Chapter VIII

March—June 1925

Chamberlain’s enthusiasm regarding German proposal—Review of alternative policies before England—Ex-Chancellor Wirth discusses the situation—Brandenburg’s History of pre-War negotiations—Briand’s draft reply to German initiative—Germany’s readiness to abolish chemical warfare—Mussolini’s clear views.

Early in 1925, the departmental experts of the Foreign Office engaged in a protracted study of this question of French Security and, under Mr. Chamberlain’s direction, a Memorandum formulating their conclusions was written by the Central European Department and circulated to the Cabinet. This Memorandum, which was dated February 20, urged the conclusion between Great Britain and France of a unilateral defensive pact. Apparently the German proposal of January for a Reciprocal Pact of Guarantee between Germany and the principal Allied Powers was to be discarded. The Foreign Secretary’s views, however, failed to secure the approval of a considerable number of his colleagues in the Cabinet, including some of the most influential members. What occurred at the Cabinet cannot be known precisely, but rumour at the time attributed definite opposition to the proposal of the unilateral defensive pact to some of the ablest members of the Government, including Balfour, Birkenhead, Curzon and Churchill. Curzon also created some surprise by declaring his opposition to the proposal. The main argument adduced by opponents of the scheme was that the unilateral pact with France against Germany would throw that country into the arms of Russia. It was further desired to proceed with the negotiations for the conclusion of a wider Mutual Pact of Guarantee on the basis of the German effort of January. Chamberlain bowed to the majority. Two days later, namely, on March 6, he stopped in Paris for twenty-four hours on his way to attend the session of the League Council. He then explained to Herriot the decision of the British Cabinet to reject both the Geneva protocol and the proposal for an Anglo-French alliance against Germany. At Geneva on March 9 Chamberlain, in an able speech, expounded the reasons which had determined the decision of the British Government to reject the Geneva Protocol.
But when the English Government had been won over to the idea of a bilateral pact, it was found that the German Government were inclined to recede from their original proposal, made six weeks earlier. They had found little encouragement abroad—none at home. The Nationalists were violently opposed to the concessions, which constituted an essential part of the suggested transaction, and, to set against their vehement opposition, there was nothing but lukewarm support from the Left. It seemed probable that 1925 would share the fate of 1922.

**BERLIN, March 23, 1925.**—Chamberlain has now adopted, with enthusiasm, the German proposal, and declares it may be the dawn of a new era in European pacification. I am convinced that we can bring this policy through to a successful issue, provided we are firm, and allow no doubt to exist in the minds of other Powers as to our exclusive adherence to a Reciprocal Pact and our definite opposition to the Protocol and to a unilateral pact against Germany. Public opinion in France will eventually come round to see the benefit of this policy, provided there is no hesitation in our advocacy of it. If France could get some anti-German form of Security she would prefer it—let her realise clearly that such a scheme will have no chance of English support, she will rally to the Reciprocal Pact and gain security by it.

Of the rival merits of the two schemes there can be no question: one may be the dawn of a new day, the other the certain prolongation of a night of strife and bitterness. Stresemann, who at first was discouraged by the cold reception of his proposals both abroad and at home, in view of Chamberlain’s new support, will soon recover his equanimity, and will push the negotiation with full vigour. The doubt is whether public opinion here will follow.

**BERLIN, March 26, 1925.**—Discussion now centres on the Polish frontier. There is an idea in London that the German proposals for security on the West are only made with a view to rendering the position more favourable
for war in the East. There is no foundation for this suspicion, but it is essential that the German Government should go farther than it has done regarding good relations with Poland and security on the Polish frontier.

Berlin, April 2, 1925.—Public opinion in England is growing more favourable to the Pact of Mutual Security. Grey made a most excellent speech at the League of Nations meeting the other night, unreservedly accepting the policy of Reciprocal Guarantee. Ramsay MacDonald has also spoken wisely.
Both in Paris and Geneva the British Government has been firm. The German offer must be treated seriously, only on such a basis can England offer guarantees for French security.
Chamberlain’s assurances on this subject are received, even by those who dislike them, with complete confidence, both in their sincerity and their finality.
The first condition of progress is that the French Government should show clearly a disposition to give friendly consideration to the German initiative, and that they are genuinely desirous of finding a basis for improved relationship between Germany and the Allies. Once their readiness to treat is realised opinion here will respond. At present it is sceptical and suspicious.
There is another point on which there may be acrimonious discussion. France and England will probably insist that Germany must enter the League of Nations before there can be any question of a Reciprocal Pact of Security. While I admit the desirability of Germany entering the League, I should not make it a pre-condition. If a satisfactory solution of the Pact is obtained, Germany cannot but gravitate to Geneva.
On all sides I hear that Chamberlain is working energetically, both to obtain a friendly response from Paris to the German overture, and a friendly reception in Berlin to
the French reply. In Paris, he can do more than anyone. In Berlin, I may be able to render assistance.

