CHAPTER III

JUNE—SEPTEMBER 1924

Graf Kessler on lecturing in America—Germany and the Micum contracts—
Germany's reply to Note on Military Control—Ramsay MacDonald's
visit to Paris—Kaiser and Crown Prince—German delegates leave
for London—U.S. Secretary of State in Berlin—Divergence between
German Foreign Office views and public opinion—French Ambassador
on Security—The London Conference—Acceptance of Dawes Report—
Its reception in Berlin—Financial and political tension relieved.

BERLIN, June 20, 1924.—Graf Harry Kessler had
luncheon here yesterday.

He has just returned from a six months' tour in the
United States. What he called "lecturing" was more or
less propaganda. He appeared to have travelled over the
whole country. I gather from others that his tour was not
a complete success, the most convincing speakers on behalf
of Germany in America having been Cuno and Hermes.
However, his observations on the States have not lost their
point through his comparative failure as a propagandist.
He praised American hospitality and their extreme anxiety
for information, but he says that in twenty-four hours they
have forgotten all the information they obtain.

A PROPAGANDIST who judges by the newspapers the day
after his arrival in New York or the day after his making
a speech may be pardoned for imagining that he has power-
fully influenced the opinion of the country. He will find,
however, three days later that everyone has forgotten his
name and no one remembers on which side he spoke.
AMERICAN idealism is quite real, but it begins after business
hours. From 9 to 5 there is nothing but hard cash.
The one subject you must avoid in America is the League
of Nations. Directly you touch it there is a shout of
reprobation.

He said that among politicians and thinking people there
is a strong feeling for England, but the lower classes are still fundamentally if not violently anti-British. On the other hand, the sentimental feeling for France continues, with the reserve that this does not include approbation of Poincaré's Ruhr policy.

Kessler believes that there is a large amount of money in America available for investment in Europe if existing political apprehensions can be calmed. He gave me quite new ideas regarding banking conditions in the Middle West, saying that the number of failures of banks who had advanced money on farm property was immense. He also underlined the great divergence of interest between the different parts of the United States territory, hinting that a fiscal separation was more than possible, although the political unity of the States would be maintained. The farmer wanted free trade in which to buy cheap working material, and a free market for his produce. Farmers felt that they were being exploited now by manufacturers in the East. He believed it would be possible for the Middle West to be free trade, the East and sea border remaining protectionist.

Berlin, June 30, 1924.—The Germans complain a great deal of the MIMUM contracts. However, what troubles the German Government even more is the question as to the status to be accorded to Germany at the London Conference.

Questions of form in London will have a great influence on the attitude of the German delegates.

Berlin, June 30, 1924.—We have had a very hard and exciting week over the different drafts of the German Reply on Military Control. I told the Government that the tone of their reply was a matter of supreme importance—that they had an opportunity to alter the whole atmosphere of their foreign relations if they adopted the statesmanlike
note of the Joint Message. After innumerable drafts (I believe there were no less than fifty-one) Stresemann took the matter into his own hands and produced a text which has finally been accepted by the Government. I have not seen it, but Stresemann says that it satisfies fully all the conditions laid down: critics less partial than the author are also pleased with the production. But there is a strong tendency in the German mind to start every memorandum with a series of conditions and reserves, and I doubt these ever being wholly absent from any document written in the Wilhelmstrasse.

The general atmosphere is favourable. The Joint Message exercised a most beneficent influence. Even the Nationalists themselves are mild about it, and their papers relatively reasonable.

The progress achieved in the course of the last month is considerable. Indeed, things look so well that one is afraid of some accident or catastrophe.

The Germans themselves would not give as favourable a report on the situation as that stated above. They are under the shadow of their grave financial difficulties—money almost unobtainable. They also complain bitterly of the Micum contracts, but I have always thought they rather overdo the shadow in this part of the picture. It is clear, however, that no time is to be lost in getting rid of the Micum and installing the Dawes régime.1

1 The Joint Message referred to above relates to a Note sent by the Inter-Allied Governments to the German Government on May 28, 1924. The Allied Governments, while declining at this stage to acquiesce in the German suggestion that the task of supervising the carrying out by the Reich of the as yet unfulfilled Disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles should be entrusted to the League, proposed to Berlin the following compromise: A general inspection would be carried out by the Inter-Allied Commission of Control inside of three or four months and, provided that no obstructions were met with and that no serious breach of the Treaty were discovered, the Military Commission could then be substantially and progressively reduced, pending the transfer of control to the League of Nations.

