuo-ch'üan. These three areas were Chekiang under Tso Tsung-tang, Kiangsu under Li Hung-chang, operating from Shanghai with Soochow as his objective, and eastern Kiangsi and Anhui under his own command. Tso Tsung-tang had already set out for Chekiang.

Meanwhile, on November 20, Tseng received an imperial mandate conferring on him the supreme military command of the four provinces Kiangsu, Anhui, Kiangsi, and Chekiang, whose governors and other officials must obey his orders. Tso Tsung-tang was to hasten to Chekiang. In the modest disclaimer required by etiquette, Tseng pointed out that his apparent successes at Anking had been due in large measure to the aid received from Hu Lin-yi and Toluoga, and that at the present moment he was far from being able to send the needed forces to Shanghai, and was in no manner fit to assume the supreme direction of operations in four provinces. He prayed that Tso Tsung-tang be granted full power in Chekiang.

While this message was being written, affairs were going from bad to worse in the last-named province. The Chungwang and the Shiwang were both there, and there is reason to believe that they had foreign officers in their employ who may have had something to do with conspicuous successes, as they probably did with the adoption by the Chungwang in the following year of foreign rifles which wrought such havoc to the armies of the younger General Tseng at Nanking. They captured Tai-

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21 Tseng Kuo-ch'üan had had the chance to go to Shanghai, but preferred to be stationed at Nanking.
22 Dispatches, XIV, 59-63.
23 Taiping T'ien-kuo Yeh Shi, XIII, 13.
24 A letter of Tseng to his brother, June 5, 1861, mentions the fact that Lo Tu-kang had three "foreign devils" with him and that now the Chung-
chow and went on to Hangchow, the capital, which fell before them on December 29, 1861. Their armies also went to the important city of Ningkou, which they held for a time until they were driven back to Chekiang early in 1862. Tso Tung-tang received the definitive appointment as governor of Chekiang, but the emperor still insisted that Tseng should accept the control of the four provinces, which, however, Tseng was very unwilling to do because of the jealousies that would undoubtedly be engendered by so great a departure from the general practice.25

On the civil side Tseng gave himself to the pleasant task of repairing the provincial academy and restoring the examinations. He also reorganised the provincial revenues by reassessing the fields, separating those of poorer grade from the others, and levying a war tax of 400 cash per mou on the better grades. He also set up a factory for manufacturing munitions of war.26

The officials and gentry of Shanghai were considering the employment of foreign soldiers to help recover interior points. Tseng, on being questioned, first by the gentry and then by the imperial court, expressed his view that justification might be found for employing foreigners at Shanghai and Ningpo, since these were treaty ports where foreigners might be regarded in a sense as defending their own interests. At Soochow, Ch'angchow, and Nanking, interior cities, the case was different. If in those

25 Nieh P'u, VII, 19b, VIII, 1. The province of Chekiang was in the jurisdiction of the viceroy of Min-Che, who also governed Fukien. From a military standpoint it was undoubtedly wiser for Tseng to have this province under control, but it would at once make him more powerful than any other viceroy had ever been.

places the Chinese should bring in foreign aid and be defeated they would become a laughing-stock to the world; if, on the contrary, they should be victorious one could not foretell what complications or disputes might arise. Even in the case of the treaty ports a careful understanding must be reached beforehand.

In February, 1862, the matter again came to Tsêng’s attention when word reached him that the authorities at Shanghai had arranged with England and France for the defence of Shanghai, with the probability that the foreign soldiers would later be used to retake Soochow. This fait accompli did not remove the uneasiness from Tsêng’s mind, because, as he made clear to the emperor, unless such foreign soldiers were inclined to virtue they might become a danger within the state, not content after the war to disband quietly with the gratitude of those whom they had delivered, but insisting on staying to seize a share in China’s inheritance.\(^25\)

Still again the question was raised when the gentry of Kiangsu and Chekiang sent a delegation to Peking to urge that the proffered aid from the British and French be accepted. The foreign ministers had similarly received petitions from their nationals asking that the neutrality heretofore observed give place to a policy of direct intervention. The imperial thought wavered between suspicion of the foreign motives and inclination to grant the petitions of the gentry in the distracted provinces. The opinion of Tsêng Kuo-fan and Tuhsingtu was desired after they should have made an investigation of the facts in the case.

For the third time Tsêng took exactly the same ground he had previously taken. If foreign soldiers, with comparatively slight Chinese aid, were now to drive out the rebels from those provinces, the guest-soldiers, outnum-

\(^25\) *Ibid.*, VIII, 3b, 4; *Dispatches*, XV, 19, 20 (March 11).
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bering their hosts, could work their will in the land. The forces of Tolunga, Pao Ch’ao, and Tsêng Kuo-ch’üan above Nanking, and the newly recruited army of Li Hwang-chang which was about to be sent to Shanghai, could not spare the necessary men to organise a sufficient Chinese force to coöperate with the foreigners in the immediate attack on Soochow, Ch’angchow, and Nanking. The Chinese would therefore be placed in the plight of a man who could do nothing but write polite notes and must hire a champion to go out and fight his battles. Only in this case it would be worse, for they would neither be able to write the notes or to fight, and could simply become a laughing-stock far and near. Since the enemy on their part were also hesitating whether to use foreigners in any numbers—although it was believed that the Taiping pretender, Hung Siu-ch’üan, hated them—prudence would dictate that the imperial government should likewise be careful in the matter, and make temporising replies, neither refusing nor accepting the foreign help, but continuing the conversations while they pressed on. For the moment the Tsungli Yamen might intimate that Tsêng had too few men to permit of his detaching any to coöperate with the foreigners, but after the campaign against Wuhu and the Two Pillars their aid might be invoked.²⁹

