CHAPTER EIGHT

WHY PEOPLE WORK

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WHY PEOPLE WORK

§ 1. The Persona and Conduct

And now we open up the fourth, the final and most important, section of our examination of human activities, the portion devoted to Will and the organization of Will. We have to enquire what forces within mankind keep all this great economic system going.

We have thrown a picture on the screen, so to speak, showing our contemporary world ant-hill at work and being fed, clothed, housed and induced to buy this, that and the other necessity or luxury, and in this picture, thus far, the men and women who work and buy and sell have been represented for the most part as moving about like neat little toy men and women in a working model. For all we have said hitherto, the participants in most of the operations might be wooden dolls wired to move and play their parts in the general scheme. Well-disposed dolls. No word have we said yet of those deep discontents that lie at the root of strikes and labour troubles generally, nor of disloyalty to the general task of production.

But now we have to get inside these puppets and make them come alive. We have to ask why they work and buy and sell. Why do they carry on at all? Why do they do it? Why do they stand it? How do they feel about it? We have to redeem the promise of our opening and explore the psychology of work and wealth.

At the outset we made it clear how large a part suppression played in the socialization of man. We have reiterated the essential difference of man’s social life from that of any other social creature’s. While the social life of the insect world is essentially instinctive, and the various workers, soldiers, queens and what not, are moved by simple inherent impulses to play their part in the biological and economic whole, Homo sapiens has undergone no such adaptation and specialization. He plays his individual part through a balance of motives. He is educated to his rôle. It is rare
that he is completely fitted to his job. Generally he does what he
has to do with a very considerable amount of internal conflict and
external friction. At bottom he is still a highly individualized
animal, resentful of subordination, competitive and exclusive,
demanding freedom and the world for himself.

But he is also amenable to fear and affection and capable of self-
restraint and reservation. In the *Science of Life* we have traced
the growth of the human community through the establishment of the
primary taboos, and we have shown how ideas of superiority and
inferiority, of leadership and obedience, were established in youth
and sustained, imposed, upon the unwilling mind of adult man.
From his very dawn into the world *Homo sapiens* is a creature at
war within himself; he has a moral conflict; he controls his impulses,
he does things that he dislikes, and in particular he toils to escape
other possibilities that he fears will be even less agreeable. This
internal conflict is essential to the nature of man. He can never
escape from it; never return to the simple internal unanimity, the
"state of innocence," the direct unencumbered reactions, of lower
animal types. But he will not be content with a bare recognition
of the restraints upon him. He will shrink from the unpleasant fact
of his own unwillingness. He will always be seeking consciously and
subconsciously a personal adjustment of this conflict; he will always
be trying to group his motives about as agreeable a conception of
himself, within the range of his possibilities, as he can contrive.

A man's guiding and satisfying idea of himself is what Jung calls
his "persona." It is a very well-chosen term. The original meaning
of *persona* was the mask worn by an actor in the Greek and Roman
drama. It gave his "character," it was what he thought he was.
In his hand he carried his *rotulus*, his little roll on which was written
the part he had to play in the story, his rôle. It was what he had
to do. From the very beginnings of the human adventure and
throughout the whole world to-day every human being is steering
a cherished persona through the allurements, buffetings and frustra-
tions of life. That is "conduct." Every one of these busy puppets
we have seen making and buying and selling in the great economic
spectacle we have displayed has a persona, an idea of himself, either
more or less harmonized to and accepting the rôle he has to play,
or more or less in rebellion against that rôle. The continued, pro-
gressive working of this continually more complicated and con-
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tinually more centralized economic society of mankind is dependent upon the sustained harmony between its operations and the hundreds of millions of personas involved in them. Beneath the material processes of economics lies the social idea; its driving force is will. The clearer the idea, the better organized the will in the personas of our species, the more hopeful and successful the working of the human ant-hill.*

§ 2. The First Class of Persona: The Peasant Persona and Types Mainly Derived from It

The earlier subjugations of man to toil were comparatively crude. Fear of the stronger individuals, the chief and leading men within the tribe, was sublimated as a sense of obligation, and the disposition to accept their rule was sustained by the greater fear of wandering from the tribe into the wilderness. The retention of immature characters has been a frequently recurring event in animal evolution. The common man, as he grew up, escaped less and less from the natural subordination of childhood. As life grew more secure and productive and laborious, toil came to him as part of that subjugation.

