CHAPTER XXIV.
THE ANGLO-JAPANESE AGREEMENT OF 1905.

No. 110.

Sir C. MacDonal to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

Tōkiō, February 18, 1905.

F.O. Japan 595.

Tel. (No. 36.) Very Confidential.

D. 8:10 P.M.

R. 3:45 P.M.

Yesterday evening I spoke to the Prime Minister on the subject of Sir C. Hardinge's despatch No. 651 of Dec[ember] 2 to Your Lordship relative to the possibility of an understanding between Japan and Russia after the war with a view to eventually isolate Great Britain in the Far East. (1) Prime Minister begged me to telegraph to Your Lordship and state in the most categorical manner that such an arrangement was altogether impossible and would not be considered for a moment by the Japanese Government. He added that Japan was entirely satisfied and would remain true to the alliance which had been of the greatest assistance to her in her hour of need in that it had enabled her to carry on the war wholeheartedly and without fear of being attacked from an unexpected quarter.

His Excellency repeated and emphasized his declaration made to me on December 23 to the effect that Japan was entirely satisfied with the extremely satisfactory manner in which England had carried out her obligations as ally.

My telegram No. 324 (of December 24, 1904). (2)

MINUTES.

This is the second message of the kind we have received. For first see his telegram No. 324. Should not Sir C. MacDonal be instructed to make some reply to the effect that it has been received with much pleasure and satisfaction?

F. A. C.

19/2.

Yes, so inform him. (3)

L.

(1) [v. supra, pp. 66-7, No. 68, and note (4).]

(2) [Not reproduced. The tenour is indicated above.]

(3) [A telegram giving instructions to this effect was sent as Tel. No. 11 of February 14.]

No. 111.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir C. MacDonald.

Foreign Office, March 24, 1905.

F.O. Japan 673.

(No. 51A.)

Sir,

I had an interesting conversation this afternoon with the Japanese Minister, who called upon me at my invitation, upon the subject of the possibility of a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. I told Viscount Hayashi that I had read with the utmost interest your confidential despatch No. 39 of the 15th of February, (4) in which you had given me a graphic description of the dinner given on the 12th of February by

(4) [Not reproduced as the tenour is indicated.]
the Foreign Minister in honour of the completion of the third year of the alliance. I had noticed with much satisfaction the terms in which Baron Komura had proposed the health of His Majesty The King and his hope that the alliance would continue to grow in strength and solidity. I said that you had also reported to me the Foreign Minister’s observation that he wished that the alliance might be extended for a further and longer period, and that its provisions might be given a larger and wider scope. Although I could not regard these statements as equivalent to an official overtture, they seemed to justify me in inviting some expression of Viscount Hayashi’s opinion as to the probable policy and intentions of the Japanese Government. I also referred to the extracts published in the “Times” of the 22nd instant from several of the most important Japanese newspapers, all of which apparently advocated a continuation, if not an extension, of the alliance. I added that, hoping as I did that the Japanese Government might before long find itself in a position to consider what terms of peace it could accept, I thought it might be of advantage to them in determining their policy to be made aware of the views of His Majesty’s Government upon this important subject.

Viscount Hayashi told me that the Foreign Minister’s observations correctly represented the general feeling in Japan, which, he said, had been appropriately expressed by the newspapers all of them important exponents of Japanese public opinion, which the “Times” had quoted. He therefore personally felt no doubt that a renewal of the existing alliance would be desired by the Japanese Government.

I replied that, although it was perhaps unusual to anticipate the moment when the question of a renewal would inevitably arise, H[is] M[ajesty’s] G[overnment] would I felt almost sure in the exceptional circumstances of the present case entertain favourably the idea of continuing the alliance for another term of years. It would however be useful to me to know what was in the mind of the Japanese Government, and what was meant by the Japanese press when it was suggested that the alliance might be given a larger and wider scope.

Viscount Hayashi said that, in his opinion, this desire was at the present mainly a matter of sentiment, although there was undoubtedly a general feeling in favour of making the alliance “more solid.” The Japanese Government had however of late been far too fully occupied with the war to permit them to think out the difficult problems involved in such a proposal. Some eminent Japanese soldiers, he added, were much in favour of an arrangement under which, in return for adequate concessions on our side, Japanese troops might be employed in India. The feeling in Japan was strongly British, and there was no question at all of a rapprochement with Russia, although such a thing might some day happen if a different system of government were to be introduced in that country. He thought therefore that the present Government, which might perhaps not remain in office long after the termination of the war, would probably be glad to take up the question of extending the scope of the alliance. He would however at once report to the Japanese Government that the subject had been informally discussed between us, and would let me know how it was regarded by them. Was there, he asked, any chance that the United States Government would join us? No combination could be more important, or more popular in Japan. I said that I had had frequent discussions with the United States Government with regard to affairs in the Far East, and that I had good reasons for knowing that their policy was eminently friendly to Japan, and I thought I might say identical with ours. There was therefore every reason for anticipating that American influence would be exerted upon the same lines as ours. The United States Government were however notoriously opposed to the idea of entangling themselves in foreign alliances, and although I should expect to find them moving upon parallel lines with us, I doubted whether they were likely to do more.

Viscount Hayashi told me, at the close of our conversation, that he had learned from a confidential source that President Roosevelt had sounded the French Minister at Washington as to the probability of the terms of peace which had been mentioned by the Japanese Government being accepted by Russia. The French Minister had brought
an answer to the effect that as Russia had over four hundred thousand men at Mukden and a powerful fleet at sea, there could be no question of discussing terms of peace.

Viscount Hayashi thought that the rumour that the President had been invited by Japan to mediate must have had its origin in those communications.

[I am, &c.]

L[ANSDOWNE].

No. 112.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir C. MacDonald. (1)

F.O. Japan 673.
(No. 78.) Secret.

Sir,

The Japanese Minister informed me this afternoon that he had received instructions to lay before me the views of the Japanese Government upon the suggestion which I had made to him on the 24th ultimo—see my despatch No. 54 of the 29th ult[imo]. (2)

The Japanese Government appreciated very highly the advantages which they had derived from the Anglo-Japanese Agreement during the war which was proceeding, and they believed that such an alliance would be even more important to Japan in the future. They would therefore be glad to renew it, and they considered that a longer period might be fixed for its duration. They suggested seven years from the present date.

On the other hand, they would prefer that the scope of the Alliance should not be extended beyond its present limits.

Finally, Viscount Hayashi was instructed to say that, in the opinion of the Japanese Government, the sooner we came to an agreement as to the renewal of the Treaty the better.

I promised Viscount Hayashi that I would lose no time in making my colleagues aware of the substance of his communication.

[I am, &c.]

L[ANSDOWNE].

MINUTE BY KING EDWARD.

App[rove].—E.R.

(1) [The substance of this was conveyed on April 21 in Tel. No. 89 to Sir C. MacDonald.] (2) [Not reproduced. It referred to the acknowledgment, made by Viscount Hayashi on behalf of the Japanese Government, of the British suggestion for the renewal of the alliance.]

No. 118.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir C. MacDonald.

F.O. Japan 673.
(No. 80.) Sir,

I had some conversation with the Japanese Minister to-day upon the subject of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement. I told Viscount Hayashi that his communication upon this subject had reached me just as the Easter holidays were commencing, and I had not consequently had an opportunity of conferring with my
colleagues until this morning. The matter was one which, in their opinion, required the most careful examination, and I was not yet able to supply him with a statement of our views. It had given them great pleasure to learn that the value of the Alliance was so thoroughly appreciated by the Japanese Government, and he might rely upon the friendly spirit in which the question would be examined. It was however obvious that a renewal of the Agreement for a much extended period of years so long before the expiration of the first term was a somewhat serious step, and one which it would be necessary to examine in all its bearings.

[I am, &c.]
L[ANDOWNE].

No. 114.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir C. MacDonald.

F.O. Japan 673.
(No. 83.) Secret.

Sir,

Viscount Hayashi asked me to-day whether I was able to say anything to him on the subject of the suggested renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement. He brought with him a draft, of which a copy is attached to this despatch, of the form of Agreement which the Japanese Government would be glad to accept. I told Viscount Hayashi that the question was still under the consideration of His Majesty's Government, and that I was not yet able to make any statement with regard to it. He replied that, in the opinion of the Japanese Government, the earlier the matter was arranged the better, as the renewal of the Agreement "would serve as an indication to other Powers of the course of action" which Japan was likely to pursue.

[I am, &c.]
L[ANDOWNE].

MINUTE BY KING EDWARD.

App[rove]d.—E.R.

Enclosure in No. 114.

Draft of Agreement.

The Government[s] of Japan and Great Britain convinced that the Agreement concluded in London between their respective representatives on the 30th of January, 1902 has contributed in the past to the general interests, believing that the said Agreement if renewed in like manner would prove generally beneficial in the future and taking note of the measures which Japan finds it necessary to take in Corea to safeguard her special political interest there have agreed as follows:

Article I. The High Contracting Parties hereby agreed to renew and prolong the above mentioned Agreement of the 30th day of January 1902 for the period of seven years from the date hereof.

Article II. Same as Article VI of the present Agreement with the necessary changes.  

(Article VI of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of January 20, 1902, runs as follows:—

"The present Agreement shall come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for five years from that date.

(1) Viscount Hayashi's draft ended here. The section in brackets, which follows, was added in the Foreign Office.)
"In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have notified twelve months before the expiration of the said five years the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the High Contracting Parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance shall, ipso facto, continue until peace is concluded."

No. 115.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir C. MacDonald.

F.O. Japan 678.
(No. 88.) Secret.
Sir,

The Japanese Minister called upon me to-day. I told him that I had mentioned to the Cabinet the desire which the Japanese Government had expressed for an early decision with regard to the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement. I was able to tell him that my colleagues were in principle entirely in favour of renewing the Agreement. We had however come to the conclusion, after a very careful examination of the case, that there would be considerable advantage in coupling the renewal of the Treaty with an amplification of its scope. It would, in the first place, be easier for us to justify a premature renewal if we were able to show that we renewed the Treaty now in order to have an opportunity of modifying its terms. Besides this, we could not help thinking that it would be to the advantage of both parties to revise the conditions and to strengthen them at certain points. I could assure His Excellency that our proposal was not dilatory, and I suggested that he should ascertain at once by telegram from the Japanese Government whether they were favourably disposed towards it, and, if so, upon what conditions. We would in the meantime further examine the question, and be ready with proposals on our side.

Viscount Hayashi asked me whether I could give him any idea as to the manner in which the Agreement might be strengthened. I said that I had no authority to express the views of His Majesty's Government, but that it seemed to me obvious that there were two directions in which the Agreement might be amplified. The parties might undertake to assist one another in the event of either of them being unprovocably attacked, whether a third Power had previously interfered or not, and it might be provided that in return for the promise that Great Britain would place the whole of her naval resources at the disposal of Japan, in the event of Japan being attacked by a single Power, Japan might on her side undertake to assist Great Britain, by land as well as by sea, within certain geographical limits. The problem, as it presented itself to me, was somewhat of the following character. Assuming Japan to be completely successful in the war, Russia would certainly make it her object, as soon as she had recovered from the shock, to renew her attack upon Japan in such strength as to crush her completely out of existence. If Russia were to adopt such a policy, I did not see how any exertions on the part of Japan would enable her to maintain so unequal a struggle. The attempt would be ruinous to her, and could, I feared, only end one way. This risk would be completely removed by an alliance with Great Britain of such a kind as to make it certain that Russia would have to reckon with the combined Fleets of that Power and Japan. With such a prospect before her, Russia would in all probability abandon the idea of reprisals in the Far East. If however she were to find herself thus precluded from realising her hopes of revenge, she would almost certainly turn her attention to other parts of the Asiatic continent, with the result that [y.e.] Britain would be more seriously threatened than at present upon the Indian frontier and at other points. In such circumstances it was not unnatural that we should look for some compensating advantage in return for the additional liability which we should, in the case supposed, have undertaken.
His Excellency listened with great attention to what I had said, and did not contest my argument. He told me however that he felt almost sure that public opinion in Japan had not yet entertained the idea of extending the alliance in such a manner as to create a casus faderia, even where one of the parties was attacked by a single Power instead of by a combination. As to the question of geographical limits, he felt sure that the Japanese Government did not contemplate an alliance which would impose upon them obligations beyond the limits of the Far East. I asked Viscount Hayashi what the Far East included, and he made it clear that India, in his opinion, formed no part of that region.

I explained to him that the latter part of my observations were purely personal, and represented my own opinions only. He told me that he would communicate the substance of what I had said at the beginning of our conversation at once to the Japanese Government.

[I am, &c.]

L[ANDOWNE].

MINUTE BY KING EDWARD.

A pp[rove]d.—E.R.

No. 116.

Sir C. MacDonal to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

Tōkiō, May 25, 1905.

F.O. Japan 678.

Tel. (No. 124.) Most Secret.

Your telegram No. 53 of (May 18). (')

Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

At councils held May 23 and 24 at which the Elder Statesmen, all Cabinet Ministers and the chiefs of the General Staffs of the Army and Navy were present, it was decided to accept in principle the revised terms and enlarged scope suggested by your Lordship.

Minister for Foreign Affairs is now drawing up the instructions to the Japanese representative at London respecting the details of what will be practically a new Alliance; these details will be laid before your Lordship in the course of a few days. I understand that they follow closely the lines suggested in your telegram above mentioned,—England and Japan to assist one another in the event of either of them being unprovokedly attacked by a third power; the geographical limits to be the Far East and East Asia including India. Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me that the decision was arrived at without one dissentient voice, the idea being that such an alliance would render war in the East practically impossible at any rate for many generations to come. As to the military and naval details—these would be worked out later by the technical advisers of the two governments.

(') [Not reproduced. It gave the substance of Lord Lansdowne's conversation with Viscount Hayashi, reported at greater length in the despatch of May 17, v. immediately preceding document.]
F.O. Japan 678.
(No. 149.) Most Secret. 

My Lord,

Tokio, D. May 25, 1905.
R. July 3, 1905.

On the 19th instant I received Your Lordship’s telegram informing me of your interview on the previous day with the Japanese Minister, Viscount Hayashi, (1) on which occasion you informed His Excellency that His Majesty’s Government were, in principle, in favour of renewing the Anglo-Japanese agreement, but, in order to justify its premature renewal, it would be advisable to revise its terms and enlarge its scope.

In reply to a question from the Japanese Minister, Your Lordship stated that the agreement might be amplified in two directions—the High Contracting Parties might enter into an undertaking to assist one another if either of them were unprovokedly attacked, whether a third Power had interfered or not; in return for such an engagement on the part of Great Britain, Japan might undertake to assist her, by land as well as by sea, within certain geographic limits.

In reply to this, the Japanese Minister informed Your Lordship that he did not think that his Government had entertained the idea of extending the Alliance to the case of attack by one Power only, and added that he was quite sure that they did not contemplate an Alliance which would impose upon them obligations beyond the limits of the Far East, making it clear that India was not included within those limits.

On May 5, I telegraphed to Your Lordship, (2) stating that Baron Komura had spoken to me several times with regard to the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese agreement for a further term of years, and I added that I thought, from hints which His Excellency had let drop, that he, personally, at any rate, was in favour of a wider scope being given to the alliance: his observations were, however, very guarded, and I could see no indications, in speaking with other influential Japanese, that there was any possibility of extending the scope of the alliance so as to include India. Indeed, the general tone was entirely in accord with the observations of Viscount Hayashi to Your Lordship, which I have quoted above.

The 22nd instant had been fixed for the annual dinner of the Japan Society, at which I was to officiate as chairman. I knew that both the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs would be present on that occasion, and I thought it improbable that they might mention the matter of the extension of the alliance during the course of the evening.

My immediately preceding despatch (3) contains a full account of the dinner, together with the speeches made on that occasion. The latter are, as Your Lordship will observe, practically a strong demonstration in favour of the Anglo-Japanese agreement. The Prime Minister, who was seated on my right during the course of the evening asked whether I had heard from Your Lordship respecting the wider scope which it had been suggested should be given to the Anglo-Japanese agreement. I said that I had been kept fully informed on this point. His Excellency then said that a Council was to be held on the following day, at which the Elder Statesmen were to be present, when Your Lordship’s suggestions would be considered,—adding that so far as his Cabinet was concerned, they were entirely in favour of these suggestions, and he thought he could answer for Field-Marshal Yamagata. As Your Lordship is aware, Marquis Yamagata is Chief of the General Staff, in other words chief of the army, and is certainly the most respected and one of the most powerful of the Elder Statesmen.

Count Katsura begged that I would keep the matter a profound secret, and thought that, as a definite decision would be arrived at on the following day, it would be advisable to wait until then before I telegraphed to my Government.

(1) [cp. supra, pp. 124-5, No. 115, and p. 125, No. 116, note (1).]
(2) [Tel. No. 105 of May 5, D. 10.40 A.M., B. 9.30 P.M.]
(3) [Not reproduced.]
Later on, Baron Komura, who was seated on my left, also asked me whether Your Lordship had telegraphed to me with regard to a conversation, which you had held with Viscount Hayashi, respecting the renewal of the alliance on a wider basis. I replied in the affirmative. He then said, "I hope, in telegraphing to your Government, you have not committed yourself with regard to Lord Lansdowne’s suggestions, because they may not be received by us in the manner you anticipate." I replied that, as Your Lordship had not asked my opinion with regard to the suggestions, I had not given it, but that the Prime Minister had just told me that, so far as the Cabinet were concerned, the suggestions were approved. Baron Komura then became more communicative, and said that the suggestions were tantamount to a new agreement, because the "basic principle had been entirely altered"; the Cabinet being of opinion that the new principle of one of the contracting parties coming to the assistance of the other, if the latter were attacked by one or more powers, was such as to ensure peace in the East for an indefinite period, it had therefore been unanimously accepted.

His Excellency said that he could inform me immediately a decision was definitely arrived at, which could not be done until the Elder Statesmen had been consulted.