a See p. 72.
There is another anxious subject of preoccupation here, namely, the precise position of Germany at the London Conference. They are afraid of the effect on public opinion if there is first of all a Conference of Allied Powers, and if Germany is only called in at a later stage. I have told them how explicitly it has been laid down that there is no intention of presenting Germany with ready-made and unalterable decisions. This, however, has brought them little comfort. It might be expedient, when the time comes for establishing precise procedure, to take their susceptibilities into account, i.e. that the invitations to arrive in London should be simultaneous, although the Germans would necessarily not attend the earlier meetings. They must be invited to dinner, even if they only come down to dessert.

The Marx-Stresemann Government are as anxious to arrive at pacification as any Government can be—and they deserve encouragement. But they have to face severe parliamentary difficulties.

Berlin, July 11, 1924.—The broad result of Ramsay MacDonald’s visit to Paris has been well received here in the more intelligent Government circles. As usual, when any improvement is achieved in the relations between Paris and London, certain elements say that Peace has been restored at the expense of Germany, but no sensible person regards the Paris result as otherwise than a fact of great benefit. It was essential to save Herriot and the Conference.

The points in the Paris agreement which arouse most anxiety are the following:

(1) It is said that the bilateral character of the understanding is not clear, i.e. the fact that Germany only agrees to assume the obligations of the Dawes report against a definite agreement by the Powers to do certain things by a fixed date.
(2) Nothing is said about military evacuation, Stresemann declares, and is, I think, sincere in declaring that he cannot meet the Reichstag without a definite date for evacuation. A series of fixed dates not too widely spaced would meet his needs.
He has recently receded from the position that he could not accept any subordination of evacuation to the issue of a portion of the loan.

(3) Invitation to the Conference. The Germans are never tired of reiterating that anything of the nature of dictation would ruin the chances of agreement. There must be discussion, deliberation and free acceptance by Germany.

I am not far myself from the view that the Germans might conceivably be better off if they did not go to London. At Spa, at Genoa and in London their presence did not do them much good, nor did it help the negotiations, but things have now gone so far in the way of publicity that non-invitation is difficult and would probably be considered an affront.

The expectation here is that the necessary legislation would not take long to pass, provided everything went smoothly in London and the general agreement was settled without much difficulty. Experts in Reichstag procedure consider that everything could be concluded before the middle of August.

Berlin, August 2, 1924.—A conversation to-day with one of the most acute observers of political conditions in Berlin, who asserted that a return of the Emperor to the throne was out of the question.
The Kaiser had not only been a failure in the War, but had behaved like a coward and not like a gentleman in escaping to Holland; also by showing so much preoccupation about saving his own fortune.

It was impossible to get information to the Emperor
during the War. The Empress was a bad influence, keeping all unfavourable news from him and thereby impeding the chance of peace negotiations. Apart from this, the Emperor was not an easy man to check or control. Once, when the Controller of the Household ventured, after a great deal of hesitation, to remark that the new electrical lighting of the White Ball-room at the palace had cost a great deal, the Emperor at once replied: "It has cost so much that I shall do with one Controller of the Household less."

The Crown Prince was now almost as unpopular. My informant had been in the Crown Prince's army during the War, and His Royal Highness's conduct had been far from exemplary. He did not know whether the stories usually current about women at headquarters were true, but it certainly was true that at the time the army was losing heavily in the Argonne, and immediately before an attack in which they had 2,000 killed and wounded, the Crown Prince, dressed in tennis flannels, saw them off and waved a racket at them. He told another story of the Crown Prince—that when ambulances were working day and night bringing the wounded into field hospitals he sent a peremptory order for one or two ambulances to come back in case there should be accidents at his pony races.

In the judgment of this observer, no restoration of the monarchy was likely, at all events for a long time, because the present grown-up representatives of the Hohenzollern family were most unsatisfactory and the Crown Prince's children still young and quite unknown. As regards the Wittelsbachs, a Catholic king is impossible in Berlin and for North and East Prussia.