In those obscure ages during which human society developed, in that phase of the taming of the human animal to subordinated associations into which the archaeologist, the psychoanalyst and the student of primitive expression now probe, there were built up traditional systems of personas, or, if you prefer the phrase, "ideals of rôles," to which we find men adapted, as writing and record develop and their mental lives become accessible to us. We find them subdaued to the conception of the classes to which they belong. We find them all saying to themselves, "This is what I am. This

* The reader will find much that is said here in terms derived from Jung put in quite another terminology in, for example, Chapter XVII (Wages) of Henry Clay's excellent Economics for the General Reader. His is the more orthodox phrasing. There the willingness to work is studied in relation to what is called the "standard of life" of the worker. A man's standard of life, his conception, that is, of what is due to him and his proper scale and quality of living, is not, of course, his whole persona as we have here defined it, but it is, from the economic point of view, a very important factor in his persona. But the persona brings in a vast motivating complex over and above the standard of life; it brings in his sense of obligation, of what it is graceful and becoming to do, his pride, what is honourable or insulting for him; and we believe that for the purposes of social and political as well as economic analysis, the wider mode of approach adopted here is altogether more comprehensive and effective.
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is what is becoming for me to do. This is what I will not endure." It is manifestly necessary, if we are to carry this survey into the field of mental reactions, that we should attempt here some sort of classification of the primitive types of persona. Man, as history in the narrower sense, history in human record, dawns, has ceased to be a spontaneous wild man, he has brought himself into a community through this self-reference to an ideal of a rôle.

What, then, are the chief forms of these operative rôles?

Here we shall have to break at times into what is almost untouched ground. Into it we must go with humility, apologies and the firmest resolution to explore it as thoroughly as we can. Social psychology has hardly begun. It is extraordinary that it was not begun long ago. Economic science, in all its schools, has been accustomed and content to work upon the crudest assumptions about motive, that it is possible to make. The Marxist indeed makes some pretensions to psychology with his phrases about a "class-conscious proletariat" and a "bourgeois mentality" and the like. He shows at least an awareness of differences of persona. But under the stresses of political and social combat such phrases have long since degenerated into mere weapons, aspirations and terms of abuse. So discredited and warped are they that they will be of no use to us here.

The basal mentality of that traditional social order from which we are now emerging seems to be that of the types for which we have used the general name of peasant. The distinctive character of the peasant type of persona is its complete acceptance of the idea that toil is virtue, and its close, intense adhesion to property and the acquisition of property. All over the world and continually peasants murder for property. Wherever there is a peasant countryside the newspapers rarely go for many weeks without an account of such a murder. Murders of passion characterize towns and the middle and upper classes. The peasant lusts and breeds, but without any pride or romantic play. He trains his young to toil at an early age, to getting and to avarice.

His suppressions make him prone to envy. His soul is equalitarian. His hostility to exceptional display imposes a standard costume and decorum upon any countryside where his is the dominant ideology. Housing and furniture too are standardized there, and the slightest departures from the rigidities of usage pro-
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voke a bitter resentment and moral condemnation. Everywhere in
Europe and Asia where the peasant persona rules, sentimentalists
delight to prate of its lovely local costumes and customs, its music
and art. Everywhere, except for differences due to conditions of
climate and natural resources, these costumes and art are practically
the same, the industriously made lace, the bright buttons, the white
linen, the red and black colourings, the tedious repetitive carving,
the traditional music, the staid dancing, the plaintive and tragic
song. It is essentially and visibly the same from Biscay and
Brittany to China.