The Council took place at the residence of the Prime Minister on the following day (Tuesday), and again on Wednesday, lasting the whole of the latter day. I saw Baron Komura on Thursday morning, when he said that he was glad to inform me that Your Lordship’s suggestions had been entirely approved of, and he had received instructions to draw up the proposals of the Japanese Government based on these suggestions, and to send them to Viscount Hayashi to be communicated to Your Lordship. He mentioned that the proposal to form a new alliance—for the old agreement would, of course, lapse—based on Your Lordship’s suggestions was carried without a single dissentient voice, Marquis Ito being one of the firmest supporters of the proposal.

As it also received the unqualified approval of Marquis Yamagata and the War Minister, General Terauchi, he supposed that the military authorities had carefully thought out the proposal from a military point of view. Speaking personally, he thought that in case of an attack by Russia on India, Japanese troops operating with ours in India, and also through Manchuria, would be most efficacious. As to the geographical scope of the Alliance, the Far East and East Asia, including of course India, had been decided upon. I observed that in Persia also the Russian Government might be expected to “display activity,” to which Baron Komura replied that it was not proposed to include Persia in the geographical scope—only India and all to the East of it. I remarked that very possibly His Majesty’s Government would raise this point.

Baron Komura gave me no particular indications as to the precise nature of the proposals which he was formulating, but he mentioned that the integrity of China, the freedom of commerce, and the open-door policy in the Far East was a principle which the new alliance would aim at upholding.

I must confess to considerable surprise at the alacrity and unanimity with which the Japanese Government have taken what I venture to think is a most momentous step. There have been no indications whatever in the Press, nor in the utterances of their responsible men, that would lead one to think that they contemplated doing anything of the kind. Everything pointed to the fact that, even if they consented to stand by us in India, which was very doubtful, they would exact a very sufficient quid pro quo. Of course, it is possible that when Baron Komura’s proposals are put forward, this may be found to be the case. It may be argued that the fact that we will come to the assistance of Japan, in case the Russians, after this war, embark upon a war of revenge, is a sufficient quid pro quo; but the Japanese are well aware that if the Russians are badly beaten in this war, their next venture is much more likely to be an attack upon us through India than an attempt to wipe out old scores with them. I venture to think that one of the main reasons for Japan’s willingness to enter into this new alliance is that given by Baron Komura, namely that such an alliance will render war practically impossible. Another reason, which would account for the
alacrity with which they have accepted the new proposals is that, should the great naval action now impending go against them, our moral obligations to stand by them, in case of ultimate defeat, are stronger now than previous to the making and acceptance of these proposals.

In speaking of the unanimity and alacrity of the Japanese Government, it must be remembered that when the Elder Statesmen are in agreement with the Government, it means that the nation will follow as one man. No opposition need, therefore, be feared in Japan to the proposals which Baron Komura will put before Your Lordship.

I have, &c.

CLAUDE M. MACDONALD.

[ED. NOTE.—On May 26 Viscount Hayashi called at the Foreign Office and communicated to Lord Lansdowne a draft of the proposed Treaty. Copies were sent by Lord Lansdowne’s instruction to the War Office, Admiralty, and to Sir G. Clarke, and the text was printed on May 27 for the use of the Cabinet. It was reprinted on May 29, in parallel columns with the Treaty of January 30, 1902, as is shown below. The text was slightly modified in some points. In this form it was circulated to members of the Cabinet for their observations. The text given in the right hand column below is that of May 29; the original wording of Viscount Hayashi’s draft is shown in the footnote.]

No. 118.

Agreement between the United Kingdom and Japan relative to China and Corea.

Draft Heads of Agreement founded on communication made by Viscount Hayashi, May 26, 1905. (1)

ARTICLE I.

The objects of the present alliance are the consolidation and maintenance of general peace in the East, the conservation of the common interests of all the Powers in China, that is to say, the independence and territorial integrity of China and

(1) [P.O. Japan 678. The actual text of Viscount Hayashi’s draft was as follows:]

ARTICLE I.

The objects of the alliance are consolidation and maintenance of general peace in the Orient, conservation of common interests of all Powers in China, that is to say, “territorial integrity of China and the open door policy therein,” and the protection of respective territorial rights and special interests of the Contracting Parties in East Asia and India.

ARTICLE II.

If either Contracting Party should be wantonly attacked by any other Power or Powers or should, owing to aggressive action of any other Power or Powers, become involved in war in defence of its increased rights or interests as above defined, other Contracting Party will at once come to its assistance and will conduct war in common and make peace in mutual agreement with it.

ARTICLE III.

Obligation of one Contracting Party to come to the assistance of other as above described is territorially limited to regions of Eastern Asia and India and no obligation in that respect shall arise unless and until hostilities or warlike operations have taken place in the said regions.

ARTICLE IV.

Right of Japan to take such measures as she may deem right and necessary in order to safeguard her special political, military and economical interests in Corea is fully recognized by Great Britain.
in the extreme East, being, moreover, specially interested in maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Corea, and in securing equal opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry of all nations, hereby agree as follows:—

ARTICLE I.

The High Contracting Parties having mutually recognized the independence of China and of Corea, declare themselves to be entirely uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies in either country. Having in view, however, their special interests, of which those of Great Britain relate principally to China, while Japan, in addition to the interests which she possesses in China, is interested in a peculiar degree politically as well as commercially and industrially in Corea, the High Contracting Parties recognize that it will be admissible for either of them to take such measures as may be indispensable in order to safeguard those interests if threatened either by the aggressive action of any other Power, or by disturbances arising in China or Corea, and necessitating the intervention of either of the High Contracting Parties for the protection of the lives and property of its subjects.

equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in that country, and the protection of the respective territorial rights and special interests of the Contracting Parties in Eastern Asia and India.

ARTICLE II.

If either Contracting Party should be wantonly attacked by any other Power or Powers, or should, owing to aggressive action of any other Power or Powers, become involved in war in defence of its menaced rights or interests as above stated, [the] other Contracting Party will at once come to its assistance, will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.

ARTICLE III.

The obligation of either Contracting Party to come to the assistance of the other as above described is territorially limited to regions of Eastern Asia and India, and no obligation in that respect shall arise unless and until hostilities or warlike operations have taken place in the said regions.

ARTICLE IV.

The right of Japan to take such measures as she may deem right and necessary in

ARTICLE V.

The Agreement to remain in force for ten years from the date of signature.

ARTICLE VI.

As regards the present war between Japan and Russia, England will maintain strict neutrality unless some other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against Japan in which case England will come to the assistance of Japan and conduct war in common and make peace in mutual agreement with Japan.

Separate Articles (Secret).

ARTICLE I.

Each of the Contracting Parties will endeavour to maintain at all times in the Far East a naval force superior in strength to that of any third Power having the largest naval force in the Far East.

ARTICLE II.

Nature and degree of armed assistance and the means by which such assistance is to be made available will be arranged by the naval and military authorities of the Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE III.

In case Japan finds it necessary to establish protectorate over Corea in order to check aggressive action of any third Power and to prevent complications in connection with foreign relations of Corea, Great Britain engages to support the action of Japan.

The use of italics indicates substantial identity of wording with the final text of the Treaty. Exact identity is impossible owing to the existence of numerous minor variations.]
ARTICLE II.

If either Great Britain or Japan, in the defence of their respective interests as above described, should become involved in war with another Power, the other High Contracting Party will maintain a strict neutrality, and use its efforts to prevent other Powers from joining in hostilities against its ally.

ARTICLE III.

If, in the above event, any other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against that ally, the other High Contracting Party will come to its assistance, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.

ARTICLE IV.

The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another Power to the prejudice of the interests above described.

ARTICLE V.

Whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, the above-mentioned interests are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly.

ARTICLE VI.

The present Agreement shall come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for five years from that date.

In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have notified twelve months before the expiration of the said five years the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the High Contracting Parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance shall, ipso facto, continue until peace is concluded.

In faith whereof the Undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Govern-
ments, have signed this Agreement and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate at London, the 30th day of January, 1902.

(L.S.) (Signed) LANSDOWNE,
   His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

(L.S.) (Signed) HAYASHI,
   Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan at the Court of St. James.

Notes exchanged between the two Governments, January 30, 1902.

Sir,
M. le Marquis,

In reference to the Agreement concluded by us to-day on behalf of our respective Governments, I have the honour to inform you that the British Government recognizes that the naval forces of Great Britain and Japan act in concert with those of Japan and Great Britain in time of peace, and agrees that mutual facilities shall be given for the docking and coaling of vessels of war of one country in the ports of the other, as well as other advantages conducing to the welfare and efficacy of the respective navies of the two Powers.

At the present moment Japan and Great Britain are each of them maintaining in the extreme East a naval force superior in strength to that of any third Power. Japan has no intention of relaxing her efforts to maintain, so far as may be possible, available for concentration in the waters of the extreme East, a naval force superior to that of any third Power.

Draft Separate Articles (Secret).—Founded on communication made by Viscount Hayashi, May 26, 1905.

ARTICLE I.

Each of the Contracting Parties will endeavour to maintain at all times in the Far East a naval force superior in strength to that of any third Power having the largest naval force in the Far East.

ARTICLE II.

[The] nature and degree of [the] armed assistance, and the means by which such assistance is to be made available, will be arranged by the naval and military authorities of the Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE III.

In case Japan finds it necessary to establish [a] protectorate over Korea in order to check [the] aggressive action of any third Power, and to prevent complications in connection with [the] foreign relations of Korea, Great Britain engages to support the action of Japan.
No. 119.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir C. Mac Donald.

Tel. (No. 59.) Most Secret.
D. 5:5 p.m.

Your telegram No. 124 (of May 25. Anglo-Japanese Alliance). (1)
Inform the Japanese Government that H[is] M[ajesty’s] Government highly appreciate the spirit in which their suggestion has been met.

The Japanese Minister communicated to me yesterday the draft of the new Treaty which the Japanese Government are prepared to conclude. They will no doubt give you a copy at your request.

You may say that we are giving it our most serious consideration, and that we hope very shortly to be able to discuss it with the Japanese Minister.

(1) [v. supra, p. 125, No. 116.]

No. 120.

Sir C. Mac Donald to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

Tel. (No. 127.) Most Secret.
D. 1:20 p.m.

Your telegram No. 59 (of May 27, 1905). (1)

New Treaty.

Foreign Minister has given me a copy of document mentioned in your telegram which he says is not a draft of new treaty, but a summary of main points to be inserted in the same. With regard to article III of the summary the geographical scope does not include anything west of India, consequently Persia is excluded.

Article VI was inserted to make Great Britain’s position during present war quite clear. With regard to No. III of the secret articles, Baron Komura states that Japanese Government are of opinion that present war is the outcome of Corean intrigues in their dealings with other Powers and the “sinister influence of Russia”: the latter power by trying to gain paramount influence in Corea brought about war. In order to obviate a recurrence of this, Japanese Government are determined to establish a protectorate over Corea and take foreign relations of that country into their hands; existing treaties with other Powers will be of course respected and upheld.

(1) [v. immediately preceding document.]

No. 121.

Minute by the Marquess of Lansdowne.

Anglo-Japanese Agreement.


I circulate a revised draft for the consideration of the Cabinet. (1)

It has been seen by the Prime Minister.

I shall be obliged to any of my colleagues who have suggestions to make for the amendment of the draft, if they will favour me with them as soon as possible.

Lt.

31/5.

(1) [Some footnotes, appended to the revised draft of June 5, 1905, infra, pp. 134-5, show the differences between the draft of May 31 and that of June 5.]
No. 122.

Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

F.O. Japan 673.  
Tel. (No. 181.) Most Secret.  
Tokio, June 1, 1905.  
Tel.  (No. 181.) Most Secret.  

Your telegram No. 61 of May 30.  
Withdrawal of battleships.  
I will ascertain views of the Japanese Government, but unless arrangement is  
temporary, they will most probably dissent on account of No. 1 of the secret articles  
of the new alliance.

MINUTE.

But our existing Agreement with Japan which is reproduced in Art. I (secret) as  
comm[unicated] by Viscount Hayashi, only binds us to keep a stronger naval force in Far Eastern  
Waters than any third Power. With 7 armoured cruisers we should be far stronger than any  
third Power except possibly the U[nited] S[tates] who have three Battleships, but nothing worth  
mentioning in the cruiser class.

P. A. G.  
1/6.  
L.

[Not reproduced. It states the Admiralty's view that the retention of British battleships  
in the Far East was unnecessary owing to the destruction of the Russian fleet. F.O. Japan 694.]

No. 128.

Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

F.O. Japan 673.  
Tel. (No. 185.)  
Tokio, June 2, 1905.  

Your telegram No. 61: Withdrawal of battleships.  
Following is the reply of the Japanese Admiralty:—

"The Imperial Navy Department believes it to be advisable as a temporary  
measure that the British battle-ships be withdrawn to European waters in  
consideration of event (of) complications arising out of peace negotiations, and that  
a squadron of five armoured cruisers should be kept in the East. They hope,  
however, that the British Government will recognize as an established principle  
the absolute necessity that each allied Empire should always maintain a naval  
force in the waters of the Far East superior in strength to that of any third  
Power having the largest naval force in the Far East."

No. 124.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir C. MacDonald.

F.O. Japan 673.  
Tel. (No. 64.)  

Your tel[egram] No. 185 (of June 2nd. Withdrawal of battleships on China  
Station).  

Question will come before Cabinet on Tuesday when I will inform you of final  
decision.

[16942]  

[16942] [v. immediately preceding document.]  

k 3
We fully recognize necessity of providing ample security in waters of Far East, and Japanese Gov[ernmen]t may rest assured that we shall make no proposal inconsistent with this principle.

[ED. NOTE.—As the result of the circulation of the draft treaty on May 20, a number of criticisms were made of its wording. The following revised draft shows the results of these suggestions.]

No. 125.

Minute by the Marquess of Lansdowne.

Anglo-Japanese Agreement.

F.O. Japan 678.

I circulate a fresh revise of the draft in which I have endeavoured to give effect to suggestions made by several of my colleagues.

L.

Foreign Office, June 5, 1905.

Draft Agreement.

PREAMBLE.

The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, being desirous of replacing the Agreement concluded between them on the 30th January, 1902, by fresh stipulations, have agreed upon the following Articles, which have for their object—

(a.) The protection of the respective rights and special interests of the contracting parties in Eastern and Southern Asia, and notably those of Japan in Korea and in territories adjoining Japan, and those of Great Britain in India and in territories adjoining India; (1)
(b.) The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China;
(c.) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the East:—

ARTICLE I.

If in consequence of unprovoked attack, or of aggressive action on the part of any other Power or Powers, either Party should become involved in war in defence of its rights and special interests mentioned in section (a) of the preamble, (2) the other Contracting Party will at once come to its assistance, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.

(1) [In the draft circulated on May 81, (a) and (c) were in the reverse order. (c), i.e., the (a) of June 5, differed in the wording of the latter part. After "Southern Asia" it reads "including territories in proximity to Japan, notably Korea, and in proximity to India, notably Afghanistan and Sistan," instead of the words given in italics in the above text of June 5.]

(2) [Draft circulated 81 May: "If either contracting party should be unprovokedly attacked by any other Power or Powers, or should in pursuance of the objects mentioned in the preamble of this Agreement, become involved in war owing to the aggressive action of any Power or Powers," &c.]
ARTICLE II.

The obligation of either Contracting Party to come to the assistance of the other, as provided in the preceding Article, is limited in respect of operations on land to the regions mentioned in section (a) of the preamble, and no obligation in that respect(*) shall arise unless and until hostilities or warlike operations have taken place or are apprehended in the said regions.

ARTICLE III.

The right of Japan to take such measures as she may deem right and necessary in order to safeguard her special political, military, and economical interests in Korea is fully recognized by Great Britain, provided always that such measures do not infringe the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industries of all nations.(*)

ARTICLE IV.

Japan, on the other hand, equally recognizes the special interests of Great Britain in the regions adjacent to the Indian frontier and her right to take such measures as she may deem proper and necessary in order to safeguard those interests.

ARTICLE V.

The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another Power to the prejudice of the interests above described.

ARTICLE VI.

In order that the alliance may not be invoked without clear and unavoidable necessity, it is agreed that whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, the above-mentioned interests are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly.

ARTICLE VII.

The present Agreement shall, subject to the provisions of Article VIII, come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for ten years from that date.

In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have notified twelve months before the expiration of the said ten years the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the High Contracting Parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance shall, ipso facto, continue until peace is concluded.

ARTICLE VIII.

As regards the present war between Japan and Russia, Great Britain will continue to maintain strict neutrality unless some other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against Japan, in which case England will come to the assistance of Japan, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with Japan.

(*) [Draft circulated 81 May: "to afford military assistance on land to the other as provided in the preceding article, is limited to the regions of Eastern Asia and India, and those immediately adjacent to the Indian frontier. No obligation in respect of assistance other than naval, shall arise unless and until hostilities or warlike operations have taken place in the said regions.
(*) [Draft circulated 81 May: "Existing treaty rights.

[16942] x 4
Notes to be exchanged containing the following Stipulations.

(A.)

After the conclusion of the present war, each of the Contracting Parties will endeavour to maintain at all times available for concentration in the waters of the Far East a naval force superior in strength to that of any third Power. *(*)

(B.)

The nature and degree of armed assistance to be afforded by either Power to the other in the circumstances mentioned in the Agreement signed this day, and the means by which such assistance is to be made available, will be arranged by the Naval and Military authorities of the Contracting Parties, who will from time to time consult one another fully and freely upon all questions of mutual interest. *(*)

*Note.—This will probably require modification. As the text stands it might compel the Parties to maintain a superfluously large number of ships in the Far East. [L.]*

[ED. NOTE.—On June 6, Viscount Hayashi called to see Lord Lansdowne and a further discussion took place as to the terms of the proposed treaty. The following extract from Lord Lansdowne’s despatch No. 98 of June 6 to Sir G. Macdonald gives Lord Lansdowne’s views as expressed on this occasion:

"I said that the main points seemed to be the definition of—

(i) the interests for the sake of which the Contracting Parties were prepared to go to war;

(ii) the geographical limits within which each Party might assist the other; and

(iii) the nature and extent of that assistance.

As to (a) [(i)], I read to Viscount Hayashi the following Preamble and Articles which I told him I had drafted tentatively for the purpose of discussion:

Preamble.