The same informant told me that the corruption prevalent in Germany to-day amongst officials is appalling. You can get anything with a bribe. Before the War bribery was unknown—scrupulous honesty was the universal rule.
I enquired whether it was true that there had been a great increase of immorality amongst women. He said, “No. The position has remained just what it was.” He was totally unable to explain the extraordinary contrast between the real poverty which existed to his own knowledge in many classes, and the apparent profusion and extravagance going on in certain circles in Berlin. He said: “You ought to go to Luna Park one night after ten o’clock. You would find everybody drinking champagne at thirty marks a bottle, and the clearest signs of extravagance.”

We went on to talk about the position of doctors in Berlin. He agreed that there are far too many of them, but he said that students, especially Jewish students, come to Berlin and, not wanting to go back to provincial towns, look about for a rich wife. Most Jews like to have a doctor in the family circle, because then what they spend on medical fees does not go out of the family. So they give Jessica and her ducats to the young doctor, and both parties are satisfied. To-day the investments which came with the rich daughter have vanished to nothing through the inflation, so the doctor has to work and finds it very difficult to extend his clientele. I told him that in Australia the leading surgeons find that the number of their operations depends mainly on the rainfall. If there is a good rainfall, squatters feel that they can afford an operation, and come into Melbourne or Sydney to have it done. In a drought they just jog along with their disease as best they can. He said in Berlin it is slightly different. They have operations when they think they require them, but they only pay for the operation when there is a good crop. It is useless to send a bill to a landed or agricultural client if the harvest is bad. He told me that a leading gynaecologist had said that he treated from 500 to 600 cases of miscarriage every year, and that it was a high estimate to say that 5 per cent. of these were natural; 95 per cent.
were intentionally induced. It was a great mistake to suppose that unprovoked abortion was at all a common event. In cases where it was natural it was generally caused by a syphilitic taint in the man, and syphilis had been prevalent after the War.

We went on to discuss a physical phenomenon that has always interested me, that is, the special characteristic that is called here a "bacon-neck" or "bull-neck" ("stier nacken" or "speck falte"). My friend was not aware of the undoubted fact that this phenomenon is peculiar to Germany—in my opinion peculiar to certain races in Germany. I do not believe that the Jews of pure blood have it. He undertook to investigate this point. He was also unaware that the average German skull is exceptionally small, much smaller, for instance, than the English and more round. It is extraordinary what an amount of acquired knowledge is lodged in so restricted a space.

In the course of a long conversation he referred to the old theme that the real danger of a future war comes from the feeling prevalent amongst the German people that they were not fairly treated after the Armistice, and that the Allies, particularly France, were determined to keep Germany down. This led to many classes in Germany thinking that there is no way out except by a fresh war. When they say this they have no idea as to how that war could be waged in the present unequal condition of armaments, but they feel that the present position is hopeless and that something should be done to find a relief.

Berlin, August 5, 1924.—The German delegates have at last left for London. There can be no doubt about their anxiety to arrive at a settlement. In the first place, the financial position here is such that some solution is urgently required. Public opinion is behind the Government on conciliation provided a date is fixed for the military evacua-
tion of the Ruhr; without this Reichstag approval is doubtful. The Germans will ask that French troops should quit the Ruhr at the same time as the British troops leave Cologne, but if a formal engagement was taken for evacuation to take effect a few months later, I believe it would be accepted. There are minor points about which some discussion will arise, but nothing serious, provided the Delegation is treated with courtesy and consideration. The importance of this latter point is always underrated. The report that rooms have been taken for the German Delegation at the Ritz Hotel has not been without its influence on public opinion. Let it be remembered: we have not only to persuade the German Delegation, but to enable the German Delegation to persuade the public here. The better they are treated, the more local authority they will have here.

Berlin, August 8, 1924.—Hughes was here for a few days last week,¹ and had long conversations with Marx, Strese-

¹ On the eve of the holding of the London Conference, which was to give legal and practical effect to the Dawes Plan—in July and August 1924—Mr. Hughes, the American Secretary of State, took upon himself, ostensibly in a purely unofficial capacity, to visit the western capitals of Europe—London, Paris, Brussels and Berlin. He had conversations with the leading statesmen and financiers of all the countries concerned, as well as the U.S. Ambassadors accredited to the several Governments. These conversations were treated as strictly private, and secrecy as to their tenor was preserved with remarkable success. But it transpired, nevertheless, that the American Secretary of State, whose views on the Reparation problem in particular coincided very closely with those of the British Government, brought very insistent pressure to bear on the new French Government of the Left to take a broader view than had been taken by M. Poincaré regarding the Reparation problem.