The peasant’s persona is subduced to a life of hard monotones and
stereotyped pleasures. He is always under the observation of his
neighbours. He is much worried about his character and personal
prestige; he exists because of his reputation—for this or that—for
his good thatching or his skilful pruning of the vines. When he is
sober he is afraid. He is afraid of his lord, afraid of the opinion of
those about him, afraid of lawyers with “bits of writing” and of
priests with mysterious powers over the gates of Heaven and hell.
Drink releases a fund of suppressed brutality and self-assertion.
With pestilence or bad seasons the subjugated imagination escapes
very readily into superstitious observances. The puzzled and dis-
tressed peasant is never very remote from the ancient blood sacri-
fice. His religion is primordial, it is unsophisticated superstition,
entirely unspiritual.

All these realities must, by a psychological necessity, be made to
appear in the peasant’s consciousness of himself in the most
pleasing light possible—interwoven with a palatable presentation
of any individual idiosyncrasy he may possess. He asks no why nor
wherefore to explain his work and his property. There they are.
What else could you have? But about himself, against any lurking
doubts he must be sturdily reassured. He sees himself therefore
as a good honest fellow, the friend of that friend of his, the local god
or the Good God, as the case may be. That god also is as possessive
and jealous and as hostile to strange ways and displays as his Maker.
The peasant’s God and the peasant stand upon their “rights” and
do what they like with their own. The peasant is free from affecta-
tions and ful-lals, and none can better him at a bargain. Let anyone
who would do him an injury beware. But nothing “stuck-up” or
arrogant enters into his composition. He can be shrewd as well as
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worthy. He "knows his way about," and is far too wise to make enemies of the rich and great. A certain humour helps him to swallow and ignore any humiliation that may come to him. He will laugh and, later on, get the better of them. The mills of the peasant, he flatters himself, grind slowly, but they grind exceeding small. On such terms with himself he finds his rôle in life endurable. It is a great consolation to reflect that many are (deservedly) worse off than himself.

Derived very directly from this fundamental type of human persona is that of the mediocre town-dweller who has drifted in from the countryside. The normal townsman is indeed a transplanted peasant. This peasant-minded townsman is under the same necessity to reconcile his egoism to a laborious and inferior rôle, and he displays the same consequent exaltation of toil as a virtue, the same self-congratulation upon simplicity, sardonic humour and sagacity, and the same disposition to avarice and a tenacious adherence to a residuum of "rights." He is brought into closer contact with a greater number of people, and that gives him a greater mental quickness. He needs a livelier sense of the instability and ultimate humiliation of those of better estate than himself, because their better fortune presses upon him more closely.

In most forms of popular religion throughout the world, the theory of compensations hereafter has been a useful help to equanimity. The priest, amidst the closer population of the town, has always been less of a medicine man and more of a consoler than upon the more superstitious countryside. He has played a helpful part in the reconciliation of man to his destiny during the ages of toil. In the end, he still assures us, Lazarus will corner the water supply of Dives. And the affections and relationships of family life have afforded the peasant type throughout the world, the consolations of authority and self-esteem which it has had to relinquish so largely in its outward social rôle. He clings to his family, therefore, as he clings to his scrap of property, and resists any infringement of his absolute ownership of either. They constitute his inner freedom, his private assurance, his self-respect. To lose them is to become a lost soul, a wanderer or a slave. He may have to submit, as peasants in Russia and central Europe submitted until quite recently, to such little infringements as the "droit du seigneur." But after all that was soon over and he was left master in his own hovel,
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free to beat and compel. It was just another tax in kind which you evaded if you could and yielded if you had to.

Arising out of this great and world-wide system of tradition and interpretation, which gives us the peasant type of persona—the prevalent type of human persona still—are others, essentially of the same nature, but liberated or disturbed by certain broad modifications of condition. In the town and in the countryside individuals may prosper exceptionally. They may get enough property to give employment to their less successful fellows or to lend them money and entangle them in debt. The acquisitive and competitive sides of the peasant mentality may lead them to a position in which they may even come to defy their original traditions so far as to indulge in display and open arrogance. The rich townsman, the money-lender and middleman, the big peasant and farmer of mediaevalism, all arise out of the main mass of peasant-minded society in a logical development of its ideas.