The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, being desirous of replacing the Agreement concluded between them on the 80th January, 1902, by fresh stipulations, have agreed upon the following Articles, which have for their object—

(a.) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the East;

(b.) The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China;

(c.) The maintenance of the territorial integrity of the possessions of the Contracting Parties in Eastern and South Eastern Asia, and the defence of their special rights and interests in the countries in the proximity of such possessions.

ARTICLE I.

It is agreed that whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, any of the interests referred to in the Preamble of this Agreement are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly, and will consider in common the measures which should be taken in order to safeguard those interests.

ARTICLE II.

If in consequence of unprovoked attack, or of aggressive action on the part of any other Power or Powers, either Party should become involved in war in defence of its rights and special interests mentioned in section (c) of the preamble, the other Contracting Party will at once come to its assistance, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it."

On the next day the whole draft treaty was printed once more for the use of the Cabinet. The Preamble and Articles I and II were as given above; Article II of the previous draft (v. supra; *(*) The words in italics were not in the draft of May 81, which ended with "Contracting Parties." )
No. 126.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir C. MacDonald.

F.O. Japan 673.

(No. 101.)

Sir, Foreign Office, June 10, 1905.

I gave the Japanese Minister to-day a draft of the proposed Agreement between Great Britain and Japan of which a copy is attached to this Despatch. (*)

Viscount Hayashi had already seen the preamble and the first two Articles of the Draft. I called his attention particularly to the fact that should hostilities due to unprovoked attack &c., arise in some region outside the limits described in paragraph C of the preamble and should those hostilities subsequently endanger the interests of Great Britain within those limits, Japan would be bound under Art[icle] II to come to our assistance. Viscount Hayashi said that he fully understood that this was intended.

I also pointed out to him the manner in which the paragraph marked A was now drawn. We contemplated that the necessary naval force should be available for concentration in the waters of the Far East but not necessarily maintained in those waters. We had also stipulated that each party should maintain a force superior in strength not to that of any other Power, but to that of any European Power in those seas. This was done in order that we might not be compelled to level our fleets up to the strength of the naval force maintained by the U[nited] S[tates] in or near the Far East. We did not consider it at all likely that we should be at war with the United States and unless this exception were made Great Britain and Japan would each be obliged to maintain a superfluous number of ships.

I said that we desired to obtain the opinion of the Japanese Government as to the maximum limit to be named in para[graph] B.

I explained to Viscom[mit] Hayashi that the draft had been prepared upon the basis of the outline with which he had supplied me and that it was offered to the Japanese Government as a basis for discussion.

He expressed his thanks and promised to communicate the draft to the Japanese Government by telegram.

I am, &c.

LANSDOWNE.

(*) [v. infra, pp. 165-9. The draft was minuted by King Edward "Approved provisionally. E.R."]

No. 127.

Brigadier-General J. M. Grierson to Sir Thomas Sanderson.

F.O. Japan 673.
St. James's Square, S.W.,


Dear Sir Thomas,

In accordance with the request contained in your letter of the 8th instant, (*) I enclose our observations on the proposed Anglo-Japanese Agreement.

(*) [Not reproduced.]
I know it to be your wish that we should, as a rule, limit what we have to say to the purely military side of the question, and I have therefore dealt solely with the two points on which Lord Lansdowne asked for an opinion.

I trust I may be pardoned for saying here, however, that Japan seems to derive more advantage from the Agreement than we do. If she is attacked by any Power we are, as I read the Agreement, bound to assist her; while if we are attacked she is not bound to assist us unless the attack is made on our possessions in East or South-east Asia—an improbable, in fact almost impossible, contingency with the exception of an attack by Russia, and even in the latter case the value of Japanese assistance is somewhat problematical.

From a military point of view therefore it would, I think, be to our advantage if the treaty should refer to a coalition only, each Power being solely responsible for safeguarding its own interests against the aggression of a third Power. However, there may be many reasons of a non-military nature which justify us concluding the Agreement, and of these I am not qualified to judge.

I should add that possibly, though not very probably, the observations I enclose may require modification when the situation in the Far East is cleared up as a result of the present war.

I remain, &c.

J. M. GRIERSON.

Enclosure in No. 127.

*Observations by the General Staff, War Office, on the Proposed Anglo-Japanese Agreement.*

Lord Lansdowne requests that the General Staff will give their opinion as to whether any, and if so what, proposals would be mutually advantageous for defining:—

(a.) The character of the military assistance to be afforded by either Power to the other.

(b.) The territorial limits within which such assistance should be given.

2. In the first place it seems necessary to recapitulate the objects aimed at by the Contracting Parties. They may be stated thus:—

Japan desires to remain predominant in, if not in actual possession of, Korea; to preserve the integrity of China, or at any rate to prevent any Power other than herself from extending its influence in that country; and to feel secure against a hostile coalition which may, sooner or later, be formed against her with the view of impeding that commercial progress which she no doubt hopes to make after she has finished with Russia.

On our side we desire to maintain the "open door" in China, and the integrity of Afghanistan and Persia—in other words, the integrity of China and the safety of India.({}^2)

As regards China, therefore, the interests of the two Parties are more or less identical, and accordingly it is to the advantage of each that the other should not be attacked and defeated by a third Power or coalition of Powers.

3. At the same time it would appear not to be prudent to place too much reliance on Japan coming to our assistance in the event of our becoming involved in war in defence of our special interests in India. History furnishes many examples of expected assistance not being forthcoming, owing to different interpretations being respectively placed on the wording of a treaty by the parties to it. A celebrated case—

(*) [Marginal correction by Lord Lansdowne: "extends to."]

(*) [Marginal note by Lord Lansdowne: "I am not sure that this is quite a fair recital."]
to quote only one—is that of the difference between England and Holland in 1756 as to the meaning of the treaties of guarantee of 1678, 1709, 1718, and 1777. By these treaties England and Holland guaranteed to each other all their rights and possessions in Europe against "all kings, princes, republics, and states," and specific assistance was stipulated if either should "be attacked or molested by hostile act or open war, or in any other manner disturbed in the possession of its states, territories, rights, immunities, and freedom of commerce." On assistance being demanded by England from Holland, however, the latter Power declined to give it, arguing that the guarantee applied only to cases in which the State in want of help was in the first instance the attacked and not the attacking party in the war, and alleged that England was in fact the aggressor.

4. There is only one guarantee that the Power which signs a treaty will fulfil the military obligations which the treaty imposes. (*). It is that the acts which it has bound itself to perform or to leave undone, are acts which its own interests, and which an intelligent and patriotic view of its own welfare, require to be done or to be left undone. In short, for a treaty to bo of real value it must be the expression of permanent interests on both sides. . . . (*)

5. Turning to the question of Japan being the party attacked, it is evident that we could not send any considerable body of troops to assist her in the Far East, for we might at any moment require all we have for employment across the North-West Frontier of India. Still, a force of cavalry and Horse Artillery, arms which for all practical purposes the Japanese army does not possess, and which it might be found possible to spare from India, might bo of incalculable value to the Japanese Forces. At the conference held in 1902 between the War Office and the Japanese authorities the latter seemed to hope that we would send troops to them, but judging from what Viscount Hayashi has said it appears that no help in this shape is now needed or expected.

10. Japan might, however, expect us to take military measures against Russia in other parts of the world, and this, with the possible exception of taking advantage of such insurrectionary movements as at present obtain in the Caucasus, we could only do through Afghanistan. We might accordingly be placed in a very difficult position, for unless Russia invaded Afghanistan we could not reach her forces except by invading that country ourselves. If we did invade it, we should be regarded by the Afghans as the aggressors, and in all probability would have to fight them as well as the Russians.(*)

11. So far as war with Russia alone is concerned, therefore, the case may be summarised thus:

(a.) We cannot depend upon Japan sending troops to assist us across the North-West Frontier of India, as the war with Russia might be begun under circumstances which, to Japan, would not appear to justify her in sending them, or indeed going to war at all.

(b.) If, eventually, she were able and willing to send them we might lose rather than gain by their help.

(c.) Action taken by her against Russian possessions in the Far East would not necessarily relieve to any great extent pressure on India. (Para. 7.)

(d.) If Japan were the party attacked, we might not be able to bring pressure to bear on Russia in any part of the world except Central Asia, and probably

(*) [Marginal note by Lord Lansdowne: "True—but this difficulty is inherent."]

(*) [Paragraphs 5-8 are here omitted. They may be summarised as follows: Paragraphs 5-6 discuss the value of the integrity of Afghanistan and Persia to Japan, and the possible invasion of the two countries by Russia. Paragraphs 7-8 deal with the difficulties in the way of Japanese cooperation in the defence of India, and suggest that the Government of India's opinion should be taken.

(*) [Marginal note by Lord Lansdowne: "The practicability of such measures would have to be discussed by the two Governments or their expert advisers. We must assume that the Japanese are reasonable.""]]
not even there—at any rate for a long time and with considerable difficulty—unless she first invaded Afghanistan.

(c) The above amounts to the conclusion that so far as military operations are concerned neither Party can be of direct assistance to the other; and indirectly only to a problematical extent.

12. In the event of France or Germany being hostile, Japanese troops could be effectively employed against the foreign possessions of these Powers. France attaches great value to Indo-China, and Germany to Kiaochau. Both these localities would therefore constitute useful objectives. The Japanese Navy would also prove valuable to us in helping to clear the sea and so admit of reinforcements being sent to India. It must be remembered, however, that the first and main attack by these Powers would be made in the Western Hemisphere, and the brunt of it we should have to bear unaided. Regarded from this standpoint, Japan—a very shrewd nation—would appear to have decidedly the best of the bargain. She cannot, until the whole strategical situation has been greatly changed from what it now is, either be invaded or suddenly subjected to serious attack on the sea; and therefore she can always depend upon our aid becoming available in sufficient time to be of use to her. We, on the other hand, might be attacked weeks or even months before Japanese assistance could possibly produce any effect.

13. In the military contingency of the United States being hostile, Japanese troops could advantageously be employed against the Philippines, and also against the States themselves, thus indirectly assisting in the defence of Canada.

14. In none of the above cases would it seem necessary or desirable to define in the Agreement either the character of the assistance to be afforded or the territorial limits within which such assistance should be given. In these days the strategical situation changes so quickly that arrangements made for combined action must frequently be revised, and therefore they can, it is thought, best be dealt with, as required from time to time, by the Naval and Military authorities of the contracting parties. (7)

15. The General Staff are of opinion, however, that the territories to which the treaty is intended to refer should be more clearly defined either in (c) of the preamble or in Article IV, than they are at present. Neither Afghanistan nor Persia are situated in "South-eastern Asia," and unless these two countries are specifically mentioned the treaty might, as stated in paragraphs 5 and 6, be interpreted to our disadvantage.

MINUTE.

It is rather surprising to me that this extremely important expression of opinion should not have been elicited earlier in the day by the Secretary of State for War.

I do not agree with some of General Grierson's arguments and there is a passage in his letter which shows I think that he somewhat misapprehends the nature of the Japanese obligation.

Please have letter and memorandum printed as quickly as possible and copy sent to Mr. Balfour.

Do not print my pencilled notes. (8)

L.
17/6.

(7) [Marginal note by Lord Lansdowne: "This seems right." (8) [These are given above, pp. 138–40, note (8) to (7).]

No. 128.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir C. MacDonald.

F.O. Japan 678.

(No. 108.)

Sir,

The Japanese Minister brought me to-day a revised draft of which a copy is attached to this despatch, of the proposed new Anglo-Japanese Agreement. (8)

(8) [infra, pp. 165–9, No. 155, column 2.]
I told Viscount Hayashi that the new drafting of Article II seemed to me to effect a substantial alteration in its meaning. Under our draft, one Contracting Party would come to the assistance of the other in the event of its interests being "endangered." Under the Japanese draft, assistance would be given only where the other Party had actually become involved in war.

Viscount Hayashi explained to me that the Japanese proposal to strike out Article IV was due to the fact that Japan did not admit that the interests of Great Britain in the proximity of the Indian frontier were open to question. The Article seemed to them therefore superfluous. On the other hand they wished to retain Article III, which deals with Korea, in which country Japan had acquired a predominant position. Great Britain and several other Powers had however interests in Korea, and it was therefore necessary to make it clear that the paramount position of Japan in Korea was to be recognised. She would have to make her own terms with the other Powers interested in that country.

I told Viscount Hayashi that the omission of Article IV was, in my opinion, to be deprecated. That Article and Article III balanced one another, and both of them seemed to me to be necessary in order to make it clear that, whether Japan became involved owing to the aggression of another Power upon Korea, or whether India became involved owing to the aggression of another Power upon countries adjoining India, the involved party would in either case have a right to call upon the other to come to its aid.

With regard to the proposed omission of Stipulation B, Viscount Hayashi said that the Japanese Government were opposed to the idea of naming a maximum limit. If the two countries went to war as allies, each country would have to put forth its full strength. We should put forth the whole of our naval power, and Japan would be ready to do the same with her land forces.

Irrespective of this, the Japanese Government were convinced that the nature and scope of the assistance to be given should be the subject of arrangement between the military and the naval advisers of the two Powers, and that any such arrangement should be subject to revision from time to time.

Viscount Hayashi told me that Japan would be glad to know whether we thought that the new Agreement, if concluded, should be made public before the end of the present war.

[I am, &c.]  
[L[ANSDOWNE].

MINUTE BY KING EDWARD.  
App[rove]d.—E.R.

No. 129.

Sir C. Macdonald to the Marquess of Lansdowne.  
F.O. Japan 678.  
(No. 172.) Most Secret.  
Tokio, D. June 29, 1905.  
R. July 31, 1905.

On the 29th instant, I telegraphed to Your Lordship that Baron Komura had handed to me Your Lordship's draft of the new Alliance and the amended Japanese counter-draft. (1)

Baron Komura has, on several occasions approached me on the subject, and asked whether Your Lordship had communicated with me respecting the terms of the draft and counter-draft. I have always replied that I had had no communication since

(1) [v. infra, pp. 165-9, No. 155, columns 1 and 2.]
May 27 (Your Lordship’s telegram No. 59(*)), and that I had no authority to discuss the terms in any way, but I had no objection, since he had shown me the two drafts, to talk the matter over with him quite informally and privately, and on more than one occasion we have discussed the terms of the new Alliance in this manner.

Yesterday I saw Baron Komura, and he again asked me whether I had heard anything from Your Lordship with regard to the Japanese Counter-draft. On my replying in the negative, he said that doubtless the arrival of Prince and Princess Arisugawa in London was occupying the attention of everybody to a great extent and an answer could not be expected until their visit was over. I pointed out that the visit of Their Imperial Highnesses, being without political motive, was a matter which concerned the Royal Family and the people of England more than it concerned the Government. The delay was doubtless due to the very great importance of the question, which was one which had to be most carefully weighed and considered, and could not be decided in a hurry.

Baron Komura spoke again about the two drafts, and repeated much that he had said before, which, as I think it may prove interesting, I venture to place as briefly as possible before Your Lordship.

Baron Komura said it would be noticed that, in the Japanese amended draft, no mention was made in the preamble or elsewhere of England’s special interests in China, such as was made in the Anglo-Japanese alliance now in force, which contains a special allusion to the interests of Great Britain in China; but the Japanese Government considered that this was entirely covered by the wording of (c) in the preamble of the Japanese amended draft, which lays down that the Treaty has for its objects “the maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contracting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and India,” which, he said, of course included China.

As to the second half of Article IV of the British draft, which lays down that “Japan equally recognizes the special interests of Great Britain in the region adjacent to the Indian frontier, and her right to take such measures as she may deem proper and necessary in order to safeguard those interests,” Baron Komura pointed out that, as Japan had no interests whatever in those regions, and considered that Great Britain had every right to take any steps whatever to guard her interests on her Indian frontier, and in the countries adjacent, Japan would consider it as an interference on her part to place such a statement on record.

As to Article III in the Japanese amended draft, which commences, “Japan possessing special paramount political, military, and economical interests in Korea, . . .” Baron Komura could not conceal from me that this was the real object of the whole alliance, and the readiness and alacrity with which Japan has accepted the proposal of His Majesty’s Government to form a new alliance, and relative to which I expressed surprise in my last despatch on the subject (No. 143 of the May 25(*)), is now pretty clearly revealed.

Japan has quite determined, after the war, to establish a protectorate over Korea. This being so, the Anglo-Japanese alliance, as it at present stands, would be a most inconvenient stumbling-block. For, as Your Lordship is aware, the language of the preamble and of the first article lays down that “Great Britain and Japan are specially interested in maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Korea.”

As, by Article III of the Japanese amended draft, Great Britain “recognises the right of Japan to take such measures of guidance, control, and protection in Korea as she may deem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance” her interests in that country, it is clear that the present Anglo-Japanese alliance must disappear, and the quid pro quo offered by Japan for Great Britain’s acquiescence in Japan’s protectorate over Korea is practical immunity from an attack on India by Russia.

Baron Komura has several times mentioned that the geographical scope, as

(*) [v. supra, p. 182, No. 119.]
(‡) [v. supra, pp. 126-8, No. 117.]
represented by the words in the British draft—"Eastern and South-Eastern Asia"—seemed somewhat extended, and that "Eastern Asia and India" appeared to him less likely to give rise to misapprehension in the future.

As to this point I had an interesting conversation yesterday afternoon with Mr. Denison, the adviser to the Japanese Foreign Office. Mr. Denison, I have no doubt whatever, drafted the "Japanese amended draft." He told me that the Japanese were afraid that the English wording—"Eastern and South-Eastern Asia"—meant that Japan might be called upon to take part in punitive expeditions, into Thibet, Afghanistan or other recalcitrant border states! For that reason, they had also asked that the second half of Article IV of the English draft might be struck out.

Mr. Denison had assured the members of the Cabinet that Great Britain would only call for Japanese co-operation when she was attacked in India by one of the Great Powers, and that she was quite capable of policing her frontiers. Mr. Denison said that the Japanese Government thoroughly understood that, if Russia attacked by way of Persia, the alliance would at once come into operation. He also said that the quid pro quo for this co-operation in India was England's acquiescence in Japan's protectorate over Corea.

I have, &c.

CLAUDE M. MACDONALD.

No. 190.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir C. MacDonald.

F.O. Japan 678.
(Nb. 114.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 1, 1905.