BERLIN, May 2, 1925.—There is one certain advantage in the German Pact proposal of January 20—it brings matters to a clear issue. We have to decide between two policies: either we adopt the French idea guaranteeing the French frontier alone, and treating Germany as a permanent enemy, or we accept the alternative policy and bring Germany into the Western combination, guaranteeing her frontiers equally with those of France.

I have long since made up my mind, and my conclusion is strengthened by the arguments used in London in favour of the former.

A remarkable document has been recently published in London purporting to be the official view of the position. This document, which is drawn up with extreme literary skill, adduces what are considered valid arguments in favour of the policy. To me, these arguments, however ingenious, appear conclusive against the course they are designed to support.

The contention is as follows:

1. It is doubtful whether even in 1914 Germany would have risked the Great War had she known for certain that the British Empire would have come to France’s assistance. If she is now assured that by invading France she will inevitably incur the hostility of the British Empire, it is most unlikely that she will make any such endeavour.

2. France will know that her ultimate security is regarded as of direct interest to the British Empire. The provocative policy inspired by her present uncertainty will tend to diminish; she will contemplate with less alarm the impending evacuation of the Rhineland; she will be less inclined to constitute the Little Entente as an armed camp to the east of Germany; she will be able to settle down to financial stabilisation and to a policy of debt repayment.
3. The smaller countries in Europe will learn that they must make peace with their neighbours, and that it is not sound policy to wait in uneasy expectancy for a second European conflagration.

4. A nucleus of certainty, of stability and of security will thereby be created. Such a nucleus can gradually be enlarged in expanding circles. There is nothing to prevent the eventual inclusion of Germany within the guarantees of security thus established.

5. Although in the present mood of Europe it would be useless even to mention the revision of the peace treaties, yet if the concert of Europe can thus gradually be recreated, saner councils will prevail. It is conceivable, especially if Germany, with French goodwill, becomes a member of the League of Nations and obtains a permanent seat on the Council, that it may become possible eventually to revise by European agreement the dangerous conditions involved in the Silesian settlement and the Polish Corridor. So far the Memorandum.

Against these arguments I contend that on the lines suggested in the Memorandum no pacification is possible. Germany would be permanently antagonised and driven unwillingly into co-operation with Russia. Military power, being now entirely on the side of France with her satellites, the danger of military bullying by the stronger combination is far greater than the danger of any aggression by Germany.

The theory that France, when guaranteed English support, and strong in her chain of Central European Allies, will be more friendly to England than to-day is erroneous. The main strength of the movement in France for maintaining a close alliance with England proceeds from apprehension of the strength of Germany. Remove this apprehension and we risk losing an ally.

The idea that an anti-German league can gradually be enlarged to include Germany is frankly absurd. Still
more absurd is it to suppose that a combination led by France, and sure of military predominance, will revise the peace treaties in such a way as to make them more lenient. This is contrary to reasonable expectation. The conception that our authority with France, once we are bound to her by a Unilateral Pact, would be stronger than to-day—when we are masters of our own soul—is profoundly untrue. Once we are tied by such an obligation, we become satellitic—deprived of independence and authority.

The Memorandum, as published, leaves out certain vital points, e.g.—

(1) Guarantee of Security to both France and Germany.
(2) Measures necessary to obliterate war mentality and to bring about pacification.