Nearly all the early pioneers of the modern large-scale industries arose in this way, and brought with them into the developing new conditions the grasping conceptions and domestic severities of their origins. The social history of Lancashire cotton or Birmingham metal goods would illuminate this very plainly. Even to-day, the persona of the big business man remains fundamentally a peasant persona. What the Communists call the “petty” and “big” bourgeoisie are in reality only the primordial peasant writ urban or writ large. They are “kulaks” one stage further on. One peculiar value of the “Five Towns” novels of Mr. Arnold Bennett lies in the clear, convincing, intimate, and yet almost unpremeditated way in which he shows the industrialized peasant mentality of the employing class in a typical industrialized region, the Black Country, waking up to art and refinement, to ampler personality and new ideas.

But while on its upper face the main peasant-souled mass of the human community throws up this prosperous minority, this crop of “well-off” families, on the lower side it produces, through excessive breeding, through selective competition—once in small quantities, and now, through changes in the scale of production, in abundance—a number of “expropriated” individuals to whom the Communist with his infallible inexactitude of nomenclature and his ineradicable passion for sham erudition, has applied the term “proletariat.” The
typical modern proletarian is generally without children, that is to say without "proles"; he has lost his grip upon any property and is unable to sustain and control a family. He is a quite landless and homeless man denied the normal consolations of his kind. He may fall into this condition from the peasant and town tradesman level, or, as happens nowadays with increasing abundance, he may be born to these conditions. In the former case the persona to which he squares his conduct and consolations may be a very rough adaptation of the fundamental peasant persona; in the latter, it may be something much more distinctive.

Now the psychological make-up and disposition of these expropriated people, these proletarians— for we have to accept that word now—are of very great importance to our present study. As small ways of trading, cultivation and manufacture give place to larger ways of doing these things, great numbers from the old peasant-townsman stratum will be forced down towards the proletarian level, while a small proportion will clamber upward to ownership and direction in the new giant concerns. Those forced down will be obliged, in sheer defence of their self-esteem, to deprecate family and property. An element of adventure, defiance, and sentimental brotherhood will be required for a satisfactory persona. All are either unemployed or threatened by intermittence of unemployment, and that too gives a chronic uneasiness. The proletarian wants change of general conditions, therefore, and is not afraid of change. In that he differs absolutely from the peasant who is still holding on to property.

Our Western business community has neglected altogether to study the new type of persona—our Western business community seems indeed to neglect the study of everything that does not make obviously for immediate profit—but the Communist has made some plausible generalizations about it. One considerable error seems to me to be his exaggeration of the power and sincerity of the proletarian sentiment of brotherhood. He has developed this alleged disposition to fraternity into an inspiring but misleading cant. And also he mistakes a craving for change due to uneasiness, a desire to upset the uncomfortable arrangement of things for a creative desire.

Here we are under no compulsion to idealize the proletarian. Generally speaking, he is a poor creature, and in the mass he may
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disgorge great accumulations of envy and be dangerous, destructive and cruel.

It is also a grave error in the communist ideology to confuse the true proletarian persona with that of organized labour in Britain, France, Germany and elsewhere. A large part of such labour is not and never has been truly propertyless and proletarian; it has never parted company with the simple domestic industrious saving ideals of the peasant types. It has generally savings to its credit. In America it has almost always savings to its credit. And its trade union and political leaders are essentially like any other members of the peasant-townsman class who have "got on." They have personas closely akin to those of rising business men.

A much more fundamental error on the part of the Communist is his assumption that the types and classes we have dealt with thus far, the acquisitive people growing rich and the working people growing poor, constitute the whole of contemporary society. They do indeed constitute its greater mass and impose their characteristic types of persona upon the great majority of human beings, but they are no more the whole of the human community than flesh and bones, viscera and blood vessels are the whole of a human body. The nerves and brain and the endocrinal glands may seem out of all proportion less, but until the activity of these controlling systems is reckoned with, our account of human physiology is very incomplete and altogether misleading.

It is only fair to admit that Communism began its career with a realization of the need of a psychological analysis of human society, but for various obscure reasons that movement has been continually the victim of its own phrases, and it early fell into slavery to "the materialistic conception of history." This phrase, however carefully it may have been qualified originally, has had the effect of insisting upon the entire supremacy of economic considerations in human life. Naturally, therefore, every type and class of human being that did not fall into simple economic categories was ignored. But man was man long before he became an economic animal.