Mr. Hughes' arguments fell on favourable soil, with M. Herriot and the Radical Socialists in control of the French Government. Likewise, at Berlin, Mr. Hughes' influence was thrown entirely on the side of conciliation, reasonableness and compromise.

In the course of a talk with M. Poincaré, Mr. Hughes employed urbane
mann and Ebert. He was entertained to luncheon at the American Embassy and subsequently to tea by Frau Stresemann in the garden of the Foreign Office villa. Hughes makes the impression of being pre-eminently sensible. He holds forth perhaps too much, but less than any other American of his standing. Americans, with the notable exception of Mellon, normally and instinctively hold forth in proportion to their fortune or position. Hughes' position in the eyes of the American public and of the world is almost of the Rockefeller standard, but he only monologues to the extent which would be justified by a fortune of a million dollars. Mrs. Hughes does not hold forth at all, and is of the good New England type.

I abstained from discussing either German or French affairs with Hughes, out of perhaps exaggerated tact, but we talked at great length on prohibition in America and drink reform elsewhere. He did not seem very enthusiastic about prohibition, but said that America had it on her back now, and could not kick it off, owing to the curious provisions of the law regarding a Constitutional Amendment. Congress could not permit the consumption of alcohol; they could, however, define what alcohol was, and leave a pretty wide margin for drinks which were not to be considered alcoholic. As to whether prohibition had improved industrial efficiency Hughes quoted Judge Gary and other industrial leaders to the effect that there had been great improvement, but he did not speak either from his own knowledge or with great conviction.

Hughes appeared to regard the successful issue of the London Conference as practically assured, and was pleased when one recalled his speech at Newhaven and adverted to the closeness with which the recommendations he made but trenchant language on the subject of the Ruhr invasion and the Anglo-French asperities that had followed it, pointing out that British security could not be a matter of indifference to the United States, since Great Britain was America's best and most honourable debtor.
for independent committees had been followed in the construction of the Dawes Commission.
While he said nothing positive, I have a clear idea that he had a pretty straight talk with Poincaré in Paris, and that it was made clear to the latter that on the basis of Poincaréism there was no help for France from America.
Hughes is certainly greatly esteemed or feared in the American diplomatic service. The assembled secretaries and consuls looked frightened out of their lives in his presence. He has the reputation of being a very strenuous worker, and a chief at once fair and exacting. Houghton, the American Ambassador, has been active since the visit of the Dawes Commission here, and has undoubtedly contributed largely to the satisfactory progress of events. He is talked of as the next Governor of New York. We are on cordial and confidential terms.

Berlin, August 11, 1924.—There is a curious contrast to-day between the official opinion of the German Foreign Office, which is pessimistic, and the opinion of the public. The latter believe that Herriot has got his way in Paris, and will agree to a speedy military evacuation of the Ruhr directly he returns to London. The German Foreign Office says that up to the present the conversations in London have given no indication that Herriot would propose, or agree to, any period less than two years for the complete evacuation of the Ruhr and Rhine ports. A compromise resulting in the commencement of evacuation at once and complete evacuation in a year would, I believe, be accepted here, and I expect this is the result which will finally be arrived at, but there will be a great deal of finessing on both sides and some delay will probably occur.

Responsibility for the War.—Considerable attention is devoted in the German Press to the documents recently published, which bear upon responsibility for the War. The documents published in Austria and Germany suggest:
(1) An immense share of responsibility on the part of the Austrian General Staff and particularly Conrad von Hoetzendorff.

(2) On the German side the folly of the Kaiser, his hostility to England based primarily on his hatred of King Edward (Sedlitz says he spoke of him as "Satan"), his stubborn devotion to the naval expansion policy for Germany, his submissiveness to that most technically efficient but politically blind Tirpitz: all these things prevent anything like exculpation of Germany from war guilt.

The real problem is—who was not responsible rather than who was responsible. The blindness, recklessness and fatuity, and perhaps even the excessive good faith of certain participants, may well be brought in as contributing circumstances if not as prime causes.

As regards England's part, there was unquestionably good faith and a sincere desire to avoid war. It is said that Grey was too much under Russian influence, and the glamour of Russia's supposed power, but it is difficult to substantiate this charge.