Berlin, May 3, 1925.—On my return here I find the German Government loyal to the proposal of a Pact of Mutual Security: loyal but not enthusiastic. There appears to be a majority in favour of it, but this majority is silent, while opponents are extremely vocal. Stresemann is the object of violent abuse from the extreme Nationalists, and is certainly apprehensive about the coming debates. The Security Pact is, indeed, not a strong indigenous plant, which will survive rough treatment. It is rather an exotic—of great value and beauty, which has to be nursed with skill and care, possessing no assured tenure of life. Regarding the League of Nations, I have made it quite clear that Germany’s entry into the League is a sine qua non of the Pact. This I have done on specific instructions rather unwillingly. The Russians continue to make the most desperate efforts to prevent Germany joining the League.

Herr Friedrich Ebert, First President of the Reich, died on February 28, 1925, following an operation for appendicitis. The election for a successor was fixed for March 29, the method
GENERAL VON HINDENBURG
President of the German Republic
of election being that all electors for the Reichstag are entitled
to vote by secret ballots, and that an absolute majority is decisive.
Should no such majority be obtained at the first ballot, a second
ballot is held a month later. At this second ballot, a relative
majority is sufficient for a decision. There were no fewer than
sixty-seven candidates to Presidential honours. Dr. Marx, ex-
Chancellor and leader of the Catholic Centre, was put forward in
the first instance as a joint candidate by the Republican parties.
The Social Democrats, however, demurred, and designated Dr.
Braun, the Prussian Minister-President. Similarly, parties of
the Right endeavoured to put forward an agreed Bourgeois
candidate in the person of Dr. Simons, the President of the
Leipzig Supreme Court, and, later, of the Reichswehr Minister,
Dr. Gessler. Dr. Marx and Dr. Stresemann, however, op-
posed the latter nomination on account of foreign, especially
French, opinion. Thereupon, the Nationalists and People's
Party fell back on Dr. Jarres. Further dissensions broke
out among the parties, with the result that, in the end, each
party selected its own candidate. These included: for the
extreme Right, General von Ludendorff; for the Bavarian
People's Party, Dr. Held; for the Centre, Dr. Marx; for
the Democrats, Dr. Helfferich; for the Communists, Herr
Thaelmann.

At the first ballot, Dr. Jarres obtained 11 million votes and
Dr. Braun 8 million votes, Ludendorff being at the bottom with
210,000 votes only. As the outcome of the first ballot, the
Social Democrats agreed to support Marx if the other Republican
Parties would support Braun as Prime Minister of Prussia.
As against Marx, the Nationalists, the People's Party, the
Bavarian People's Party and other minor groups put forward the
candidature of Field-Marshal von Hindenburg.

Von Hindenburg triumphed at the second ballot with
14,639,000 votes as against 13,752,000 for Marx.

Berlin, May 4, 1925.—A conversation with ex-Chancellor
Wirth to-day.
He was obviously depressed at the defeat of his colleague,
Marx, for the Chancellorship, and apprehensive of the
reaction Hindenburg's election might have on foreign
policy during the immediate future. As far as he was able
to foresee, Briand, for whose ability he has the highest
regard, would be in no hurry to promote discussion of the
Pact of Mutual Security. In all probability the promised Note on disarmament would be transmitted here, and this problem would have to be dealt with first. The three important questions—the evacuation of Cologne, entry into the League, and the Security Pact—presented formidable difficulties, and although he agreed that the best solution would be simultaneous settlement of these three questions, he was of opinion that the task was one of extraordinary magnitude. Without energetic leadership on the part of England he failed to see any prospect of a comprehensive settlement.

As regards the disarmament question he foresaw that Stresemann’s position would be anything but enviable when the Allied demands were presented. He had had ample experience with the French in 1922 in the course of his numerous interviews with General Nollet, who, whatever his reputation might be abroad, was a very bitter adversary during the discussion of military questions in Germany.

The problem of the “Sicherheitspolizei” presented the greatest difficulty. In the course of his conversation with Nollet the latter remained deaf to every argument for the retention of police in barracks, or the existence of any organised formation which might be utilised as a military force. Nollet refused to admit the necessity of a police force to suppress Communism, and held that the Reichswehr were always available in the case of Communist disturbances. Wirth insisted that his experience during the Communist troubles in 1920 convinced him that the police were indispensable, and that the use of soldiers to suppress civilian disorder was quite out of the question. The German Nationals were not elated by Hindenburg’s election. They realised the difficulties of their position both in regard to the question of disarmament and the evacuation of Cologne. On the other hand, they were anxious to see the pact negotiations die of inanition. He
did not think that Tirpitz would be able to influence the President, nor indeed that anybody would be likely to influence him, as he was aloof from the political problems of the day.