For strategic purposes Communism has now become entirely dogmatic. That has given it enormous revolutionary effectiveness at the price of any scientific development of its ideas. Perhaps we of the Atlantic world are too disposed to be ungrateful to the vast experiments Communism has made and to underrate its achieve-
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ment. But there can be no doubt that its dogmatism sets a very
definite term to its usefulness in the world, and that ultimately it
may become, like every other rigid motivating system that has
preceded it, a mass of mental encumbrance to human thought.

THE FISHERMAN, THE PEASANT OF THE WATERS

We may note here the variations of the peasant type that appear
where fertile rivers flow and where land meets sea. There appears
fishing. The fisherman is a water cultivator. Fishing has produced
its own distinctive types of habitation in pile dwellings which still
survive in the Celibes to-day, and which, because of the facile
preservation of their remains, figure so largely in the archaeology of
the Neolithic period. The Swiss lake dwellings, the Glastonbury
finds, mark important points in the history of our knowledge of this
science. Fishing probably crept down the rivers to the sea and
mingled with the casual life of the longshore prowler looking for
shell fish and edible seaweed and leaving his "kitchen middens" of
shells for posterity. Probably fishing clung to the shore and rarely
went out of sight of land until the Middle Ages. Inland people ate
river fish or none at all, and oysters brought from Britain were, as
everyone knows, a Roman luxury, but sea fishing as an industry
and a regular food supply is of recent origin.

The fisherman in our study of personas has to be distinguished
quite sharply from the seagoing man. Maybe the latter learnt the
first tricks of navigation from the river and longshore folk, but from
the very beginnings of history we find him trader, slaver and pirate,
and he falls under the second broad class of personas we shall next
consider. The first real sailors linked the seaways with the desert
routes, but the villages of the fishermen spread along the rivers,
dotted lagoons and sheltered in coves and inlets away from any
ports or cities.

The expansion and industrialization of fishing came only with the
general expansion and industrialization of enterprise in the fifteenth
and sixteenth centuries. Its most picturesque and romantic exten-
sion was whaling. Since the beginnings of human association men
have no doubt attacked stranded whales or whales in shallow water.
Since palæolithic man did not hesitate to attack an embarrassed
mammoth in a swampy place and even trap the monster in a pit,
he would certainly have set about a whale had he got the slightest chance to do so. The Esquimaux have killed whales among the ice from time immemorial, and wherever there were fishing boats we may be sure that men would find the presence of whales off-shore provocative and exciting. But the arts of shipbuilding and navigation had to precede any attempt to push the assault further. It was only after the sixteenth century that the systematic extermination of whales became a business enterprise, and the same period saw the invasion of fishing by larger ships and apparatus and the methods of capitalism. In the broad issues that concern us here, the psychology of the industrialization of the seas and ocean does not differ materially from the industrialization of the land.

§ 3. The Second Class of Persona: The Typical Nomad's Persona and Its Variations

Let us now bring in certain other strains of tradition to this account of human motivation. Our general problem of why people carry on in, and submit to, social and industrial life, and how the progressive organization of human life is to be sustained, will then take on quite a new and different appearance.

And first there is a very considerable range of ideas that come into modern life from the mentality of the aggressive nomad. We write "aggressive nomad" and not simply "nomad." Our introductory history has followed the Bible in its recognition of the early schism between Cain and Abel, between the cultivator and the herdsman. This was a regional climatic difference between arable and periodic pasture lands. In the one, cattle were accessory; in the other, cultivation was incidental. Normally the nomad led a life almost as inaggressive as the cultivator, but his mobility made him more easily a thief, a robber, a raider, a merchant, and at times a cultivator. Cattle was naturally his money of account. Outside the arable levels of recently deposited soil, "the great alluvial valleys" in particular, he wandered into ore-bearing districts and became the first metallurgist. The gipsy tinker, with his distinctive morals and traditions and pots and pans, is the last decaying survival of the nomadic life in western Europe.