I asked the Japanese Minister to call upon me this evening, and showed him the second British draft of the proposed Anglo-Japanese Agreement. (1) I called Viscount Hayashi's attention to the points at which it differed from the Japanese counter-draft communicated by him to me on the 23rd of June.

With reference to Article II, I again asked him whether I was right in supposing that, in the view of the Japanese Government, each of the Contracting Parties was bound to come to the assistance of the other should it become involved in war in defence of its territorial rights and special interests, irrespective of the fact that the quarrel might have arisen in some other part of the world—e.g., I said, out of a quarrel between Great Britain and Russia as to Denmark. Viscount Hayashi uneasily answered that I was right in my assumption.

We had some conversation with regard to the proposal to insert in Article III (the Korean Article) words having reference to the treaty rights of other nations. The Minister told me very frankly that Japan desired to be given as fair a hand as possible in Korea, but admitted that our commerce should be given equal opportunities in that country. They were however reluctant to say too much about the treaty rights of other nations. He was afraid that some other nation might put forward a claim based upon an exaggerated interpretation of a most-favoured-nation treatment clause, and that we might thereupon find ourselves called upon to take part of that other nation. I pointed out to him that no agreement which we could make would have the effect of depriving a third Power of any treaty rights to which she was entitled, and that I thought it might be good policy to insert in our Treaty words making it quite clear that we neither of us desired to encroach upon the rights of others.

Viscount Hayashi raised no objection to my proposal to retain Article IV (the Indian Article) to which I told him we attached considerable importance.

(1) [v. infra, pp. 165–6, No. 155, column 1 and notes.]
As to Note B, he pointed out that Japan would henceforth be obliged so to organise her military forces in time of peace as to provide in time of war a suitable force for service in India. Such a force, he said, would be outside her ordinary preparations. On the other hand, he could conceive a case in which Russia might concentrate the whole of her strength in an attack upon Japan in the hope of overwhelming her at the outset of the war. In such a case it would not be possible for her to send to India the number of men stipulated for. I said that I thought the wording of Note B was capable of improvement, but that we attached importance to making it perfectly clear that the military arrangements of Japan would henceforth provide for an expeditionary force available for service in India.

The Minister apparently regarded with approval the new Note D.

I gave His Excellency a copy of the new draft, explaining that it had not yet been seen by the Cabinet, and that His Majesty's Government must not be regarded as officially committed to its terms.

[1 am, &c.]
L[ANSDOWNE].

MINUTE BY KING EDWARD.

App[rove]d.—F.R.

No. 181.

Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

F.O. Japan 673.
(No. 170.)
Tel. P.(1)

Tokio, July 8, 1905.

The following is secret, having reference to the new alliance:

I saw Baron Komura this morning. His Excellency gave me a copy of the amendments made by your Lordship to the Japanese counter-proposals.(2) He also gave me a copy of the Japanese reply to these amendments, which he had sent to Viscount Hayashi on the 6th instant. I have also just seen the Prime Minister. Both Ministers repeated the arguments set forth in the Japanese reply. They dwelt strongly on the two very important points regarding which agreement has not yet been reached by the two Powers.

I refer to the geographical scope of the new alliance, and the change which your Lordship has proposed in Article III, viz., that the following words should be introduced: "Provided always that such measures do not infringe" the Treaty rights of other Powers.

With regard to the first of these points, the Japanese Government think that the wording proposed by your Lordship, "region in proximity to the Indian frontier," is tantamount to an indefinite extension of the geographical scope, and to such an indefinite extension the Japanese people and all the members of the Grand Council are very averse. The scope indicated by the formula "India and Eastern Asia" is to them definite and clear.

The following points came out clearly in the course of my conversation with Count Katsura and Baron Komura:

1. They think that we might consider ourselves entitled to invoke the alliance should we undertake a punitive expedition into any of the States in proximity to the frontier, e.g., Afghanistan, Thibet, or Persia, and Japan would thus

(1) [This is given in paraphrase, as the original cannot be traced.]
(2) [i.e. immediately preceding document.]
become involved in war with that State. I said that I had no instructions from your Lordship, but I did not think that it was intended by His Majesty's Government to construe the Article in any such sense.

2. They think that, should we undertake such a punitive expedition and some other Power were to object, Japan would become involved with us against this third Power. I did not venture an opinion on this point.

3. The Ministers are of opinion that, for all practical purposes, the region in proximity to the Indian frontier is included in the alliance, because the alliance would at once become operative were India involved, and trouble could hardly rise in that region without India being drawn in. They dislike Article IV, however, as proposed by us, because they think it will alarm the people of this country and make them think that the Government is going too far afield. The Japanese Government readily recognize that we have special interests in this region, but as they have no interests whatever there, they think it out of place to mention our special position.

With Corea the case is different. There, while they have special interests, we have interests too, and therefore Corea is specially mentioned.

With regard to the insertion of the words proposed by your Lordship in Article III, the reasons given in the Japanese reply for their omission seem to be fair and reasonable, and I could see, from my conversation with Count Katsura and Baron Komura, that if His Majesty's Government persist on this point the new alliance will be in very close danger of shipwreck.

No. 192.

Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

Tokio, July 8, 1905.

F.O. Japan 678. D. 7 P.M.
Tel. (No. 171.) Secret. R. 9 P.M.

New alliance. My immediately preceding tel[egram]. Min[ister] for For[eign] Aff[airs] at our interview this morning admitted that as a Japanese protectorate of Corea after the war was absolutely essential to the future peace of Japan the Japanese Gov[ernment] had considered what quid pro quo they could offer to Great Britain in order to induce her to acquiesce in such a protectorate and to nullify the declarations resp[ecting] the independence of Corea contained in preamble and art[icle] I of existing agreement. As a result of the deliberations they had decided to acquiesce in an arrangement by which invasion of India by Russia was rendered a very remote contingency. Considering that whether we acquiesced in establishment of such a protectorate or not, the protectorate being essential to Japan's future peace will merely be established and that this alliance will render India free from all fear of attack for many generations to come I venture to think that we should accept the Japanese reply without further delay. I am aware that my opinion has not been asked but as H[is] M[ajesty's] representative on the spot I venture to put it before Y[our] E[xcellency].

[16942]
Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

F.O. Japan 678.

Tel. Private.

Tokio, July 12, 1905.

D. 9 P.M.

R. 8 P.M.

My telegram No. 171 of July 8.(1) Following is an extract from a private letter to me from H[is] M[ajesty's] Representative at Seoul dated July 7. "It may be heresy to say so but I feel certain that nothing short of a protectorate will ever save the situation here. In the interests of Coreans themselves this is the only possible solution and the people as distinguished from the officials would I believe infinitely prefer it to Government which they have had during last 10 years of nominal independence."

Above is spontaneous—I have (not) mentioned subject of protectorate to Mr. (Sir J.) Jordan.

(1) [r. immediately preceding document.]

* * *

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir C. MacDonald.

F.O. Japan 678.

(No. 122.) Secret.

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 14, 1905.

The Japanese Minister brought to me to-day the criticisms of the Imperial Government upon the second British draft of the new Anglo-Japanese Agreement(2) —vide my despatch No. 114 of the 1st July.(2) They were as follows:—

Article III. The Japanese Government propose to retain in the first line the word "paramount," omitting the word "special." They desire to omit in the same Article the reference to the Treaty rights of other nations. The proviso should, they think, run as follows—"provided always that such measures do not infringe the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations." Viscount Hayashi explained to me that in the opinion of the Imperial Government the reference to "the treaty rights of other nations" would encourage other Powers entitled to most-favoured-nation treatment in Corea to strain their rights against Japan. As I was aware, there were many interpretations of most-favoured-nation treatment, and some Powers who enjoyed a right to it were in the habit of claiming in respect of that right equality of treatment not only in regard to commerce, but in respect, e.g., of the construction of railways and telegraphs. It would be very inconvenient to Japan that such equality should be claimed by the Powers in Corea, and the Japanese Government deprecated the use of language which would not only encourage such claims but render it difficult for Great Britain not to support them. The original wording, as at first proposed by us, was sufficient to protect "the real interests" of other Powers.

Article IV. The Japanese Government begged that this Article should be omitted, not because they did not recognise the special interests of Great Britain in the regions in proximity to the Indian frontier and our right to safeguard those interests in whatever way we considered proper and necessary, nor because, should we become involved in war by so doing, the Japanese Government desired to be relieved of the responsibility of coming to our assistance. The words

(1) [v. infra, pp. 105-9, No. 155, column 1 and notes.]

(2) [v. supra, pp. 148-4, No. 130.]
"wherever arising" in Article II accepted by Japan showed clearly that they had no wish to impose any such limitations. On the other hand, the Japanese Government considered that the Article as it stood would have a disturbing effect upon public opinion in Japan, and would in appearance give a geographical extension to the Agreement wider than had ever been contemplated by the Japanese Government.

His Excellency in these circumstances was instructed to tell me that the Imperial Government are prepared "to consider as perfectly legitimate within the meaning of Article II all measures which the British Government may see fit to take in regions in the proximity of the Indian frontier, provided those measures are found necessary for safeguarding their territorial rights in India itself. In other words the Imperial Government will regard such measures on the part of the British Government as essentially defensive and non-provocative in their nature, and consequently such measures will not in the opinion of the Imperial Government prevent Article II from being effective or preclude an appeal to it."

Viscount Hayashi went on to propose the omission of paragraphs A, B, and D at the end of the draft. He said that, in the opinion of the Japanese Government, the nature of the assistance given by one party to the other must depend upon "the character of the conflict," which could not be foreseen. Any attempt therefore to define long in advance the extent of that assistance would be unwise, and would hamper rather than strengthen the Alliance.

It would therefore be much better that all these questions should be dealt with from time to time by the military and naval authorities of the two Powers.

I told Viscount Hayashi that I would lose no time in bringing his observations before my colleagues.

I also asked him whether, assuming that we were able to come to terms, he thought it would be desirable to make public the fact that an agreement had been arrived at. It seemed to me that such an announcement at the very moment when peace negotiations were commencing might be subject to criticism.

Viscount Hayashi said that in his opinion there was considerable force in this argument. The Japanese Government would however be glad to have the matter settled as soon as possible. He would communicate with them in regard to the question which I had raised.

[I am, &c.]  
L. [ANSDOWNE].

MINUTE BY KING EDWARD.

App[rove]d.—E.R.

No. 135.

Sir G. MacDonald to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

F.O. Japan 673.  
(No. 188.) Secret.  
My Lord,  
Tōkūd, D. July 15, 1905.  
R. August 14, 1905.

With reference to the amendments made by Your Lordship to the Japanese Counter-Proposals respecting the New Alliance, and the Japanese reply thereto, which was telegraphed from here to Viscount Hayashi on the 6th instant, I ventured to point out by telegraph on the 8th instant,(1) which I had also stated in my despatch No. 172 of June 29th,(2) that the new alliance partook of the nature of a bargain in which,

(1) [v. supra, pp. 144–5, No. 131.]  
(2) [v. supra, pp. 141–3, No. 129.]  

[16942]  

2
in return for our acquiescence in the protectorate which Japan intended to establish over Korea at the conclusion of the war, she would engage to assist us should our Indian Empire be attacked by a third Power. I also pointed out that this acquiescence would entail a reconsideration and amendment of the pledge made in conjunction with Japan in the preamble and Article 1 of the now-existing Anglo-Japanese agreement recognizing the territorial integrity and independence of the Empire of Korea.

I ventured also in the above-quoted telegram to state that, as Japan would most certainly establish such a protectorate whether we acquiesced or not, and as her assistance in the matter of an attack on the Indian Empire would render such an event a practical impossibility for generations to come, I thought that we should accept the terms of the Japanese reply without delay. As to the future Japanese protectorate over Korea and the certainty that it will come I think there can be little doubt; reports sent to Your Lordship by Sir John Jordan from time to time show that the Japanese are getting the entire administration of the country into their hands, and both the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister have mentioned to me that a continuance of the state of affairs which existed in Korea before the war, and which to a certain extent exists now, was impossible and would inevitably lead to further Russian intrigues and possible war. In connection with this, Baron Komura informed me that the Emperor only two months ago was in secret correspondence with M. Paylof in Shanghai. At my last interview with these two statesmen they both said that a Japanese protectorate over Korea was essential to the peace of the Far East.

Since sending my telegram of the 8th instant, I have received on the 12th a letter dated the 7th from Sir John Jordan, than whom no one is more fitted to give an opinion which contains the following passage:—

"It may be heresy to say so" (Sir John is probably thinking of the existing Anglo-Japanese agreement), "but I feel certain that nothing short of a protectorate will ever save the situation here. In the interests of the Coreans themselves this is the only possible solution, and the people, as distinguished from the officials would, I believe, infinitely prefer it to the Government they have had during the last ten years of nominal independence."

As Your Lordship may remember, I was appointed Her Majesty's Representative to Korea in 1896, presenting my credentials personally to the Corean Emperor, then King, in March 1897; from my experience of the country and people I am entirely in accord with the views here put forward by Sir John Jordan. But whether we are right or wrong a Japanese protectorate over Korea will certainly be established after the war.

With regard to a possible attack on India, it may be urged that we are capable of holding our own in that quarter, and require no assistance from Japan or any other Power. Recent statements in the British House of Commons by the Prime Minister would seem to go far to strengthen this view. I would however with great deference point out that, notwithstanding the crushing defeats which Russia has received in this war, she has transported and still maintains, at a distance of over 9,000 miles from Russia proper and connected by a single line of rail, an army of 250,000 men, and that the frontiers of India are much nearer to her base than the spot, where the above army is now encamped.

I have, &c,

CLAUSE M. MACDONALD.
The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir C. MacDonald.

F.O. Japan 673.
(No. 124.)

Sir, Foreign Office, July 18, 1905.

I asked the Japanese Minister to call upon me yesterday in order that I might communicate to him the impression produced upon His Majesty’s Government by the suggestions which he had made to me on the occasion of our last discussion of the second British draft of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement.(1)

I told Viscount Hayashi that we had carefully considered the suggestion of the Japanese Government that the reference to the Treaty rights of other nations should be expunged from Article III. My colleagues fully understood the reasons which led the Japanese Government to desire the omission of these words, and there was, so far as I could see, no difference between us as to the object in view. We desired that the Clause should be so worded as to afford the minimum of embarrassment hereafter to Japan. We could not however help thinking that the words ‘equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations’ might prove even more embarrassing to Japan than the reference to the treaty rights of other nations. The former words were extremely wide, and on the strength of them it might be possible for other Powers to claim that any concession made to Japan for industrial or commercial enterprises should be compensated by equivalent concessions to themselves. On the other hand, the rights which other nations could claim on the strength of their title to most-favoured-nation treatment were those which were usually summarised in the expression ‘the open door,’ which Japan did not, we believed, intend to deny to other countries in Corea. Viscount Hayashi did not agree with me upon this point, and adhered to his belief that the special reservation of the treaty rights of other Powers was much more dangerous to Japan than the alternative sentence. What he dreaded was the clause of other Powers to equality of political influence and position in Corea. The words which the Japanese Government proposed to omit would certainly be regarded as qualifying in the most marked manner our engagement to ‘recognise the right of Japan to take such measures of guidance, control, and protection in Corea as she might deem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance her political, military and economic interests in Corea.’ Viscount Hayashi suggested that, if the words were retained, it was conceivable that other Powers might claim a right to construct military posts on the Corean coast were such posts to be established by Japan. He also observed that if before peace were concluded we were to guarantee Russia in her existing treaty rights, her position as against Japan would be greatly strengthened. The Japanese Government regarded this point as vital, and he did not think that they would care for the Treaty if the objectionable words remained in it.

We then proceeded to discuss Article IV, and I explained to him that we attached the greatest importance to retaining such an Article in the Treaty. I said that I had communicated to my colleagues the statement which he had been instructed to make to me upon this point (vide my despatch No. 122 of the 14th instant).(1) and that we were entirely satisfied with the language used by the Japanese Government, which seemed to us indeed to be admirably chosen. We thought it however most important that these assurances should be embodied in the Treaty itself, and not merely in a Note. I said that if the Japanese Government were obliged to take into consideration the effect which might be produced by the insertion of such a Clause upon Japanese public opinion, we also had to take into account the effect which would be produced upon public opinion here if the Corean Clause were to be retained and no such reference as we had proposed were to be made to British interests upon the confines of India.

We then discussed various alternative draftings, and I asked His Excellency

(1) [v. supra, pp. 140–7, No. 134.]
whether he thought that the Japanese Government would accept a clause worded somewhat as follows:—"Japan recognises the special interests of Great Britain in all that concerns the security of the Indian frontier, and her right to take such measures in the proximity of that frontier as she may find necessary for safeguarding her Indian Possessions." Viscount Hayashi thought that the wording which I had proposed might be acceptable.

I informed him that we had no objection to the omission of Paragraphs A and B, but that we thought it necessary, either by means of an Article in the Treaty or by an exchange of Notes, to make it clear that this country was not assuming under the Agreement a new and formidable military liability. Viscount Hayashi expressed his conviction that the Japanese Government had no desire to impose any such liability upon us, and felt confident that they would authorise us to state that this was the case. I gathered from him that the Japanese Government would not mind omitting the words under which Japan was relieved of the obligation to send ships out of Asiatic waters.

Viscount Hayashi came to see me again this morning, and we had some further discussion of the question which had arisen with regard to Article III. I pointed out to him that if the reference to treaty rights were to be omitted, it was conceivable—to take an extreme case—that Japan, in her endeavours to secure her "paramount political, military, and economic interests" in Korea, might attempt some encroachment upon the rights of another Power, and thereby involve herself in war with it. In such a case, would Japan expect us to come to her assistance? The point was one which it was obviously necessary to guard carefully. Viscount Hayashi assured me that nothing was further from the intentions of the Japanese Government than to ride rough-shod over the treaty rights of other Powers. If those rights stood in her way, she would have to come to an arrangement with the Powers concerned. I replied that we were far from imputing any such intentions to the Japanese Government, but that the question would certainly be raised when the Treaty came to be discussed. I referred to the position of Great Britain in Egypt, where we certainly had a paramount position, but where we nevertheless had to reckon with the rights of the other Powers and make the best terms we could with them. I suggested as a solution of the difficulty that for the words "do not infringe the treaty rights of other nations" we might perhaps substitute the words "are not contrary to established treaty rights." This would avoid the assertion of dormant or extravagant claims. I also suggested that there might be an interchange of Notes in which it would be made clear that Japan had no intention of summoning us to her assistance in any case where the established treaty rights of other Powers were in question.