With regard to entry into the League of Nations, Wirth was manifestly opposed to entry before the Security Pact was reached. The reasons he gave were not very convincing, and I could not help thinking that his recent visits to Russia had exercised some influence on his judgment. He was of opinion that things were progressive in Russia, though progress was slow owing to lack of foreign capital. It is clear that the entry of Germany into the League of Nations will have a decisive influence on relations between Moscow and Berlin.

Berlin, May 4, 1925.—While the majority are tepidly in favour of the Pact of Mutual Security, it suffers from the fact that its supporters are mute. A friendly attitude on the part of the Allies is therefore of dominant importance, not only because they have to agree to the Pact, but because it will not survive in Germany, unless it receives encouragement. I find it difficult to get this idea accepted in Western Europe. There the view persists that the whole scheme is a crafty device of some Teuton Machiavelli.

The Russians continue to make desperate efforts to prevent Germany from joining the League. They have persuaded Brockdorff-Rantzau—the German Ambassador at Moscow—to come specially to Berlin in order to urge their views on the question.

Berlin, May 8, 1925.—Brandenburg on the History of Pre-war German Diplomacy is a masterly work.1 When he first began the study of the documents he was inclined to

1 This book, entitled Von Bismarck zum Weltkriege, is published in English by the Clarendon Press under the title From Bismarck to the World War.
regard England as the villain of the piece, but a closer examination of the facts has brought him round to an entirely different conclusion. The book deserves close study.

Berlin, May 8, 1925.—The question arises: What effect will the election of Hindenburg as President have upon foreign affairs? Is it the case that the policy of pacification which has been followed by the Luther-Stresemann Government will be abandoned? This was the first expectation of pessimists, but it has passed away rapidly, and the best judges now believe that the German offer of a Pact of Peace, which was made to France on February 9, will be maintained. If it is maintained, the presence of Hindenburg as head of the Government will give additional weight to the engagement. Not only Wilhelmstrasse officials but German politicians are loud in their complaint that the initiative of February 9 has not met with adequate response from France. England, after a period of hesitation, has responded cordially to the German initiative. Chamberlain's speech of March 5 leaves nothing to be desired.

Personally, I regard the French hesitation as due mainly to party tactics, but delay is dangerous. The attitude of the German Nationals towards the Security Pact is momentarily more favourable than is their normal attitude. They are certain to revert.

Berlin, May 25, 1925.—Briand has given a further elucidation regarding his draft reply, and my impression of this is not less favourable than was my opinion of the original draft. I am becoming hopeful about these negotiations, provided they are brought to an issue in the course of the next two or three months. Delay may be fatal. To possess maximum validity the Pact should be approved by a
Ministry containing Nationalist Ministers. Further, it should be countersigned by Hindenburg, whose word is binding on all sections. This can be achieved now—many good judges think it may not be attainable later; the Nationals are not always wise.

At the military Sub-Commission of the Conference on Traffic-in-Arms held at Geneva, the German delegate, on May 26, 1925, made the following declaration:

"Germany is ready to endorse, without any reserve whatsoever, any international agreement aiming at the abolition of chemical warfare. In making this declaration I feel I am giving a satisfactory answer regarding a solemn obligation on the part of Germany not to have recourse to chemical warfare."

On May 27, the Minister of the Reichswehr, Dr. Gessler, made the following declaration in the Reichstag:

"Germany has proposed at Geneva that the use of poisoned gas, this peculiarly inhuman and unchivalrous method of waging war, should be abolished. At the same time, so long as that is not the case, we must prepare all the necessary means of defence available."

Berlin, June 1, 1925.—It was stated before the Reichstag that Germany is prepared, without any reserve whatsoever, to endorse an international agreement to abolish chemical warfare. I am convinced that it is expedient to take every possible advantage of the declarations made both by the German delegate at Geneva and by Dr. Gessler before the Reichstag.

This spontaneous offer of Germany is an opportunity which should not be lost to abolish for ever this method of warfare. In my view, enough has not been made of the German declaration. The opening should not be missed.