But at times, as we have told in the Outline of History, the herdsman gathered in strength and raided "for keeps." Then he founded
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kingdoms and autocracies and ruled the men with the peasant personas. He had, and has to this day where he still maintains his freedom in the Asiatic midlands, an entirely more robust and swaggering tradition than the peasant. Fundamentally he despises work. His spirit towards property is "easy come and easy go." Not to get easily and give freely reflects upon his force and vigour. His love is fierce, romantic, personal and not nearly so prolific as that of the cultivator in constant need of "hands" for the soil. He gambles, and he does it with pride and elegance. Waste is a glory to him. He is, and in his persona he knows himself to be, a fine, reckless, desperate fellow.

Such have been the quality and disposition of kings, aristocrats, soldiers and ruling classes since the social world began. From them by snobbery and imitation, through romantic poetry, literature, art and example, this tradition has soaked into the general imagination of mankind. It introduces an element of conflict and fluctuation now into most personas in the world. Even the young peasant sits in the village cinema theatre to-day watching the familiar situations of romance unfold, and imbibes new notions altogether of what it is to be a man.

And upon the ideology of the nomad and the sword the incessant search and fight for territory and ascendancy, the essential forms of our political life are framed. It seems perfectly natural to us to see a king with spurs and sword; we should never dream of seeing him with a hammer or a spade. These are the implements of the robbed and subjugated. It was only in the nineteenth century and under the menace of the peasant-minded moralist that kings began to flaunt their virtues and imitate the bourgeoisie. As indeed it was only in the same period that the acquisitive classes won their way to spur and coronet. The onset of great-scale production was altering all the values of the old dispensation.

The Communist confuses this predatory tradition of the robber nomad with the tradition of the acquisitive peasant type, growing rich. In modern life the two mingle extraordinarily, but that does not make them the same. They are and remain different threads. They make indeed the personas and conduct of people in dominant positions muddled and confused, but mixture and confusion: do not mean assimilation. The stands are fundamentally different and essentially separable. The present solidarity of the rich with the
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royal and “noble,” based on mutual accommodations and common fears, is an apparent solidity that will probably fail to stand any great social or economic strain. The aristocratic woman sells herself and her pride of caste in marriage for money, and her family finds a compensation in the snobbish imitativeness of the newly rich. She feels herself that she has not so much sold herself as captured money. But recent revolutions have greatly cheapened “nobility,” and its prestige declines as the social confidence of the plutocracy increases.

I do not know how far we may be able to establish and demonstrate the ideological confusion and indecisiveness of collective initiative, this melange of the rich boor and the proud baron has produced in the directive classes of the modern European community. Presently some shrewd student of social psychology will gather and focus the light of letters, memoirs, well-informed novels and plays and reports of divorce proceedings upon this clash of cultures. *

§ 4. The Third Class of Persona: The Educated Persona and Its Derivatives

But now we must consider a third great system of tradition, a third great system of personas and self-esteem. This in the early stages of society was represented by the priest. From the beginning the priest represents a type of persona more or less detached on the one hand from the family idea and the obsession with property of the peasant, and on the other from the personal assertion and lordship of the aristocrat. It would be extraordinarily interesting to work out the evolution and ramifications of the priestly type of persona. In that we should find a mass of indications of the utmost value in our final estimate of the need and destinies of our planetary ant-hill.

It is a biologically important fact that generally speaking the priest has been as often as not unproductive. The characteristics of the priestly persona are not therefore inherited; they are the outcome of a particular training, a particular system of suggestions, and not of any selective process. It is not necessary to breed an educated intellectual class. The Brahmin caste in India, which we may regard as an experiment to that end, shows no distinctive mental superi-

* Sombart’s Moderne Kapitalismus is illuminating here.

and what is more important, intelligent
Priests over a large part of the world are drawn from every section of the community. Throughout Christendom, for example, noble, trader, peasant have all contributed their quota to the priestly stratum.