Viscount Hayashi's personal opinion was that both these suggestions might be entertained by the Japanese Government, and I undertook to submit them to my colleagues.

[On another sheet.]

LANSdowne.]

MINUTE BY KING EDWARD. | A pp[rove]d.—E.R.

No. 187.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir C. MacDonald.

K.O. Japan 673. (No. 126.)


I told the Japanese Minister to-day that I had laid before the Cabinet the substance of the communications which had passed between us on the occasion of our recent conversations as to the Anglo-Japanese Agreement, and I handed him a
corrected draft, a copy of which is attached to this despatch. I also handed to him the
draft of a Note to be exchanged, after the signature of the Agreement, dealing with the
interpretation of Article III. A copy of this draft is also enclosed with this despatch.
I informed Viscount Hayashi that in the opinion of His Majesty’s Government such a
Note would be sufficient for the purpose of making it clear that we were not to be
called upon to come to the assistance of Japan in support of any measures adopted in
violation of established Treaty rights, and that if the Note were agreed to by the
Japanese Government we were prepared to omit all reference to Treaty rights from
Article III.

Viscount Hayashi expressed himself much gratified, and told me that in his
opinion the Japanese Government would in all probability accept the draft and the
Note in their present form.

[I am, &c.]

[LANSDOWNE].

MINUTE BY KING EDWARD.

App[rove]d.—E.R.

Enclosure 1 in No. 187.

[Draft Agreement. v. infra, pp. 165–9. No. 155.]

Enclosure 2 in No. 187.

* Draft of Note from the Marquess of Lansdowne to Viscount Hayashi.

Sir,

With reference to Article III of the Agreement signed by us this day, in which
Great Britain recognises the right of Japan to take such measures of guidance,
protection and control in Corea as she may deem proper and necessary to safeguard
her interests in that country, provided always that such measures are not contrary to
the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations, it
has been clearly understood between us that the Article does not contemplate the
adoption of any measures which would be in violation of established Treaty rights,
and that the Japanese Government would not consider themselves entitled to call upon
His Majesty’s Government under the Article to come to their assistance in support of
measures of such a character. I should be glad to receive from you a written
confirmation of the assurances which you have given me in this respect.

[I have, &c.

LANSDOWNE.]

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No. 188.

Note by Mr. A. J. Balfour.

F.O. Japan 678.
Lord Lansdowne,

House of Commons, July 19, 1905.

I think the draft exactly carries out the view of the Cabinet. You will however
remember that the Cabinet were not prepared to insist on the explicit declaration by
Japan that she would not violate “established treaty rights” provided that in any
case we were not to be dragged into any quarrel which those rights might occasion.

A. J. B.
No. 189.

Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

Tokio, July 20, 1905.

F.O. Japan 673.
Tel. (No. 175.) Secret.

D. 5.30 p.m.
R. 7.30 p.m.

New Alliance.

Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me to-day that no reply had been received from His Majesty's Government to the last Japanese note sent to Japanese Representative in London for presentation to your Lordship on 6th July. (My telegram No. 170.) He earnestly hoped that no misunderstanding had occurred.

Personally, he thought it would be advisable to get matter settled before Peace Conference commenced sitting, though alliance need not be made public until the Conference had come to an end, or at such other time as His Majesty's Government wished.

His Excellency assured me that Japanese Government have understood and agreed that should hostilities, due to unprovoked attacks, &c., arise in some region outside geographical limits described in the preamble, and should those hostilities subsequently endanger interests of Great Britain within these limits, Japan would be bound to come to our assistance, the limits being Eastern Asia and India.

(1) [v. supra, pp. 144–5, No. 131.]

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No. 140.

Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

Tokio, D. July 20, 1905.

F.O. Japan 678.

(No. 194.) Secret.

My Lord,

R. September 18, 1905.

On the 15th instant, in my despatch No. 188,(1) I ventured to point out that the terms of the Japanese reply, respecting the New Alliance, which was telegraphed by the Japanese Government to their Representative in London on the 6th instant, appeared to me to be of a very reasonable nature, and I suggested that, as the bargain, which formed the basis of the New Alliance, seemed favourable to ourselves, we should accept it without further delay. I had already, on the 8th instant, communicated these views to Your Lordship by telegraph.

This morning I had an interview with Count Katsura, the Prime Minister, acting for Baron Komura, the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Count Katsura betrayed considerable anxiety in that no answer had yet been received from His Majesty's Government to the Japanese Note of the 6th instant. He said that both the London and Tokyo newspapers had commenced to write about the Alliance, stating that negotiations were in progress, and in some cases making very correct surmises as to the terms. Personally, he thought that the Alliance should be concluded as soon as possible and before it became a matter of public knowledge. At any rate, he considered, it would be useful to get the matter settled before the peace conference commenced its sittings, though it need not be published until the conference had come to an end, or at any later time convenient to His Majesty's Government.

His Excellency asked me whether I had heard from Your Lordship with regard to the Japanese communication of the 6th instant. I replied in the negative, but added that without doubt a reply would come very shortly, for I knew that His

(1) [v. supra, pp. 147–8, No. 135.]
Majesty’s Government were giving the matter their most earnest consideration. His Excellency begged me to convey by telegraph to Your Lordship the fact that the Japanese Government were anxious, and he personally hoped that no misunderstanding had arisen.

In the course of conversation, he said that the Japanese Government thoroughly understood that, should hostilities arise in regions adjacent to the Indian frontier, due to the unprovoked action of any other Power or Powers, and should such hostilities endanger our interests in India, we should have the right to invoke the Alliance. His Excellency mentioned Thibet, Afghanistan and Persia as adjacent regions. I had the honour to convey the gist of this despatch to Your Lordship in my telegram No. 175.(5)

I have, &c.

CLAUDE M. MACDONALD.

(5) [v. immediately preceding document.]

No. 141.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir C. MacDonald.


Tel. (No. 94.) D. 45 p.m.

Your telegram No. 175 (of July 20. Anglo-Japanese Alliance).(5)

I communicated a revised draft to the Japanese Minister on the 19th instant.

In Article III reference to Treaty Rights was omitted. Article IV now runs “Japan recognizes the special interests of Great Britain in all that concerns the security of the Indian frontier and her right to take such measures in the proximity of that frontier as she may find necessary for safeguarding her Indian possessions.” Of stipulations respecting notes to be exchanged A, B and D are omitted and C becomes Article VII in body of Agreement with following addition: “It is however understood that the measures agreed upon shall not include any obligation on the part of Japan to send ships out of Asiatic waters for the purpose of affording naval assistance to Great Britain or any obligation on the part of Great Britain to send troops to the Far East for the purpose of affording military assistance to Japan.” I also communicated Draft of note to be exchanged after signature of agreement to the effect that it is understood that Article III does not contemplate the adoption of measures of violation of established Treaty Rights, and that Jap[anese] Gov[ernment] it would not be entitled to call upon H[is] M[ajecty’s] G[overnment] under the Article to come to their assistance in support of such measures. Jap[anese] Minister expressed satisfaction and thought Jap[anese] Gov[ernment] it would probably accept agreement and note.

(5) [v. supra. p. 152, No. 139.]

No. 142.

Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

F.O. Japan 673. Tókió, D. July 25, 1905, 11 p.m.

Tel. (No. 178.) Secret. R. July 26, 1 p.m.

Your telegram No. 94 (of July 21, 05).(5) New Alliance.

Prime Minister spoke to me at length this afternoon on this subject of your telegram above quoted. A similar one had been telegraphed to him by the Japanese Minister in London.

(5) [v. immediately preceding document.]
He desired me to say amendments therein set forth did not meet with the approval of the Japanese Government in their present form.

In the course of conversation he said His Majesty's Government had by omitting reference to Treaty rights in Article 3 made said Article acceptable to Japanese Government but that note to be exchanged after signature nullified good effects produced by omission.

Prime Minister thought that the Addition of Article VII was a mistake as it tied the hands of the military and Naval experts. I said it was probably inserted to meet adverse criticism in Parliament and that under any circumstances the expression "shall not include any obligation" was not a particularly strong one and would not in case of war prevent troops or ships being sent to the east or west respectively if experts thought they should be sent.

As to Article IV Prime Minister said that language was more in accordance with views of the Japanese Government but he still thought it would be better to omit Article entirely.

I said this was also probably a case of guarding against adverse criticism because Corea had an article all to herself whereas India had not. I said speaking entirely privately and without instructions that I thought Article IV and the additional Article VII did not seem to be of great importance but that His Majesty's Government would certainly require some assurance respecting the non-violation of established Treaty rights. His Excellency said that matter was being very carefully considered by the Japanese Government, and an answer would be sent shortly.

Private. I do not think that the satisfaction expressed by Japanese Minister in London is at all shared by the Japanese Government.

(*) [Sir C. MacDonald was informed in Tel. No. 96 of July 25, that Lord Lansdowne approved his language.]

No. 148.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir C. MacDonald.

F.O. Japan 678.

Tel. (No. 96.)

* Your telegram No. 178 (*) (of July 25).

Hayashi has not yet received instructions.

Your language correctly expresses our views.

Retention of Article IV which has been recast in deference to Japanese criticism is in our opinion indispensable for reasons mentioned by you.

Article VII is of less importance, and a note might be substituted for it.

Language of note as to treaty rights might be amended all we desire is that we should not be compelled to go to war say with the United States in the event of a violation of established Treaty rights by Japan.

I clearly understood from Hayashi that in such a case, which was not at all likely to arise, they would not think of invoking our aid.

(*) [v. immediately preceding document.]
No. 144.

Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

F.O. Japan 673.
Tel. (No. 173.) Secret.

Tókió, D. July 28, 1905, 11:35 p.m.
R. July 29, 12:30 p.m.

Your tel. No. 96 (of July 26. Renoul of Alliance). (*)

During my interview with Prime Minister on the 25th,(*) I said that the Japanese could hardly expect us to engage in war with a Power or Powers whose established treaty rights had been violated by her,(**) and I instanced the United States as being a Power with whom Japan was at present on exceedingly friendly terms. Though I pressed him, Prime Minister avoided giving me a definite answer.

It is possible that present hesitation may be due to misunderstanding, more especially as Minister for Foreign Affairs and foreign adviser have gone to America. It is possible also that Japanese Government may be repenting of their bargain. Now that I know the view of the British Government, I can speak with more confidence.

(*) [v. immediately preceding document.]
(**) [v. supra, pp. 153-4, No. 142.]
(*) [In the first draft of decipher the word "Dependency" appeared after "her" in the place of the comma.]

No. 145.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir M. Durand.

F.O. Japan 673.
Tel. (No. 109.)

Foreign Office, July 29, 1905.
D. 6 p.m.

We have made considerable progress with the negotiation of new Anglo-Jap[an]ese Agreement. Preamble recites that objects of two Powers are:

"(a.) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India;
(b.) The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China;
(c.) The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contracting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India, and the defence of their special interests in the said regions."

Now agreement differs from present Agreement mainly in that contracting parties will come to one another's assistance if either of them is involved in war owing to unprovoked attack even of a single Power.

An important article with regard to Corea is under discussion it runs as follows:—

"Japan possessing paramount political, military and economic interests in Corea, Great Britain recognizes the right of Japan to take such measures of guidance, control and protection in Corea, as she may deem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance those interests, provided always that such measures are not contrary to the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations."
This Article to which Japan attaches the utmost importance seems to us in accordance with President's views (see your private tel[egram] of January 28 and my reply, also my tel[egram] of January 29 and your reply). (1)

You may communicate this information in strict confidence to the President.

You might call his special attention to (b) in the preamble, which is in close accordance with his policy.

Secret.

From Mr. Loomis' language I gather that Corean article is not likely to be objected to.

(1) [Not reproduced. cp. the following note, unsigned, which is endorsed "Position of Japan in Corea. Views of His[...] Majesty's Gov[ernment] respecting. Keep with Sir M. Durand Tel. 109, July 29, 1905."]

When we were at the beginning of this year discussing with the President of the U[nited] S[tates] the question of the terms of peace he thought that if Japan continues to withstand Russia she should be permitted to retain Port Arthur and paramount influence in Corea (Sir M. Durand tel[egram], private, of Jan : 23).

In our reply we informed Sir M. Durand that in our view if Japan's success were maintained she would be entitled to insist on retention of Port Arthur and paramount influence in Corea. (To Sir M. Durand tel[egram] private of Jan : 25.)

On the 28th of January we telegraphed to Sir M. Durand the conditions of peace which would in the opinion of the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs be indispensable. These included:

(a) Corea to be within the exclusive sphere of Japanese influence and no special Russian interests to be allowed within it.

Sir M. Durand was informed that the terms did not seem to us excessive and was instructed to communicate the substance of the telegram verbally and in the strictest confidence to the President.

Sir M. Durand informed us on the 30th of January that the President agreed in all points with the views expressed in the telegram of the 28th. He did not think that Russia would agree to the terms suggested by Japan, but prima facie saw no objection to these terms.]

No. 146.

Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Lansdowne. (1)

F.O. Japan 678.

Tel. (No. 180.) Secret.

Tokio, July 30, 1905.

D. 10:55 a.m.

R. July 31, 8:30 a.m.

Your tel. No. 96. (2) New Alliance.

On receipt of above telegram, I immediately sent a paraphrase of it from the words "Your language" to the end to the Prime Minister, at the same time asking for an interview which was fixed for this afternoon and from which I have just returned.

Prime Minister said that your telegram had very considerably cleared up the situation. Jap[anese] Gov[ernment] were however at a loss to know why the words "infringement of treaty rights of other nations" had been suddenly introduced into Art[icle] 3 and still more why the note which it was proposed to substitute for these words suggested that the Japanese "contemplated the adoption of measures in violation of treaties or infringement of existing treaty rights." (2) This had never

(1) [The decipher of this telegram is endorsed: "As several passages are undecipherable we have asked for a repetition." A revised version was therefore telegraphed on August 1. D. 5:30 p.m., R. August 2, 8:30 p.m. The changes are indicated in the footnotes below.]

(2) [v. supra, p. 154, No. 143.]

(2) [Revised version has here "contemplated the adoption of measures in violation of established Treaty rights." v. infra, p. 166, note (2), and supra, p. 151, No. 157, excl. 2.]
occurred to the Jap[anese] Gov[ernment] (1) and they could not understand why we
should introduce the subject into the Alliance. I said I had no instructions but I
now knew the views held by H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] and I thought if the
Jap[anese] Gov[ernment] telegraphed confidential (2) assurance to Your Lordship,
a note might not be necessary or at any rate one in a very modified form.
As to why this assurance had been asked for at a rather late stage of the negotiations,
I thought that perhaps H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] were not aware that Japan
was determined to establish a protectorate until as a result of an interview with
Baron Komura the matter had been put before H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] on
July 8, (4) and they thought it would be best to put it clearly on record, that in case of
war resulting from a possible wilful breach (2) of treaty rights, the alliance could not
be invoked. It was not intended to suggest that Japanese (group omitted) were
going to (5) deliberately violate treaty rights of any power. The Prime Minister seemed
satisfied with this explanation. His Excellency said that Japanese were drawing up a
further amendment to Your Lordship's revised draft of July 19 which would be
telegraphed to Jap[anese] Min[istry]r in London in the course of two or three days.
Although Jap[anese] Gov[ernment] had no intention of violating any existing treaty
(group undecipherable (6)) it was essential, in interest of peace that steps should be
taken to prevent Emperor of Corea and the Corean Gov[ernment] from intriguing with
Powers and making treaties and agreements in a loose and irresponsible manner. The
present war was to a great extent caused by such intrigues with the Russ[ian] Legation.
As to Art[icle] IV Prime Min[istry]r said he was well aware of British
Parliamentary difficulties and possible opposition and as he wanted to make this alliance
acceptable to Parliament, he was considering in case of Art[icle] III (groups
undecipherable) (10) Your Lordship's wishes in the Indian frontier article.

As to Art[icle] VII he did not anticipate any difficulty.

MINUTE.

Much more hopeful.

L.

(1) In revised version this sentence begins as follows: "His Excellency said that he could
assure me that violation of Treaties or infringement of existing Treaty rights had never
ever occurred to the Japanese Government."

(2) "Confidential" omitted in revised version.

(3) In revised version " on 8th July by me."

(4) [Revised version has "violation" instead of "wilful breach."]

(5) [Revised version of this sentence is identical with this text except that " were going to"
becomes " would." "Group omitted" is therefore probably an error.]

(6) ["Group undecipherable" here proved to be "or infringing Treaty rights." The word
"treaty" preceding this should read "treaties."]

(10) [In revised version this line reads "he was considering in case Article III could be
arranged, how to meet your Lordship's wishes. . . . ."]

No. 147.

Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

F.O. Japan 673.

(No. 200.) Secret.

My Lord,

Tokio, D. July 31, 1905.

B. September 18, 1905.

In my telegram No. 178 of the 25th instant (1) I gave an account of an interview I
had with His Excellency the Prime Minister relative to the proposals contained in
Your Lordship's telegram No. 94, (2) and I stated that I was desired by His Excellency
to inform Your Lordship that the said proposals, at any rate in the form on [sic]

(1) [v. supra, pp. 153-4, No. 142.]

(2) [v. supra, p. 163, No. 141.]
which they were presented, did not meet with the approval of the Japanese Government.

On the 27th, I was greatly gratified to receive Your Lordship's telegram No. 96, (*) stating that the language I had used at the above-quoted interview correctly expressed the views of His Majesty's Government.

Your Lordship further stated that Art[icle] IV, with regard to the Indian frontier, had been recast in deference to Japanese criticism, and for the reasons I had given was indispensable; as to the note respecting Treaty Rights, the language might be amended, the sole desire of the British Government being that Great Britain should not be compelled to go to war, say, with the United States, in case Japan violated established Treaty rights.

As to Art[icle] VII respecting the sending of ships and land forces, this Your Lordship thought was of less importance, and a note might be substituted for it.