Berlin, June 2, 1925.—Germany would, I believe, join the League of Nations at once were it not for fear of breaking with Russia. Brockdorff-Rantzau, the German
Ambassador at Moscow, is too much with us and too influential.

Regarding the Pact, the Italian Ambassador, Bosdari, who has considerable influence, remains pessimistic; he regards the entire scheme as idealistic.

In his judgment the whole conception of a Mutual Security Pact is pure nonsense.

Berlin, June 3, 1925.—The development of the negotiations regarding Security follows a course which, if not rapid, is essentially satisfactory. Not much to complain of in Briand’s original draft reply to the German Note of February 9, except that it comes somewhat late, and that it will not be communicated to the German Government until after the Note on Disarmament. This may upset opinion here and so spoil the chance of a good reception of the Pact.

In large sections of German opinion, the desire for a Security Pact is not sufficiently sturdy to stand rough treatment. For this reason I should have preferred sending the Security Note either at the same time as the Disarmament Note or previous to it. It would have been wise to sweeten the bitterness of the Disarmament demands by an admixture of Security.

While as a whole the German Ministry remains favourable to the Pact of Mutual Security, the National Members are afraid of being abandoned by their followers, while the Socialists grudge a Government of the Right the credit of carrying through Security, which Socialists have always advocated, and which the Right has always opposed. The reserve made by the English Government that our guarantee should only cover the western frontiers of Germany, and not the eastern, is evidently wise and sound. I am just doubtful whether, instead of formulating this reserve, it would not have been better to let Briand send his Note, and to let our reserves come somewhat later.
There was no danger in our being compromised, and there would have been a decided advantage in getting the Security negotiations well under way.

With the development of aerial warfare I doubt whether the demilitarisation precaution has much validity, and it leaves the essential point of who is the aggressor undetermined. The last war appears to show that an essential precaution against aggression is to devise machinery which shall clearly reveal the aggressor.

Berlin, June 11, 1925.—A long confidential talk with Stresemann last night. He is now more or less reassured about the "Durchmarsch," and realises that the Havas telegram ¹ put the matter in an entirely false light.

¹ On June 8, 1925, the Havas Agency circulated a message from Geneva which gave to the Agreement, said to have been made by Mr. Austen Chamberlain and M. Briand, a purely unilateral character. The message read:

"The Agreement now complete between the Governments of France, Great Britain and Belgium stipulates the formal resolve of Great Britain to guarantee the frontier of the Rhine as it is left by the Treaty of Versailles. It may be said that Great Britain makes her own the frontiers of France and Belgium adjoining Germany, and that she considers any violation by Germany of the territorial and military clauses relating to the Rhine frontier a casus belli. . . . Finally, it is formally stipulated in the Franco-British Agreement that, should the eastern Allies of France be the object of manifest aggression, France shall be authorised to make use of the demilitarised Rhine zone as a field of operations in order to come to the aid of her attacked Allies."

The effect of this publication throughout Europe was startling. In Germany there was an outcry from the Press, the suggested right of France to cross the demilitarised Rhineland in order to help her eastern Allies being deemed wholly unacceptable. Dr. Stresemann at once asked Lord D'Abernon whether the Havas statement represented the views of the British Government. In Belgium, on the other hand, the Havas telegram was received with unmitigated enthusiasm, Belgian newspapers regarding it as proof of a return by Great Britain to the previously rejected proposals for unilateral Anglo-Belgian and Anglo-French defensive agreements. In Italy, great perturbation and discontent were created, inasmuch as the Havas telegram completely ignored the participation of Italy. Signor
He intends to publish the original German proposal of February 9 about Security in a few days. Public opinion has advanced. The German proposal, if published in February, would have created violent hostility. Stresemann is convinced that he would have been shot by some excited partisan of the Right. Now he faces publication with calm.

The fact that the text of the document was kept secret for two months speaks well for the possibility of secret diplomacy. If, as reported, Herriot kept the whole matter to himself for several days without mentioning it to anyone, he deserves a crown for unexampled discretion.

About the probable development of negotiations, Stresemann said: "My own view is that all these questions will practically have to be settled together, and can only be settled in Conference. Germany cannot join the League of Nations until Cologne has been evacuated. Unless Germany joins the League I quite realise that there is no Security Pact. Then again, the execution of the Disarmament demands will be greatly facilitated if the Security negotiation is proceeding smoothly.