I write "priest" here. But I intend much more than the specialized religious officiator in the modern scheme of things. "Cleric" might have been a better word, but then there is risk of confusion with the modern "clerk." Originally the priests constituted the entire learned class; the priesthood was all the learned professions. The Egyptian priest was doctor, lawyer, teacher and financier. His order supplied the only writers and poets. He was architect and artist. He stood at the side of the ruler as secretary and minister. The temple was bank, treasury and museum. This original monopolization of education by the religious organization is written plain over the history of those mediæval and Renascence European communities from which the contemporary world derives the bulk of its tradition. If there was any collateral development of writing and reading in ancient times it was probably in relation to the account-keeping of nomadic and sea-going traders. The estate clerk and the court scribe may also have been laymen from very early times—but they must have been educated by men in the priestly tradition.

Until the Protestant Reformation universities were monastic in spirit and organization; the great statesmen were church dignitaries, and there was scarcely any intellectual life at all outside the priestly organizations. From this identification of intellectual activity with the clerical tradition arises a fact that is too often overlooked in progressive discussion. Liberalism is too apt to denounce "priestcraft" as altogether evil. Yet the progressive and revolutionary initiatives of the past have been almost entirely of priestly origin. True that in theory the priest has been the inflexible guardian of tradition, but in fact it has been priests and learned clerks who have led almost every breakaway from tradition that has ever occurred. Roger Bacon, that morning star of modernity, was a Franciscan. Huss, Wycliffe, Luther, Calvin, Knox were all priests, dissentient priests. Mendel, the founder of genetics, was a priest. And it is interesting to note how many of the pioneers of that most revolutionary of all sciences, anthropology, were priests. Even Karl Marx was a university product, a doctor of distinction.

Through the scholastic clerical tradition nearly all the intellectual
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growth of humanity has come. The contribution to human initiatives of the vast peasant-souled majority is small by comparison. A few starry men of genius break through, a Shakespeare, a Burns, but even these are expressive rather than critics and innovators. The aristocrat gave more, but not so very much more, his principal gift that pride which tells the truth, and even his loyalty and chivalry have a quality of plagiarism from the priestly conceptions of devotion. It was the Church that saved learning throughout the Dark Ages. From priestly sources all learning had to come, and only in learned circles could the flame of criticism and discussion be kept alive. At times the protection afforded that flame may have impeded the access of air, but it was better for us on the whole that it should sometimes have been in need of blowing up than that it should ever have been altogether blown out.

And now let us look a little more closely into the type of persona produced by the priestly tradition. Under this heading we shall have to deal not only with priests and ministers of religion, but with a vast world of quasi-disinterested effort, with teachers of every class, with writers and creative artists, with scribes and journalists, with doctors, surgeons and the associated professions, with judges and lawyers generally, with administrators, and particularly that excellent type the permanent official, with technical experts, and finally, most hopeful, various and interesting of all, with the modern scientific worker. All these types of persona have characteristics in common that mark them off quite definitely from either the proliferation of the varieties of acquisitive peasant-townsmen soul, or from the royalties, aristocrats, robbers and genteel social parasites, who constitute the predatory classes. In the modern professional soldier we have perhaps a type intermediate between the predatory and priestly group and deriving more and more from the latter tradition, and in the modern barrister the pretensions of an aristocratic protector of a client subdued to the exigencies of a hireling bravo, and mingled too often with the unredeemed greed of the peasant. (So that it is with dire public lamentations that he “gives up” a practice “worth” so much for some honourable promotion that is not so heavily fed.)

The first distinctive element in this third and most important class of persona, the educated persona, is the conception of self-abnegation, of devotion. The individual is not supposed to work
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directly either for his own enrichment or for his own honour and glory. He belongs, he has made himself over, to an order consecrated to ends transcending any such personal considerations.

That is the essence of priesthood, of professionalism, and of all artistic and literary pretensions. The robber type has its devotions to king and chieftain, intensely personal and sentimental, often to the sexual pitch, but the devotion of the learned-priestly type is to a God or to a divine overruling idea. This idea runs through almost all the endless developments and variations of the learned-priestly type we find in the world to-day. The doctor, the solicitor, the teacher, the artist all have their professional standards and repudiate "mere commercialism." Neither the barrister nor the physician works for definite fees. There is a tradition of gratuitous service both in law and medicine, and in Great Britain a quack can sue for his fee while a registered practitioner is restrained from doing so by his professional organization. Even the undisciplined writers have their unwritten code, and when three prominent authors, Mr. G. B. Shaw, Mr. Arnold Bennett, and another, were invited by a great London general store to write matter for its advertisements for some enormous fee—with full liberty to say what they liked, praising or blaming as they saw fit—they all declined the proposal as an infringement of their priestly function, as an imputation upon that complete disinterestedness and spontaneity which is to a self-respecting writer the most vital quality of his persona.