I immediately sent a paraphrase of Your Lordship's telegram to Count Katsura, stating that I would be very pleased to offer any explanations, should he think them necessary. His Excellency wrote fixing a meeting for the afternoon of Sunday the 30th at his private residence.

On my return from this interview I telegraphed an account of it to Your Lordship at some length, and I have little to add to the information given in that telegram (No. 180 of yesterday's date). (*) The meeting was much more cordial than the one I had, with His Excellency on the 25th instant (my telegram No. 178 and despatch No. 199 secret of the same date [*]), on which occasion I could see that a serious hitch had taken place in the progress of negotiations. This cordiality was undoubtedly due to Your Lordship's telegram which I have quoted, and which Count Katsura said had "considerably cleared up the situation."

The set-back in the negotiations was, I think, due to the proposed insertion by His Majesty's Government in Art[icle] III of an assurance on the part of Japan that the measures which she might take in establishing a Protectorate over Korea would not infringe the Treaty Rights of other nations, and, still more so, to the fact that when, on representations made by the Japanese Government, His Majesty's Government agreed to withdraw this reference; they, the British Government, wished to substitute therefore a note to the effect that it is understood that Art[icle] III does not contemplate adoption of measures on the part of Japan in violation of established Treaty Rights, and that the Japanese Government would not be entitled to call upon His Majesty's Government under the article to come to their assistance in support of such measures.

In my telegram of yesterday's date, a paraphrase of which I have the honour to enclose (**) I state the reasons for which I thought these stipulations had been suggested at so late a stage of the negotiations, which explanation seemed to satisfy His Excellency. I added that I was quite sure that His Majesty's Government had no intention whatever of implying that the Japanese Government would deliberately violate the Treaty Rights of any Power.

Count Katsura speaking with great earnestness through Mr. Matsui, Chief of the Political Bureau, who, on this occasion, as on the last, was interpreter, said that though the Japanese Government had no intention whatever of infringing the rights of any Power, yet there was a point upon which they must insist. One of the chief causes of the present war was the habit of the Emperor of Korea, and of high Korean officials, of intriguing with Foreign Powers, and of making arrangements and agreements in the most irresponsible manner. This could not be permitted to continue; otherwise all the blood and treasure which Japan had poured out, would have been poured out in vain, for at any moment fresh intrigues would take place, fresh troubles would arise, and the peace of the Far East would never be assured.

(*) [v. supra, p. 154, No. 149.]
(**) [v. immediately preceding document.]
(****) [Not reproduced. It gives a fuller account of the interview described in Tel. No. 178.]
(*****) [Not reproduced.]
Not only, said His Excellency, do the Korean Government intrigue with Russia, but he would inform me confidently that, within the past few weeks, they had been intriguing with Japan!—a deputation of high officials, members of the Korean Government, having secretly approached Marquis Ito, inviting him to become Governor-General, or, as Mr. Matsui translated it, "Dictator of Korea." Count Katsura said that, but for the fact that Japan was united and Marquis Ito was entirely in accord with the Government, an awkward situation might have been created, whereas it was only amusing, but it showed to what lengths the Korean Government could go. It was, therefore, absolutely essential, added His Excellency, for the peace of the Far East and the future good Government of Korea, that the Emperor and the Korean Ministers should be deprived of their power of causing serious mischief.

When talking of the possible infringement of established Treaty Rights, His Excellency asked me in what way Japan could infringe Treaty rights. I replied that I had heard it mentioned that she might, in Korea, find it convenient to do away with Consular jurisdiction, or make such alterations in the Customs Tariff as would tend to her benefit, and not to that of other Powers. His Excellency assured me that such measures had not even been contemplated, and reminded me that Japan had, after much negotiation, arranged a Customs Tariff with Foreign Powers; also that Consular Jurisdiction had been done away with in Japan, but only after long and careful consideration and negotiations; should Japan ever find it necessary to resort to such changes in Korea, His Majesty's Government might rest assured that the same careful consideration and negotiation would take place with the Powers concerned.

Count Katsura, in conclusion, said that the Japanese Government were drawing up further amendments to Your Lordship's revised draft of July 19th which would be sent to Viscount Hayashi in the course of a few days.

I have, &c.

CLAUDE M. MACDONALD.

No. 148.

Sir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

Tokio, August 3, 1905

F.O. Japan 673.
Tel. (No. 184.) Secret.
My telegram No. 180: ('') New Alliance.
Prime Minister has this morning handed me copy of instructions sent to Japanese Representative in London on the evening of 1st August.
With reference to notes regarding Article III to be exchanged after signature of Agreement, said instructions contain the following passage:

"Japan has no intention to disregard the Treaty rights of other Powers, nor could any such intention be presumed to exist from the wording of the Article. She recognizes the binding force of Corea's existing Treaties.

"In the opinion of the Imperial Government, even the establishment of a Protectorate would not ipso facto terminate Treaties of other Powers with Corea, and if any change become necessary in regard to those Treaty rights, such changes will have to be made only after direct negotiations with the Powers concerned. Imperial Government do not therefore see any necessity for the exchange of the proposed notes." Passage ends.

("') [v. supra, pp. 150-7, No. 146.]
In face of this most clear and definite declaration, I earnestly hope His Majesty's Government will not press for exchange of the diplomatic notes. Any insistence on this point will create a most deplorable impression here.

Article IV.—Prime Minister has retained this Article in a modified form, which will be submitted to your Lordship by the Japanese Minister. Its retention will have to be explained to the Privy Council and House of Representatives on account of its superfluity, from a Japanese point of view, as they consider this point is sufficiently covered by Preamble and Article II. Count Katsura proposes to say that it was retained to meet wishes of British Government, or he will give any other reason which your Lordship wishes, provided that the reasons given here and to British Parliament are the same.

Japanese Government are unable to agree to the second paragraph of Article VII for reasons which Japanese Minister will give to your Lordship, and which appear to me sound. Prime Minister said: Why tie the hands of military and naval experts in time of war with political conditions?

Count Katsura expressed a very earnest hope that His Majesty's Government would accept the proposal of the Japanese Government, which had been arrived at after very serious consideration.

I do not think that we shall be able to obtain better conditions, and venture to urge their acceptance.

No. 149.

Viscount Hayashi to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

F.O. Japan 678.

Dear Marquess Lansdowne,

Japanese Legation, August 3, 1905.

I have forgotten to say that after the insertion of the Article VII the wording of the Article VIII viz. "The present agreement shall, subject to the provisions of the preceding Article . . . ." should read "The present Agreement shall subject to the Article VI . . . ."

I write these lines just to inform your Lordship that I have altered the wording as above.

Yours sincerely,

TADASU HAYASHI.

No. 150.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir C. MacDonald.

F.O. Japan 678.

(No. 134.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 3, 1905.

I had an interview with the Japanese Minister to-day after the meeting of the Cabinet, and informed him—

1. That in deference to the views which he had expressed to me on the occasion of our last interview, we had re-drafted Article IV, which we proposed should run as follows:—

"Great Britain having a special interest in all that concerns the security of the Indian frontier, Japan recognizes her right to take such measures in the proximity of that frontier as she may find necessary for safeguarding her Indian possessions."
Viscount Hayashi told me that he saw no objection to this wording, but that he must telegraph it to the Japanese Government.

2. That in deference to the strong wish expressed by the Japanese Government, we were prepared to omit the concluding sentence, beginning, "It is however——," from Article VII.({1})

3. That I had repeated to the Cabinet the statement which he had made to me on the 2nd instant with regard to the proposed Note dealing with the question of established treaty rights, and that my colleagues were content to accept, as a satisfactory settlement of the matter, his statement to me that in the view of the Japanese Government an attack resulting from an attempt by either of the High Contracting Parties to violate established treaty rights would not be regarded by the Japanese Government as an unprovoked attack, or of such a nature as to justify the Party attacked in calling upon the other Party to come to its assistance.

With regard to the question of publication, I said that the Cabinet were of opinion that the publication of the Agreement at a moment when the peace negotiations were on the point of commencing might be regarded as an improper and indefensible proceeding. The Agreement dealt with some questions which must inevitably come before the Plenipotentiaries at Washington, and the Governments concerned might not unreasonably complain if an attempt were made to dispose of those questions by means of an arrangement such as that into which we were about to enter. It is also conceivable that should the peace negotiations unfortunately prove abortive, the responsibility for their failure might, if the Agreement were to be revealed at such a moment, be thrown upon our shoulders. We were therefore of opinion that, supposing it to be signed within the next few days, the fact of the signature should be kept secret. We could not however contemplate that the knowledge of it should be withheld for an indefinite time from the public, and whether the negotiations failed or succeeded it would be necessary to publish the Agreement within a reasonable time. It would be easy for us to confer as to the date which might be selected for this purpose. Viscount Hayashi expressed his personal agreement, and promised to repeat the substance of my remarks to the Japanese Government.

[I am, &c.,]

L[ANSDOWNE].

({1}) [r. infra, p. 168, No. 155, note (4).]

No. 161.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir C. MacDonal.

F.O. Japan 678.
(No. 187.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 8, 1905.({1})

The Japanese Minister called upon me to-day and made a statement to the following effect with reference to the fourth British draft of the new Anglo-Japanese Agreement:

The Imperial Government accept the new wording of Article IV as proposed by the British Government. They understand however that the new wording is preferred as being better in point of form, and not because of any essential difference in meaning.

The Imperial Government consent to the proposal that the Agreement should be signed at the end of this week.

They concur in general with the views of the British Government as to the date at which the Agreement might be made public, and deem it advisable to hold the

({1}) [Altho[hough dated August 8, this despatch was obviously not sent until August 9 at earliest.]  
[16942]
publication in abeyance until such time as the two Governments are convinced that the Agreement may be made public without prejudicing the success of the peace negotiations about to commence between Japan and Russia.

The Imperial Government thought it desirable that the two Governments should arrive at a previous understanding with a view to harmonising the explanations which they may be called upon to make in regard to the scope and character of the Agreement, especially with regard to Article III and Article IV. It might become necessary for the Imperial Government to give such explanations to the Japanese Privy Council as soon as the Agreement is published. An early understanding upon the point is therefore most desirable.

As to these Articles, the Imperial Government will have no hesitation in declaring, with regard to Article III, that they firmly intend to respect the established treaty rights which other Powers possess in Korea. They desire however to refrain from making in their declaration any reference to the statement made by me to my colleagues to the effect that, in the imaginary case of a war arising from a violation of the established treaty rights of other Powers in Korea by Japan, that war would not be regarded as unprovoked. The Imperial Government deem it highly desirable to keep complete silence upon this point, not only owing to considerations affecting the domestic politics of Japan herself, but in order to ensure full effectiveness for the Agreement.

As to Article IV, the Imperial Government will be prepared if necessary to state that any attack made by a third Power, in consequence of measures taken by Great Britain in the proximity of the Indian frontier in order to safeguard her Indian Possessions, will be considered by Japan as entirely unprovoked within the meaning of Article II, although it is a matter of course that the armed assistance contemplated by Article II will be rendered exclusively in case of a war in defence of the territorial rights of Great Britain in India, as is already set forth in the same Article.

I subsequently wrote to Viscount Hayashi a note of which a copy is attached to this despatch.

[I am, &c.]

L[ANSDOWNE].

MINUTE BY KING EDWARD.

App[rove]d.—E.R.

Enclosure in No. 151.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Viscount Hayashi.

F.O. Japan 673.

Dear Viscount Hayashi,

I laid before my colleagues the substance of the memorandum which you were good enough to leave with me this morning. His Majesty's Government do not consider that the new wording of Article IV is different in meaning from the Japanese draft. As a matter of form, however, we prefer our wording, and we are glad that it is accepted by the Imperial Government.

If convenient to you, I propose that we should sign the Agreement on Saturday next, the 12th.

I am glad to find that the Imperial Government concur with us in believing that the publication of the Agreement would, at the present time, be undesirable. When more is known of the progress of the peace negotiations, it will be possible for us to arrive at a decision as to the moment for publication. Upon this question it will be necessary that we should confer with one another from time to time.

(*) [Sic. The letter was written on August 8.]
With regard to the explanations which the Japanese Government proposes to give as to the scope and character of Articles III and IV, His Majesty's Government do not take any exception to the statements contained in your memorandum.

It must of course be clearly understood that it is the actual text of the Agreement which is binding upon the parties. Subject to this, we should welcome the declaration of the Japanese Government that they firmly intend to respect the established treaty rights possessed by other Powers in Korea. It was never our intention that either of the Contracting Parties should gratuitously offer any statement as to the manner in which a violation of the treaty rights of another Power by one of the contracting Parties might be dealt with. All that we desire is that, should either of us be challenged upon this point, we should state that both the Contracting Parties fully recognise the sanctity of established treaty rights, and that if an attack should be made upon one of the Parties in consequence of a violation of such rights by it, such an attack could not be regarded as unprompted within the meaning of Article II. We have however no desire to raise the point.

As for Article IV, the statement embodied in your note appears to us to be a legitimate account of the combined effect of Articles IV and II and of the Preamble of the Agreement.

Allow me to take this opportunity of offering you my personal congratulations upon the successful conclusion of this important negotiation.

[I have, &c.]
L[ANSDOWNE].

I agree.

MINUTE.

A. J. B.
8: 8: 1905.

No. 152.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir C. MacDonald.

F.O. Japan 673.

Your telegram No. 186 (of 8th August: New Alliance). (1)

Japanese Minister communicated yesterday reply of Japanese Government.

I have proposed that we should sign Agreement on 12th instant, and when more is known of progress of peace negotiations arrive at decision regarding publication.

I have informed him that His Majesty's Government do not take exception to proposed explanations as to Articles III and IV, and that it must be understood that it is actual text of Agreement which is binding. Subject to this we should welcome declaration of intention to respect Treaty rights of other Powers in Korea. It was never our intention that either Contracting Party should volunteer statement as to manner in which violation of such rights should be dealt with. All we desire is that it either be challenged on point we should state that both recognize sanctity of established Treaty rights, and that an attack made upon one of them in consequence of violation of such rights could not be regarded as unprompted within the meaning of Article II.

(1) [Not reproduced. It referred to the reply of the Japanese Government.]
No. 158.

Sir C. Mac Donald to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

Tokio, August 11, 1905.

F.O. Japan 673.
Tel. (No. 189.) Secret.

Your Tel. No. 100.(1)
Vice Minister for F[oreign] A[ffairs] has been to see me to say Japanese Gov[ernment] thoroughly understand and are in accord with wishes of H[is] M[ajesty's] Gov[ernment] as to the explanations to be given, when challenged, of Art[icles] 3 and 4. Japanese Minister in London has been authorized by telegraph to sign tomorrow.

(1) [r. immediately preceding document.]

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No. 154.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir C. Mac Donald.

F.O. Japan 672.
Tel. (No. 101.) Secret.

Your tel[egram] No. 189 (of 11th inst[ant]).(1)
Treaty signed today.

(1) [r. immediately preceding document.]

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No. 158.


F.O. Japan 673.

[ED. NOTE.—The main stages in the framing of the Agreement were as follows:—

(i.) After some preliminary negotiations between representatives of the two Powers, Viscount Hayashi presented a draft on May 10, 1905 for the renewal of the Treaty of January 30, 1902.
(ii.) On May 29, 1905 Viscount Hayashi presented a draft of a new Treaty, consequent upon an exchange of telegrams on May 18 and 26.
(iii.) A British Counter-draft was given to Viscount Hayashi by Lord Lansdowne on June 6, 1905, after several drafts had been considered by the British Cabinet.
(iv.) On June 28, 1905 Viscount Hayashi presented a revised draft.
(v.) The second British draft was presented to Viscount Hayashi on July 1, 1905.
(vi.) To meet the criticisms upon the second British draft communicated by Viscount Hayashi on July 14, a third British draft was communicated to him on July 19, 1905.
(vii.) A fourth British draft was communicated on August 8, 1905.
(viii.) On August 12, the Treaty was signed.]
The Table below shows the final British Counter-draft of June 10, 1905, and the revised Japanese draft of June 23, together with the final text. The various stages in the alterations made in the drafts are shown in footnotes. The use of italics in the British and Japanese drafts indicates identity of wording with the final text.

### First British Counter-Draft of June 10, 1905

**Preamble.**

The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, being desirous of replacing the Agreement concluded between them on the 30th January, 1902, by fresh stipulations, have agreed upon the following Articles, which have for their object—

(a) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the East;

(b) The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China;

(c) The maintenance of the territorial integrity of the Possessions of the Contracting Parties in Eastern and South-Eastern Asia, and the defence of their special rights and interests in the countries in the proximity of such Possessions:—(*)

### Japanese Revised Draft of June 23, 1905

**Preamble.**

The Governments of Japan and Great Britain, being desirous of replacing the Agreement concluded between them on the 30th January, 1902, by fresh stipulations, have agreed upon the following articles, which have for their object—

(a) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and India;

(b) The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China;

(c) The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contracting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and India, and the defence of their special interests in the said regions:

### Final Text

**Preamble.**

The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, being desirous of replacing the Agreement concluded between them on the 30th January, 1902, by fresh stipulations, have agreed upon the following Articles, which have for their object—

(a) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and India;

(b) The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China;

(c) The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contracting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and India, and the defence of their special interests in the said regions:

### Article I.

It is agreed that whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, any of the interests referred to in the preamble of this Agreement are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly, and will con- (*) [The second British draft (July 1) adopts the wording of the Japanese draft of June 23, which is retained in the later drafts and is identical with the final text.]
consider in common the measures which should be taken to safeguard those interests.\(^{(1)}\)

**Article II.**

If in consequence of hostilities due to unprovoked attack, or aggressive action on the part of any other Power or Powers, the rights and special interests of either Party mentioned in section (e) of the preamble should be endangered, the other Contracting Party will at once come to its assistance, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.\(^{(2)}\)

**Article III.**

The right of Japan to take such measures as she may deem right and necessary in order to safeguard her special political, military, and economical interests in Corea is fully recognized by Great Britain, provided always that such measures do not infringe the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industries of all nations.\(^{(3)}\)

**Article IV.**

Japan, on the other hand, equally recognizes the rights of other nations.\(^{(4)}\)

\(^{(1)}\) [The second British draft (July 1) adopts the wording of the Japanese draft of June 28, which is retained in the later drafts and is identical with the final text.]