The agreement come to in June 1914 regarding English-Russian-French co-operation in the naval sphere has not hitherto been adduced as a cause of German determination to bring on war. To quote it as having been a provoking course of action would be inconsistent with the German attitude of non-responsibility, and therefore it cannot be brought forward by Germany, but if hearts were searched, I suspect that, in last analysis, anxiety about this agreement was one of the causes which strengthened the war party in Germany and weakened the friends of peace and the advocates of delay.

By others, Grey is attacked on the ground—honourable to his character—that he was such a declared advocate of peace that it was not possible for the German rulers to believe that under him England would come into the War. He was indeed so strong an advocate of peace and clung
so firmly to the hope of it that he delayed the declaration that England would come into the War until it was too late for Germany to draw back. Had he declared at an earlier stage that England might, under certain contingencies, enter the War on the side of Russia and France, it is contended that Germany might have altered her policy.

The suggestion is most unjust, for Grey could make no declaration about England coming into the War until after Saturday, August 1: it was only the invasion of Belgium by Germany which rendered England’s entry into the War at all a matter of certainty.

One can speculate to an unlimited extent upon what might have happened had Germany abstained from commencing the campaign by the invasion of Belgium. My own view is that a very little diplomatic skill on the part of Germany would have sufficed to prevent, or at any rate delay, England’s participation in the War.

Berlin, August 12, 1924.—A long conversation with the French Ambassador this afternoon regarding the question of Security.

He reverted as usual to the point that public opinion in France would not agree to a pact of Security which only ensured the French frontier and did not give protection to the Polish frontier against German aggression. While he stated this as a fact, I thought that he was somewhat less vehement on this point than on previous occasions, and he quite recognised what an enormous gain it would be for Europe if the danger of a direct war between France and Germany were averted.

He told me that on several occasions German officials had frankly stated to him: ‘While we are ready to give you complete guarantees against military aggression as regards France, and while we are also prepared to engage not to make any military attack on Poland, no German
Government will sign a document which binds us to consider the Danzig corridor as a permanent solution.” Maltzan said to the Ambassador: "Why not be satisfied with the pact of guarantee for the French frontier? The Polish question is really a part of the Russian question. England and Italy have already signed an agreement with Russia, and France will certainly follow suit. At that time, take your precautions against an attack on Poland. The question is more Russian than German."

BERLIN, August 14, 1924.—As far as one can judge the situation, the public here will abide by the decision of the German delegates in London. The principal point which excites interest is the date for the evacuation of the Ruhr. I believe that April will be considered satisfactory by the general public, provided no unilateral concessions have to be made regarding future commercial relations. If, instead of continuing military control, clauses were agreed to ensuring reciprocal security, the public here will accept stringent clauses.

THE LONDON CONFERENCE, July 16—August 30, 1924

The Allied delegates assembled on July 16, 1924, Great Britain being represented by Mr. MacDonnell and Mr. Thomas; France by M. Herriot, M. Clémentel and General Nollet; Belgium by M. Theunis and M. Hymans; Italy by Signor Scialoja and Signor Grandi; Japan by her Ambassador in London, Baron Hayashi.

For nearly three weeks the Germans were not called in, the Allies being occupied with reaching an agreement among themselves. The chief difficulty was found to be the French claim to the enforcement of new Sanctions should Germany default under the proposed Dawes plan. After prolonged negotiations, an Inter-Allied Protocol was agreed to, under which the enforcement of Sanctions in such a contingency would be subject to an exhaustive procedure of impartial arbitration. Applications of Sanctions should not take place unless and until the wilful default by Germany had been
proclaimed by the proposed Arbitral Tribunal. Moreover, if and when consideration was given to the application of sanctions, the interests of the subscribers to the proposed German loan would have to be taken into account.