"FURTHER, the whole question of Germany's external Mussolini indeed remarked that he was completely bewildered, considering that the terms of the Agreement—as recorded by the French News Agencies—were utterly out of consonance with the views of the French Government. Anxiety had also been aroused in London by the French semi-official communication. So much so that, on July 10, a private notice question to the Prime Minister was handed in, to which Mr. Baldwin replied to the effect that the strictly bilateral character of the settlement was adhered to as regards Great Britain.

Rome was most emphatic that if the agreement was one which would place the Allies once more in a position of antagonism to Germany, Italy could have nothing to do with it. Italian participation would only be forthcoming in support of a Pact of mutual conciliation between Germany and her late enemies.

The attitude of Mussolini on this occasion was the more remarkable in that the Pact idea received no support from the Italian Embassy in Berlin: Count Bosdari was openly sceptical about the whole conception.
relations has to be settled. We cannot forego the Russian connection, such as it is, without having something positive on the other side. I have already to face very violent Russian opposition. I do not know which they are most opposed to—the Security Pact or entry into the League of Nations—but I have a stiff fight in front of me on both these issues."

Stresemann then hinted that Germany might, in the Security Pact discussion, raise the issues of a reduction of the period of the Rhineland occupation and the grant to Germany of a Colonial Mandate. I at once said that in my opinion it would be extremely unwise to mention either subject. Success was out of the question, and raising them would make a bad impression. It was obvious that from the Security Pact Germany, who was unarmed, had in the immediate future more to gain than France, who was militarily dominant. German public opinion must realise this.

Stresemann replied: "Well, perhaps they will slowly, but I shall have considerable difficulty with the President about entry into the League of Nations. I have to show positive advantage for it. Hindenburg is not opposed to the League of Nations, but, like most military men, he is sceptical as to the efficacy of any alternative to war. I do not meet with deliberate opposition from him, but he is unversed in political affairs."

Stresemann then said: "I notice you had a long talk with Chancellor Luther last night—what was said?"

This great minister is not free from jealous susceptibility concerning foreign affairs, and resents any discussion of them with the Chancellor. I replied: "I told him more or less what I am telling you, and expressed an optimistic view regarding the Security Pact. The Chancellor was less convinced of success than I was, and appeared to be alarmed by the Havas telegram about an eventual right to march through Germany."
In conclusion Stresemann told me that he had received overtures from Beneš regarding a possible meeting at some mountain resort or watering-place. The Czecho-Slovakian Minister had been to him two or three times on this subject. So far he had not given any definite answer, but was inclined to think that nothing but advantage could result from a discussion with anyone as intelligent and well-informed as the Czecho-Slovakian Foreign Minister.

**Berlin, June 21, 1925.**—The Italian Government maintains its favourable view, and considers a Five Power Pact of Security on a reciprocal basis the surest means of promoting the general pacification of Europe. While others negotiate and make reserves, the clear views and strong opinions of Mussolini have a decisive importance in advancing the cause of peace.

**Berlin, June 22, 1925.**—London is conducting the negotiations for the Pact of Mutual Security with admirable vigour. Chamberlain has done his utmost to bring the German Government to recognise the favourable features in the French reply, urging them to avoid petty discussion of detail and accept without cavil the broad general principles. It is of course true that the original initiative proceeded from the Germans, but encouragement to persist and push matters through to a satisfactory solution is none the less required.

**June 22, 1925.**—A feature which delights me in the whole negotiation is the paradox that he who was thought to be a very reluctant convert to the Reciprocal Pact is more persuasive and able to achieve more than any first-hour enthusiast. Paris feels that if Chamberlain adheres, no other course is open; Paris must therefore follow suit.

**Berlin, June 24, 1925.**—The main difficulty over the German initiative proceeds from mutual suspicion. When
the proposed Pact was communicated to London and Paris, there was a strong idea in both places that it was a German trap. Now that Briand has replied in what I consider friendly terms, the German Government suspects that he is plotting to wreck the Pact, and will do so, provided he can throw the odium of failure upon them. The Germans say secret information confirms this view. I tell them that secret information is generally wrong, and that this secret information is no exception. Briand’s good faith and willingness to proceed with the negotiations are apparent on the face of the documents. Why harbour suspicion?