We must not infer from these several messages of ill-concealed opposition to the policy of employing foreigners under any circumstances that Tsêng had no interest in the province of Kiangsu, or that he underrated the importance of Shanghai. In many of his letters home he mentions the place and his great anxiety over keeping it from falling into the power of the enemy. As early as November 4, 1861, he mentions it. About the middle of

²⁸ The Two Pillars were two important hills on each side of the river above Nanking.

²⁹ Dispatches, XV, 64-66.
December he indicates that he may possibly send his brother, Kuo-ch’üan, to Shanghai because of its great strategic and economic value through its trade relations with Soochow, Hangechow, and foreign lands. It is not quite clear, but there are some indications, that he actually offered the place to his brother, who preferred to go on to Nanking. At any rate, within the next ten weeks he had secured Li Hung-chang’s consent to go there, and had promised to supplement his Anhui recruits with General Ch’en Hsueh-ch’i—who had once been in the rebel ranks—and a thousand men, supplemented by five thousand of the Hunan water forces.

On the twenty-second of February Li Hung-chang came to Anking with his new Anhui force. He proceeded to organise them on the model of Tsêng’s Hunan army, following similar rules. Tsêng detailed several ying of his own command to help train these new men. At the end of March eight thousand of the Anhui force were ready to go down the river. So urgent was the call for them that the original purpose of having Tsêng Kuo-ch’üan and Li Hung-chang fight their way down the river was abandoned, and seven steamers were chartered at a cost of 180,000 taels, which the Shanghai gentry secured. During the month of April the entire body was carried down in three trips.\(^{30}\) On April 25 Li received the formal appointment, long expected, of acting governor of Kiangsu.\(^{31}\)

The points of chief military activity were now along the Yangtsze below Anking, where Tsêng Kuo-ch’üan was slowly making his way with a force of twenty thousand men, accompanied by his brother, Chen-kan, with about five thousand, and P’eng Yu-ling, who commanded the fleet. In Chekiang, Tso Tsung-tang was commencing his

\(^{30}\) *Nieuw’s*, VIII, 8 ff.; *Home Letters*, April 1 and 2, 1862.

\(^{31}\) *Home Letters*, May 9, 1862.
operations. In central Anhui, about Lüchow, Tolunga and Li Shou-i had the difficult task of preventing the Taiping and Nien rebels from coming together. South of Nanking Pao Ch’ao was attacking Ningkuo, and the southern portion of Anhui was held by the army of Chang Yui-lan, who, in possession of Huichow, had command of the roads leading into Chekiang. Independent of Tsêng, but operating heartily with him, were Tuhsinga with Kiangpei regulars, Yuan Chia-san, and Li Shi-chung along the upper Hwai River in Anhui; also an independent detachment at Chinkiang.

On May 13, 1862, Lüchow was captured by Tolunga after having been stoutly defended for a long time by the Yingwang. The rebels fled to Shouchow, followed by Tolunga. Shouchow then succumbed, and Miao P’ei-lin treacherously delivered up the Yingwang to Sheng Pao. He was put to death by Tolunga in the presence of the army. This victory greatly simplified the task of concentrating on the chief objective points, Nanking and the cities of southern Anhui, Chekiang, and Kiangsu. Nevertheless, when the war was thus apparently localised, there came a call for help from far-away Shensi, which robbed the imperialists of Tolunga’s valuable coöperation. He did manage to leave a garrison of five thousand men at Lüchow.

The imperial cause now prospered at all points except Huchow in northern Chekiang. Tsêng Kuo-ch’üan continued to work his way down the river, capturing all the towns along the way, and he arrived on May 31 before the walls of Nanking, where he pitched his tents at Yu-lhwat’ai. Yangchow on the Grand Canal fell to Tuhsinga,

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22 Nieh p’u, VIII, 4-8, passim. 23 Nieh p’u, VIII, 10b.
24 Ibid., VII, 13b; Chungwang, Autobiography, p. 49.
25 Nieh p’u, VIII, 12b.
26 Ibid., VIII, 11a; Dispatches, XVI, 9-12.
thus pacifying northern Kiangsu. In Chekiang Taichow was retaken. With foreign aid Ningpo was also captured.

Nothing seemed more probable than the speedy end of the war. But Tseng Kuo-fan, having slowly and with the greatest difficulty brought these forces to concentrate on Nanking, was unwilling to risk everything on a single throw. If he gathered all his available men before Nanking the rebels outside might once more scatter out and make it necessary to do the work all over again. He therefore adopted an "anaconda policy," gradually closing in on the rebels from three directions as described above, while his brother at Nanking slowly strangled that city.

57 Nienp'u, VIII, 12a. 38 Ibid., VIII, 12.