When these and other difficulties had been settled in principle among the Allies, it was decided to send for the German representatives, who arrived in London on August 6. They included Chancellor Marx, Dr. Stresemann, and the Finance Minister, Dr. Luther. Practically a fortnight was spent in discussion between the principal Allied and German delegates, greatly helped by the presence and the friendly intervention of the so-called American “observers,” Mr. Kellogg, the U.S. Ambassador, Colonel Logan, the American representative on the Reparation Commission, and Dr. Owen Young, the chief author—with Sir Josiah Stamp—of the Dawes report. After protracted negotiations, formal and private, agreement was reached with the Germans, which was finally dated August 30, 1924. This Agreement, with its various Annexes and Protocols, provided not only for a new scale of Reparation Annuities payable by Germany and secured on certain revenues, but also for a 40,000,000 sterling loan to be issued in the International Market; also for provisions relating to arbitration in the event of differences between Germany and the Creditor Powers. Last, but not least, the principal Agreement was accompanied by another, negotiated between Germany, France and Belgium, stipulating the progressive economic and military evacuation of the Ruhr by France and Belgium within a period of roughly twelve months. Mr. MacDonald, who presided over the Conference, was chiefly responsible for the opening up of these Franco-Belgo-German negotiations outside the actual Conference proceedings.

Berlin, August 17, 1924.—I hear from London that the Conference began by following the old lines. On the first day, wrangling between the Allies, followed by wrangling with the Germans, both wranglings on quite secondary points. Meantime, the Committee of Experts worked every night until 3 a.m., sustained by whiskies and sodas, sandwiches and cigars, then reference next morning by the Experts to the heads of Missions. All this talk and all this labour about points which everyone
knew did not really matter; what really mattered was—and is—the Ruhr.

Herriot has been extraordinarily temperamental—at one moment dejected—at another moment elated; very resistful against pressure, still more resistful against any suspicion of a plot to entrap him into new concessions. However, Herriot has impressed everybody by his goodwill, and his desire to find a possible arrangement. The Germans have been well treated, and received with courtesy. This is so much to the good.

It is as I expected. Marx is more popular than Stresemann; the latter always inspires those who do not know him with the erroneous view that he is unreliable. Ramsay MacDonald appears to have shown tact and skill, and to have done his best to reduce the period of delay in the evacuation of the Ruhr. Time after time, I am told, Ramsay MacDonald has surmounted or turned extreme difficulties. His power of work is astounding everyone at the Conference; he starts early in the morning and works hard throughout the day. Schubert has distinguished himself by his good sense and precision.

Berlin, August 18, 1924.—Am writing to the Prime Minister suggesting that the time has perhaps come for me to resign the post of Ambassador to Berlin. I have been here more than four years, and have had a strenuous time.

The Pact of London, or—as it is usually called—the Dawes plan, has now achieved general acceptance, and thus a great step has been made towards a financial basis for pacification. I do not say final pacification, because I do not give the Dawes plan more than three or four years; it will then have to be modified. But the financial foundation for a better diplomatic relationship is there.
Berlin, August 22, 1924.—Conferences of Experts always remind me of a Chinese saying which runs: “What one knows: to know that one knows it. What one does not know: to know that one does not know it. That is true wisdom.”

It is a wisdom most conferences of experts lack.

Berlin, September 1, 1924.—To-day the Reparation Commission announces that the Dawes plan has come formally into being.

Berlin, September 3, 1924.—I have already written an account of the negotiations in London which led to the Dawes report. It may be interesting to note the ups and downs of the dealings here between the Government and the leaders of the parties in the Reichstag. Last Thursday, at eight o’clock in the morning, the leaders of the Nationalist Party called upon the Chancellor, stating that they had decided to vote against the Dawes report unless the Chancellor promised to resign within a fortnight. He was, further, to engage to hand over the Chancellorship to them, and to have three Nationalist Members of the Cabinet. Marx declared, with some humour, that while personally he would be delighted to resign in favour of so competent a successor as the Nationalists would select, the matter did not depend upon him; it depended upon the parties of the Coalition. All he, Marx, could do was to engage to make a declaration regarding the war culpability of Germany, a declaration similar in character to that which was eventually published.

This reply infuriated the Nationalists, who determined to reject the legislation required by the Dawes settlement. When the time came, however, this decision was modified, because rejection would have meant a new election, and a new election would mean a gain to the Socialists and a loss to the Nationalists. When it came to the actual debate,
there was a certain amount of jockeying, the Nationalist Deputies giving out that they would say "No," whereas in reality they intended to say and did say "Yes." This manœuvre was justified on the ground that if the Socialists had realised that the necessary legislation would be accepted, they would have found some means of quashing the proceedings. From what I can gather, it appears true that the Government has given no positive pledge regarding the admission of Nationalist members into the Ministry.