\(^{(2)}\) [The second British draft (July 1) is identical with the final text, except that it has "special interests in the regions mentioned" instead of "special interests mentioned." The third British draft (July 19) is identical with the final text.]

\(^{(3)}\) [The second British draft (July 1) adopts the wording of the Japanese revised draft of June 28, except that it ends "provided always that such measures do not infringe the Treaty rights of other nations or the principle of equal opportunities for their commerce and industry." The third British draft (July 19) omitted reference to "Treaty rights" at the instance of the Japanese Government, and substituted for its inclusion a Note to be exchanged after the signature of the Agreement (c. supra, p. 131, No. 137, encl. 2.) The text of the third British draft is identical with that of the final text.]
special interests of Great Britain in the regions adjacent to the Indian frontier and her right to take such measures as she may deem proper and necessary in order to safeguard those interests.\(^(*)\)

**Article V.**

The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another Power to the prejudice of the interests above described.\(^(*)\)

**Article IV.**

The high contracting parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another Power to the prejudice of the interests described in the Preamble of this agreement.

**Article V.**

The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another Power to the prejudice of the interests described in the preamble of this Agreement.

**Article VII.**

As regards the present war between Japan and Russia, Great Britain will continue to maintain strict neutrality unless some other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against Japan, in which case Great Britain will come to the assistance of Japan, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with Japan.\(^(*)\)

**Article V.**

As regards the present war between Japan and Russia, Great Britain will continue to maintain strict neutrality unless some other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against Japan, in which case Great Britain will come to the assistance of Japan, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with Japan.

**Notes.**

(\(C.\)) Subject to the above obligation, the conditions under which armed assistance shall be afforded by either Power to the other in the circumstances mentioned in the agreement signed this concerns the security of the Indian frontier, Japan recognizes her right to take such measures in the proximity of that frontier as she may find necessary for safeguarding her Indian possessions.

(\(B.\)) The conditions under which armed assistance shall be afforded by either Power to the other in the circumstances mentioned in the present Agreement, and

\(^(*)\) [The second British draft (July 1) has wording identical with the first British draft except that it omits "on the other hand, equally," and substitutes "in proximity to" for "adjacent to." The third British draft (July 19) is identical with the first, except that it omits "on the other hand, equally," substitutes "in all that concerns the security of the Indian frontier" for "in the regions . . . frontier," has "in the proximity of that frontier" after "measures," and "find necessary" for "deem proper and necessary," and "for safeguarding her Indian possessions" for "in order to safeguard those interests."

The fourth British draft (August 6) is identical with the final text.]

\(^(*)\) [The second and later British drafts (July 1, etc.) are identical in wording with the final text.]

\(^(*)\) [In the second British draft (July 1) and third British draft (July 19) this is Article VI.]

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tioned in the Agreement signed this day, and the means by which such assistance is to be made available, will be arranged by the Naval and Military authorities of the Contracting Parties, who will from time to time consult one another fully and freely upon all questions of mutual interest.\(^1\)

**ARTICLE VI.**

The present Agreement shall, subject to the provisions of Article VII, come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for ten years from that date.

In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have notified twelve months before the expiration of the said ten years the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the High Contracting Parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance shall, ipso facto, continue until peace is concluded.\(^2\)

**ARTICLE VI.**

The present Agreement shall, subject to the provisions of the preceding Article, come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for ten years from that date.

In case neither of the high contracting parties should have notified twelve months before the expiration of the said ten years the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the high contracting parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives either ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance shall, ipso facto, continue until peace is concluded.

**ARTICLE VIII.**

The present Agreement shall, subject to the provisions of Article VI, come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for ten years from that date.

In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have notified twelve months before the expiration of the said ten years the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the High Contracting Parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance shall, ipso facto, continue until peace is concluded.

In faith whereof the Undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed...

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\(^1\) [The second British draft (July 1) has a Note C identical in wording with Article VII of the final text, except that for "the present Agreement" it has "the Agreement signed this day." The third British draft (July 19) has an Article VII identical in wording with the final text, except that it adds the following: "It is, however, understood that the measures agreed upon shall not include any obligation on the part of Japan to send ships out of Asiatic waters for the purpose of affording naval assistance to Great Britain, or any obligation on the part of Great Britain to send troops to the Far East for the purpose of affording military assistance to Japan" cp. Note D of July 1, infra, note \(^4\).]

\(^2\) [The second British draft (July 1) is identical in wording with the Japanese draft of June 28, as is that of July 10. It is Article VII in the draft of July 1, and Article VIII in that of July 10. In the fourth British draft it is identical with the final text.]
this Agreement and have affixed thereto their Seals.

Done in duplicate at London, the 12th day of August, 1905.

(L.S.)

LANSDOWNE
His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

(L.S.)

TADASU HAYASHI
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan at the Court of St. James.

Notes.

(A.)

After the conclusion of the present war, each of the Contracting Parties will endeavour to maintain at all times available for concentration in the waters of the Far East a naval force superior in strength to that of any European Power in those seas. (*)

(B.)

It is agreed that Japan will, in the event of war, provide and maintain a force which shall be equal to the force of British troops from time to time in India up to a limit of 3,000,000. (**) [The second British draft (July 1) adopts the wording of the Japanese draft of June 23. There is no such clause in the third and fourth British drafts.]

No such clause.]

(*) [The second British draft (July 1) is identical in wording with the first, except that it omits "provide and," has "available for service in India" after the first "force," substitutes "not less than" for "equal to," and "maintained from time to time in that country" for "from time to time . . . . . . .000." The second British draft has an additional Note:—

D.

It is, however, agreed that Japan shall not be bound to send ships out of Asiatic waters for the purpose of affording naval assistance to Great Britain, and that Great Britain shall not be bound to send troops to the Far East for the purpose of affording military assistance to Japan.

There is no such clause in the third and fourth British drafts.]
No. 156.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir C. Mac Donald.

F.O. Japan 672. Foreign Office, August 12, 1905.

Tel. (No. 102.) D. 1:30 P.M.

Secret. Your tel[egram] No. 191 (of 11th inst[ant]).(1) Prime Minister may rest assured that we shall spare no pains to avoid being drawn into any statement which might impair usefulness of alliance.

(1) [Not reproduced. It states the hope of the Japanese Government that a situation which would necessitate the statement given in the last paragraph of Lord Lansdowne’s telegram No. 100 (v. supra, p. 103, No. 152), may be avoided, as it might impair the effectiveness of alliance for peace.]

No. 157.

Sir M. Durand to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

F.O. Japan 672. Lenox, August 12, 1905.

Tel. (No. 87.) D. 2 P.M.

Your tel. No. 101 to Sir C. Mac Donald.(1)

When you think it desirable that I should inform President please telegraph in that sense.

MINUTE BY KING EDWARD.

I presume soon?

F.R.

(1) [v. supra, p. 164. No. 154.]

No. 158.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir M. Durand.

F.O. Japan 672. Foreign Office, August 16, 1905.

Tel. (No. 116.) D. 7 P.M.

Your Tel[egram] No. 87.

I am most anxious to show the President that we trust him completely, but can we be quite sure that the secret would be kept. I must leave it to your discretion to decide whether you can safely impart this important intelligence to him for his personal information only and under pledge of absolute secrecy.

No. 159.

Sir C. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

St. Petersburgh, September 2, 1905.

F.O. Japan 672. D. 4:20 P.M.

Tel. (No. 161.) Secret. R. 6 P.M.

My private letter of August 16.

I think that it would be politic and would produce a good effect if before the publication of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty I were authorized to communicate its text to the Russian Government with an assurance of its unaggressive and purely defensive intent. I should like to be able at the same time to express the desire on
the part of Y[our] L[ordship] to resume the negotiations for an Agreement which were interrupted by the war. I anticipate that such an offer would receive a warm welcome since even yesterday in reply to my congratulations, I received a private note from C[oun]t Lamedorff in which he said "I hope also that peace will aid powerfully our efforts tending to a loyal and sincere rapprochement of our countries and that nothing should prevent an understanding for their reciprocal good."

MINUTE.

I had anticipated this suggestion. v. also my private letter to him in the pouch which left this morning; and my telegram, (copy sent herewith). (1)

L.

(1) [v. infra, p. 172, No. 164, and Ed. note.]

No. 160.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir E. Barrington.

F.O. Japan 672.
My dear Eric,

Derby, September 2, 1905.

I wish we had thought a little earlier in the day of the reassuring despatch which I am to write to Hardinge and Bertie about the new Treaty.

Here I am without a blessed document to work upon and obliged to trust to my bad memory.

The enclosed draft is only a rough outline. I have kept a copy and will touch it up as soon as I receive the necessary papers from you, and the office must also do what it can to lick the draft into shape.

Your original suggestion that we should not publish officially until the Treaty has been signed, was, I think, sound, and some days will no doubt pass before that event takes place.

Meanwhile I gather from yesterday’s Irish papers that London papers have virtually got the whole thing. This rather forces our hand, but I don’t know that it much matters, or obliges us to publish prematurely.

The reassuring despatch ought to be seen by Balfour, and we must send it to him as soon as we possibly can.

You can at the proper moment telegraph to Ponsonby that we intend to publish, and also to communicate the new Treaty to Powers with a few reassuring explanations. I don’t think H.M. will want to see the text.

I should say that the despatch might be a circular to all the Great Powers—what does the office think.

Y[our]s,

L[ANSDOWNE].

No. 161.

Sir E. Barrington to Viscount Hayashi.

F.O. Japan 672.
Dear Viscount Hayashi,

September 2, 1905.

I hear this morning from Lord Lansdowne(1) that he thinks it would be better to wait until the Treaty of Peace is signed, before publishing the Anglo-Japanese Treaty; so there is no question of hurry about its publication.

Y[our]s v[ery] sincerely,

E[RIC] B[ARRINGTON].

(1) [v. immediately preceding document.]
No. 162.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Mr. Campbell.

F.O. Japan 672.
Mr. Campbell, Derreen, September 3, 1905.

I think the best plan will be that we should communicate an advance copy of the new agreement to (1) Russia, (2) France, (3) the United States.

I am rather in the dark as to the probable date of publication. We ought not I think to publish until the Treaty of Portsmouth has been signed. This cannot be for a few days. Meanwhile, as soon as the draft circular has been settled, we can send it to Hardinge, Bertie and Durand to be communicated the moment we instruct them to do so.

L[ANSDOWNE].
9/9.

No. 163.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Mr. Campbell.

F.O. Japan 672.
Tel.

Derreen, September 4, 1905.

D. 11:50 a.m.
R. 12:22 p.m.

We might add to my draft a paragraph authorizing the Ambassador to intimate that there are no secret articles.

No. 164.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir C. Hardinge.

F.O. Japan 672.\(^1\) Foreign Office, September 4, 1905.
Tel. (No. 834.)

Your telegram No. 161, Secret\(^2\).

I entirely agree. I had already written to you suggesting that text of Treaty should be communicated to the Russian Government, together with explanatory despatch, before publication.

I had also written to you privately in the same sense.

\(^1\) [Also in F.O. Embassy Archives, Russia, 181/849; endorsed R. September 5.]
\(^2\) [v. supra, pp. 170-1, No. 159.]

[ED. NOTE.—Lord Newton has shown the Editors the draft of this private letter. It merely states that Russia should not be offended at the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which had no aggressive purpose, and that England could work with Russia for the good of the civilized world, "as we are doing at this moment in Macedonia and in Crete," in other directions as well.

A similar personal letter was written to Count Benckendorff on the 4th. It reached him on the 8th, with a copy of the renewed Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which was thus sent to him before publication.]
Mr. Campbell to the Marquess of Lansdowne. (1)

F.O. Japan 672.
Tel. Foreign Office, September 5, 1905.

I would only suggest omission in paragraph 7 of draft of words "as well as from chronic misgovernment." They seem hardly necessary and will hurt feelings of Korea.

As regards addition of paragraph stating there are no secret Articles, this might, I think, be a separate instruction and not published. Otherwise on future occasions absence of such a statement may give rise to comment.

[ED. NOTE.—The following despatch is a printed copy dated September 6, from F.O. Embassy Archives, France, 144/1905. It was sent unsigned to Sir F. Bertie in this form on the 7th, and in his despatch to Lord Lansdowne of September 9 (No. 389), Sir F. Bertie acknowledges its receipt on the 8th, and says he communicated it to M. Rouvier the same evening.

As will be seen in No. 168 Lord Lansdowne made an addition and correction to this No. 165 by telegram on September 8, viz., adding "and" before its inability to stand alone," and deleting "and the danger arising from its weakness." Sir F. Bertie received this telegram at 4.30 P.M. on the 8th, and mentions in his despatch of the 9th that he got M. Rouvier to make the corrections himself on the 8th. The text of No. 166 here following is therefore a printed copy giving the version received by Sir F. Bertie on the 8th. The subsequent corrections were made in ink on the copy in accordance with the directions given in No. 168.

This copy omits both the passage about "geographical limits" (v. note (1) below and note (2) on p. 174 and also that about "chronic misgovernment" (v. note (3) on p. 174). It is probably the same as that sent the same day to Sir Charles Hardinge, but this also has perished or been lost. The final version sent to Sir F. Bertie with all the corrections embodied in it,

(1) As shown above (No. 160) the first draft of the despatch referred to in this telegram was sent by Lord Lansdowne from Derroc on September 2. A revised form was sent by him on the 3rd and reached the Foreign Office by the 5th. As seen here Mr. Campbell then proposed to omit the phrase "as well as from chronic misgovernment," to which Lord Lansdowne had assented by the 6th. On the previous day, the 5th, however, Mr. Campbell wrote privately to Sir Charles Hardinge, sending him by bag a copy of the despatch explaining that "it is not finally settled." It is rather difficult to know what this copy contained, as the draft in F.O. Japan 672 is confused, and the Embassy Archives, Russia, F.O. 181/840, are damaged and this despatch with many other papers is missing. But an explanatory private telegram by Mr. Campbell has been preserved, cancelling a paragraph of the draft.

Embassy Archives Russia.

Mr. Campbell to Sir C. Hardinge.

(Unable.) R. September 8, 1905.

I sent you by bag copy of explanatory despatch about Anglo-Japanese Agreement for communication to Russian Government.

Lord Lansdowne now telegraphs to me that paragraph 6 commencing "the geographical" and ending "Contracting Parties themselves" is to be omitted and that with this omission the despatch may be issued at once.

He also directs that the despatch be published on Monday provided we are sure that it will before then have been communicated to Russian Government.

Please therefore make the communication with above omission and telegraph at once when you have done so. We will not publish until we receive your telegram. Signed copy will be sent to you on Saturday by post.

The full text of the passage thus desired to be omitted is here printed in italics (it originally came before the word "Article III" in the text in No. 160): "The geographical limits within which such co-operation may take place and the nature of that co-operation are questions that must be for the decision of the Contracting Parties themselves.

The copy of the despatch referred to in the above telegram was communicated to Count Lamsdorff by Sir C. Hardinge on the 8th: the later amendments, described in No. 168, infra, p. 175, were not added until the 9th.]
and signed by Lord Lansdowne, is in the Embassy volume. It is identical with the text followed in No. 165 except that the corrections required by the telegram of the 8th are entered on it.

The despatch, with the text of the Treaty, was published on September 27, 1905. They are not in A. & P. 1905 but in A. & P. (1906), CXXXVI, (Cd. 2009), pp. 318-8. They are also both in B.F.S.P., Vol. 08, (1909), pp. 196-40.

No. 166.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir F. Bertie.(

F.O. Embassy Archives, France, 146/38387.
(No. 588.)

Sir, Foreign Office, September 6, 1905.

I inclose, for Your Excellency’s information, a copy of a new Agreement concluded between His Majesty’s Government and that of Japan in substitution for that of the 80th January, 1902. You will take an early opportunity of communicating the new Agreement to the French Government.

It was signed on the 12th August, and you will explain that it would have been immediately made public but for the fact that negotiations had at that time already commenced between Russia and Japan, and that the publication of such a document whilst those negotiations were still in progress would obviously have been improper and inopportune.

The Russian Government will, I trust, recognise that the new Agreement is an international instrument to which no exception can be taken by any of the Powers interested in the affairs of the Far East. You should call special attention to the objects mentioned in the preamble as those by which the policy of the Contracting Parties is inspired. His Majesty’s Government believe that they may count upon the good-will and support of all the Powers in endeavouring to maintain peace in Eastern Asia, and in seeking to uphold the integrity and independence of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in that country.

On the other hand, the special interests of the Contracting Parties are of a kind upon which they are fully entitled to insist, and the announcement of those interests must be safeguarded is one which can create no surprise, and need give rise to no misgivings.

I call your especial attention to the wording of Article II, which lays down distinctly that it is only in the case of an unprovoked attack made on one of the Contracting Parties by another Power or Powers, and when that Party is defending its territorial rights and special interests from aggressive action, that the other Party is bound to come to its assistance.(

Article III, dealing with the question of Corea, is deserving of especial attention. It recognizes in the clearest terms the paramount position which Japan at this moment occupies and must henceforth occupy in Corea, and her right to take any measures which she may find necessary for the protection of her political, military and economic interests in that country. It is, however, expressly provided that such measures must not be contrary to the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of other nations. The new Treaty no doubt differs at this point conspicuously from that of 1902. It has, however, become evident that Corea, owing to its close proximity to the Japanese Empire, its inability to stand alone, and the danger arising from its weakness, must fall under the control and tutelage of Japan.

(*) [Also to Sir C. Hardinge as No. 251.]

(*) [The paragraph beginning “The geographical limits . . . .” referred to above in the note to No. 165 came here in the first draft sent to Sir C. Hardinge on the 6th. It was cancelled as the result of a suggestion from Mr. Balfour. On September 5, Mr. Campbell telegraphed to Lord Lansdowne “Prime Minister entirely approves draft, except that he wishes to omit paragraph six.”]

(*) [In Lord Lansdowne’s draft of September 8 the words “as well as from chronic misgovernment” occurred here. They were deleted before the draft was sent to Sir C. Hardinge as the result of an exchange of telegrams between Lord Lansdowne and Mr. Campbell (c. supra, p. 173, No. 165). For the further deletion of the words “as well as from chronic misgovernment” see infra, p. 175, No. 165.]
His Majesty's Government observe with satisfaction that this point was readily conceded by Russia in the Treaty of Peace recently concluded with Japan, and they have every reason to believe that similar views are held by other Powers with regard to the relations which should subsist between Japan and Corea.

His Majesty's Government venture to anticipate that the Alliance thus concluded, designed as it is with objects which are purely peaceful and for the protection of rights and interests the validity of which cannot be contested, will be regarded with approval by the Government to which you are accredited. They are justified in believing that its conclusion may not have been without effect in facilitating the settlement by which the war has been so happily brought to an end, and they earnestly trust that it may, for many years to come, be instrumental in securing the peace of the world in those regions which come within its scope.

[I am, &c.

LANSDOWNE.]

No. 167.

Sir E. Barrington to Viscount Hayashi.

F.O. Japan 672.
My dear Minister,

Lord Lansdowne wishes me to let you know that our Ambassadors at St. Petersburg and Paris will be instructed to communicate advance copies of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement to the Governments concerned in the course of to-morrow. We propose to publish it in all newspapers on Monday morning. This will I hope meet the views of the Japanese Government.

I am, &c.

ERIC BARRINGTON.

No. 168.

Mr. Campbell to Sir F. Bertie and Sir C. Hardinge.

F.O. Japan 672.

Foreign Office, September 7, 1905.

Lord Lansdowne's despatch respecting Anglo-Japanese Agreement.(1)

In paragraph 6 beginning "Article 8" Lord Lansdowne wishes words "and the danger arising from its weakness" omitted, and word "and" inserted before "its inability."

(1) [v. supra, pp. 173–4, Ed. note, and No. 166, note (2).]

No. 169.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir F. Bertie.(1)

F.O. Japan 672.

Foreign Office, September 8, 1905.

Tel. (No. 116.)

My despatch No. 588 of September 6. Anglo-Japanese Agreement.

You can state that Agreement is complete as it stands and that there are no secret articles or notes attached to it.

(1) [Also to Sir C. Hardinge as No. 339.]
No. 170.

Sir C. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

St. Petersburgh, September 8, 1905

F.O. Japan 672.
Tel. (No. 163.)

Your despatch No. 251.

I communicated to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day copy of your despatch, and gave him the text of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement. I read to him at the same time some extracts from your private letter of 4th September, (1) and did my utmost to reassure him as to the absolute sincerity of His Majesty's Government in their desire to live on friendly terms with Russia and in their harbouring no aggressive designs against her.

Count Lansdorff did not read Treaty in my presence, and abstained from any comments of its contents, but he thanked me warmly for communicating the text of the Treaty, which he said he would transmit to the Emperor without delay. He reiterated his desire for friendly relations between England and Russia, but remarked that there were certain people who wished to prevent them, and that a certain personage had already been to him to point out that Treaty was directed against Russia with hostile intent.

I conclude that he referred to the German Ambassador. I remarked that I felt certain that, after studying the terms of the Treaty and the explanatory despatch which I had communicated to him, he would be convinced of the pacific intentions of His Majesty's Government and of their most earnest desire for the maintenance of peace throughout the world.

(1) [v. supra, p. 172, Ed. note.]

No. 171.

Sir F. Bertie to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

Paris, September 8, 1905.

F.O. Japan 672.
Tel. (No. 58.)

An Anglo-Japanese Agreement.

I carried out this evening instructions contained in your despatch No. 588 and your telegrams Nos. 116(1) and 117.(2) Minister for Foreign Affairs promised to treat communications as secret. He said that he did not see anything in the Agreement to which France could take exception. He remarked that with regard to Article 2, that 'unprovoked attack' might be difficult to interpret in some cases.

He noticed the omission of any mention of Persia, press having stated that it was covered by Agreement. He did not suppose that Russia would like Agreement. On my suggesting that there was nothing hostile to Russia unless she desired to disturb us in India, and that perhaps existence of Agreement might help to facilitate matters in discussion between Russian and British Governments, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that French Government would be very glad if they could be of service in bringing the two Governments together, and that he thought that on the whole Russia would perhaps see not so very much to object to.

(1) [v. supra, pp. 174-5, No. 166, and p. 175, No. 169.]
(2) [Not reproduced.]
F.O. Japan 672.
(No. 393.) Confidential.

My Lord,

I had the honour to receive yesterday the despatch of the sixth instant, in which your Lordship forwarded to me a copy of the new agreement concluded between his Majesty's Government and that of Japan, and gave me directions as to the explanations and observations by which the communication of the agreement to the French Government was to be accompanied.

I had an interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday evening for the purpose of carrying out your Lordship's instructions.

I found that M. Rouvier had just received from the French Embassy in London French translations of a letter from your Lordship to the Ambassador, of the agreement, and of your despatch to me. His Excellency therefore read out the French translations of the despatch and the agreement, whilst I held the original text received from your Lordship.

At my request M. Rouvier struck out of the French translation the rendering of the words which your Lordship's telegram of the 8th instant had directed me to remove from your despatch, viz., "and the danger arising from its weakness."

His Excellency had been led from newspaper statements to suppose that Persia would be mentioned in the agreement, and on this point I reminded him that the policy of his Majesty's Government in regard to that country was well known from the statements made in Parliament by your Lordship.

* The only criticism which M. Rouvier made on the text of the agreement was that "unprovoked attack" in article 2 might be difficult to interpret in some cases.

His Excellency asked me to thank your Lordship for the communication which you had directed me to make to him. He said that he did not see anything in the agreement to which France could take exception; that Russia could not be expected to like it; and on my suggesting that there was nothing in it hostile to her unless she desired to disturb us in India, and that it might even help to simplify matters in discussion between the Russian and British Governments, M. Rouvier said that the French Government would be very glad indeed if they could be of service in bringing the two Governments together. Finally he said that perhaps, on the whole, Russia might not see so much to object to.

I gave to his Excellency the assurance desired by your Lordship's telegram No. 116 of yesterday that the agreement is complete as it stands and that there are no secret articles or notes attached to it.

I left with M. Rouvier copies of your Lordship's despatch and the agreement. I told him that the date of publication had not yet been settled, and he promised to treat the documents as secret.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.
F.O. Embassy Archives, Russia, 181/857.
(No. 586.) Confidential.

St. Petersburg, September 9, 1905.

My Lord,

Immediately upon the receipt of Mr. Campbell's tele[gram] of the 7th inst[ant][2] requesting me to commun[icate] at once to Count Lansdorff the text of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement together with the explanatory despatch[atch] which I had received yesterday morning by bag messenger, with the omission of the sixth paragraph, I called upon H[is] E[xccllency] and commun[icate]d to him the text of both documents. I read to him at the same time a few sentences from Y[our] L[ordship]'s private letter to me of the 4th Sept(ember)[3] which I thought particularly fitting to the occasion and likely to convince him of Y[our] L[ordship]'s friendly intentions and of the very sincere desire of H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] to maintain harmonious relations with Russia and elsewhere.

I drew Count Lansdorff's special attention to the objects of the Agreement as set forth in the preamble and while main remarking that the maintenance of peace and of the principle of the open door were motives which I felt certain would appeal to the Russian Gov[ernment] as being in accordance with their own aims, the maintenance of the territorial rights of Great Britain and Japan, and their defence of their special interests in Eastern Asia and India could only be regarded as an insurance of their possessions and rights against unprovoked aggression as was clearly shown by the text of the agreement, and constituted a measure which every far-sea[ing] Gov[ernment] would be justified in taking to secure the peaceful enjoyment of their rights and privileges without harbouring any aggressive designs against a third or other Powers. The conviction belief of H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] that the existence conclusion of this agreement may not have been without effect in facilitating a settlement of the war now happily closed should be an additional reason to cause the Russian Gov[ernment] to view its existence with approval and satisfaction and the fact that the policy of H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] and that of the Mikado would in future be homogeneous should be regarded as a guarantee against any ideas, such as had been attributed to Japan, of aggressive intentions against towards the possessions of other Powers in the Far East, and should serve to lay for a long time to come the ghost of the "Yellow Peril" which had been conjured up during the past few years but which never had been seriously accepted in England as a danger to the civilisation of the white races. I impressed upon Count endeavoured to the utmost of my ability to convince Count L[ansdorff] of the absolute sincerity of H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] in their desire for peace and for friendly relations and to assured [sic] him that they have no desire to interfere with the legitimate activity of Russia nor to seek a policy of aggravation at her expense.

Count L[ansdorff] whose knowledge of English is very limited, read neither the agreement nor the explanatory despatch[atch] in my presence but he thanked me warmly for the communication which I had made to him which he said he would transmit to the Emperor without delay. He said that he had already received many contradictory reports as to the existence of such an agreement and as to the nature of its contents and he was glad that all doubts would now be set on one side. He remarked that I was well aware of his friendly sentiments and of his desire for good relations between our countries and that he and I should now work strenuously together to remove all these points of dissension which in his opinion were based solely on unreasoning prejudice. There were certain people who wished to prevent the realisation of a state

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[1] The draft, not the original, is here reproduced as having some interesting corrections. The original is in F.O. Japan 572.

[2] [s. supra, p. 178, No. 105, note (1).]

[3] [s. supra, p. 172, Ed. note.]
of affairs so much to be desired and to the mutual advantage of both countries, and he could tell me confidentially that a certain personage had already been to him to question him about the Treaty and to point out to him that such an agreement could only be directed against Russia and with a hostile intent.

It was evident to me that C[oun]t L[amsdorff] referred to the German Ambassador who, I hear, has shown great activity in searching for information as to the text and purport of the agreement and came a few days ago to question me on the subject.

I told C[oun]t L[amsdorff] that Y[our] L[ordship] proposed to publish very soon the text of the agreement and that I felt convinced that on its publication the pacific intentions of H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] and their earnest desire for the maintenance of peace throughout the world would be generally recognised. I added that I felt confident that after a study of the terms of the agreement he would share the same views.

I considered that it was would be hardly justified by Y[our] L[ordship's] te[legram] No. 334 of the 4th Sept[ember] and your letter of the same date(*) in expressing a desire on your part to resume the negotiations for an agreement which were had been interrupted by the war, but in the course of a somewhat protracted conversation I alluded casually to the possibility of their being resumed at a future date, and C[oun]t Lamsdorff at once replied that he was most anxious that they should be brought to a successful issue but that they should not be unduly hastened.

In depreciating a too early renewal of negotiations there is much to be said in favour of C[oun]t L[amsdorff]'s opinion as such an agreement to be of advantage, must be based on public opinion, and there is so much in it [sic] the recent development of the political situation in the Far and Middle East to which Russian public opinion has yet to become reconciled that any attempt at further change in the near future might, if initiated, possibly defeat its own object.

*There is no doubt that there will be an outcry in the organs of the Anglophilic and reactionary Chauvinist press such as the "Novoe Vremya" and the "Moskovski Vedomosti" when the terms of the treaty are published, since in the comments which have already appeared on the incomplete versions of the treaty published in the Ageny telegrams ill-humour is shown at the recognition of the fact that threats of the invasion of India will in future be futile, and that "the sword of Damocles which Russia has hitherto held against England, now falls from her grasp." There is, however, every reason to hope that Russian statesmen and the more rational section of Russian public opinion, who are weary of a policy of adventure which has brought only defeat and humiliation in its train, will not not [sic] be slow to recognise that the new agreement contains no provision to which Russia or any other Power with peaceful aspirations can reasonably take exception.

[I have, &c.

CHARLES HARDINGE.]

(*) [v. supra, p. 172, No. 164, and Ed. note.]

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No. 178.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir M. Durand.

F.O. Japan 672. Foreign Office, September 10, 1905.
Tel. (No. 149.) D. 10 A.M.

(Anglo-Japanese Agreement.)

I trust no offence has been given to the President owing to concealment of the fact that we had signed Agreement on 12th August. You might, perhaps, explain to him that while we had supplied him with timely information as to the contents of the

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Agreement, it was thought more convenient that, whilst the negotiations were proceeding, the fact of signature having taken place should remain undisclosed; but you can judge better than I whether such a communication is desirable.

No. 174.

Viscount Hayashi to Sir E. Barrington.

F.O. Japan 672.

Dear Sir Eric,

4, Grosvenor Gardens, September 10, 1905.

I have just received an answer from my government to my telegram concerning the date of publishing our new agreement.

From the reports received through different sources Japanese government learn that the war party in Russia has again gained ascendancy in St. Petersbourg and loudly express dissatisfaction against the treaty of peace and if the agreement is published, they fear that it will give additional pretext to the war party in protesting against the conclusion of peace more strongly. Under the circumstances, the Japanese Government desire very much that the publication of agreement be postponed until the ratification of the treaty.

I am, therefore, instructed to request Lord Lansdowne that he will see the way to comply with the desire of the Japanese government.

Hoping you will communicate the above to His Lordship at the earliest opportunity.

I remain,

Yours sincerely,

TADASU HAYASHI.

No. 175.

Mr. Campbell to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

F.O. Japan 672.

Foreign Office, September 10, 1905.

Lord Lansdowne,

The King sent for me this evening, and gave me the enclosed memo[andum] for you by Baron Wedel which had been sent to him by Princess Charles.

His Majesty seemed fairly easy in his mind as to the turn things were taking and said more than once he thought P[rin]ce Charles' candidature fairly safe, or rather implied this.

He quite agrees with Y[our] L[ordship] as to non-intervention by H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment].

His Majesty also desired me to tell you that he had met C[oun]t Benckendorff at luncheon today and that the latter was very pleased at the communication of the Anglo-Japanese treaty. As regards publication and the Japanese objections he asked, "What will L[or]d Lansdowne do?"

I said I was not sure but that I thought the possible course would be to wait some days and in the meantime to ask Hardinge what foundation there was for the fear that the war party in Russia were gaining the upper hand and that if we were assured that it was not the case we might then return to the charge with the Japanese. H[is] M[ajesty] said he thought this a good idea.

As regards Johnstone's telegram Sir T. Sanderson will no doubt see M. Nansen tomorrow and report.

I am writing in a great hurry to catch the train.

F. A. C.
Sir M. Durand to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

F.O. Japan 672. Lenox, D. September 11, 1905.
Tel. (No. 108.) R. September 12, 1905, 7:15 A.M.

Your telegram No. 143 (Anglo-Japanese Treaty). (1)

I have no reason to suppose that any offence has been given. President writes to me that he has no doubt that the signing of the Treaty was a powerful factor in inducing Japan to be wise and reasonable as to terms. His letter is quite pleasant in tone. I have not received actual text of the Treaty.

(1) [v. napra, pp. 179-80, No. 173.]

Note by Mr. Campbell.

F.O. Japan 672. Foreign Office, September 18, 1905.

Count Bernstorff called to say that he had received a telegram from Berlin instructing him to convey to you the warm thanks of the German Government for the confidential communication of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement.

F. A. C.

Viscount Hayashi to Mr. Campbell.

F.O. Japan 672.
Confidential.

My dear Mr. Campbell,

Japanese Legation, September 18, 1905.

I am just in receipt of a telegram from Count Katsura instructing me to express to the Marquess of Lansdowne the grateful acknowledgement of the country which has prompted His Majesty's Government to consent to defer, to a later date, the publication of the new alliance Agreement in compliance with the request of the Imperial Government.

Further, I am directed to add for the information of the Marquess the following matter. Being in possession of reports to the effect that there is a misunderstanding prevailing in the official circles as well as among the people of Germany regarding the objects of the new treaty which they regard as not to be compatible with the established rights of Germany in the Far East the Imperial Government have caused their representative in Berlin to communicate to Prince Bülow the text of the Agreement. Count Inouye has, at the same time, been instructed to explain to the Prince the true aims of the treaty for which it has been concluded.

Yours sincerely,

TADASU HAYASHI.

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No. 179.

Sir C. MacDonal to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

F.O. Japan 672.
(No. 244.)
My Lord,

Tokio, September 21, 1905.

At an interview I had this afternoon with the Prime Minister I pressed His
Excellency on the subject of the publication of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement, which
had been signed in London on the 12th of last month.

I reminded Count Katsura that Your Lordship, telegraphing on the 12th
September, had consented to postpone the publication of the Alliance at the special
request of the Japanese Government for a fortnight, and this limit would expire on
the 26th or 27th.

His Excellency said that, as I knew, the publication of the new agreement, which
the Japanese Government proposed to carry out immediately after the signing of
the Peace Treaty, had been deferred on the advice of Baron Komura until the Treaty
could be ratified (my telegram to Your Lordship of the 6th inst.), and subsequently, on
account of the information which the Japanese Government had received from Russia,
and which had appeared in the papers, to the effect that the military party in Russia
were very discontented with the Peace terms and were urging the Emperor not to
ratify the Treaty; but, the information which I had been good enough to convey to
him on the 16th inst., to the effect that in St. Petersburg there was no indication
whatever of any intention or desire on the part of the Russian Government or the
War Party to prevent ratification, coming as it did from so high an authority as
Sir C. Hardinge, had decided the Japanese Government not to wait for the arrival
of the actual Peace Treaty, which was not due till the 6th October, but to make
arrangements if possible, to ratify a copy which had been telegraphed from Washington.
These arrangements, he hoped, would be completed by the 26th or 27th inst., when
the Anglo-Japanese agreement would be made public. I asked His Excellency whether,
in case the arrangements he spoke of were not completed on the date mentioned, the
publication of the agreement would be still further delayed. Count Katsura replied that
he did not think there would be any further delay, thanks to the reassuring information
given by Sir C. Hardinge.

I have, &c.

CLAUDE M. MACDONALD.

No. 180.

Viscount Hayashi to Mr. Campbell.

F.O. Japan 672.
Dear Mr. Campbell,

4, Grosvenor Gardens, September 24, 1905.

I have just received a telegram from my Government saying that they are now
prepared to publish the Alliance Agreement on Wednesday the 27th inst[ant] (1) if
that date is agreeable to His Majesty’s Government. As the Imperial Government are
expecting the answer to the above telegram in time, I shall be much obliged if you will
be good enough to let me know the decision of His Majesty’s Government on the matter
as soon as possible.

Believe me.
Yours sincerely,

TADASI HAYASHI.

(1) [The text of the Treaty and the covering despatch were both published in September 27,
v. supra, p. 174, Ed. note.]