The element of devotion in this learned-priestly tradition is absolutely essential to the processes of civilization. One cannot imagine the economic social machine running at all, without the services of this now very various class, these definitive or constructive public servants, these judges, doctors, teachers, writers, officials, more or less honest and trustworthy. And they are practically trustworthy and efficient because they have all been brought up to and educated in this type of persona. That is a point to note. These types are more "made" than the peasant, townsman, money-earning types, who for the most part take up the tradition in which they find themselves without much scrutiny, or than the robber, aristocrat, military types;—though the military at least develop now an increasing distinctive moral training. This third great class of persona is moulded and its qualities are evoked out of germs of
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purpose which remain latent in all the less educated elements of the,
social mélange. That is the key-fact to the study of social
psychology. .

Again we approach the culminating topic of our survey, educa-
tion. But from that we will diverge for the present to discuss the
secular change in mental attitude which the priestly-learned factor
in human development is undergoing. In the traditional past, educa-
tion has been the preserver and transmitter of tradition. The
mass of the priestly-learned class was essentially conservative. It
learnt, it repeated, it handed on. So it remains in bulk. But there
has been an increasing development of critical and reconstructive
qualities in that mass. The priestly-learned class has never been
blindly obedient and disciplined. Because, behind his teacher, the
novice has always been aware of the overriding idea, the Truth, the
Deity, or the spirit of the order or profession he was entering. The
bolder ones have always found confidence and strength in that.
They would derive courage from it to question the authority of
their immediate teachers. In the past almost all the great changes
in teaching have been proposed as returns to the original ortho-
doxy, as rebellions against recent corruptions. "Reformations"
have been due not to a defect but to an exaggeration of loyalty.
It was clerics, not Jew nor Moslem nor pagan, who broke the
Catholic unity of Christendom.

And though such dissentients might seek support in other quar-
ters for their novelties, it is in the ineradicable idea of disinterested
integrity which this priestly-learned class alone has fostered that the
future of humanity resides. The innovating spirits of the closing
eighteenth century pitted the expansive urge of the new industrial
and financial bourgeoisie against aristocracy, and so created
Liberalism. It was not the newcomers who produced Liberalism.
They took to it very readily, but that is another matter. The
socialist thinkers of the following decades sought for driving power
in the discontent and resentments of the multiplying proletariat.
But in either instance the "idea" came from the class that alone
breeds ideas. A great mind-dominating organization like the
Roman Catholic Church is for ever searching its own body for the
infection of original thought and revolt, because it knows that the
deadliest antagonists to its current procedure are the men who most
intimately possess its tradition. It fears the good it has engendered.
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All complex reforms of method and spirit come from within. It is lawyers who must simplify law and harmonize it with social biology and psychology; it is medical men who can alone readjust medical practice properly to modern ideas. The schools are the ultimate citadel which must be won, if the general character of human thought is to be changed. It does not matter whether most doctors, most lawyers and most schoolmasters and spiritual teachers are formal and reactionary or not. It is within the training of these professions that the redeeming impulse is to be found. Liberalism and Marxism, whether they are right or wrong, are mere phases in that great conflict for orderly creation to which the gathering liberation and gathering courage of the priestly-learned mind have brought humanity. They are not really insurrectionary impulses from below.

§ 5. The Civilization of the Entrepreneur*

Out of the interplay of a vast multitude of variations and distortions of these three primary types of persona, the peasant, the aristocrat-soldier-robber, and the priestly-learned man, arose the mental life, the tolerances, acquiescences, concessions and usurpations of the old traditional life from which we are now emerging. Out of the development of these, out of their steady modification by circumstance and their deliberate remoulding by a new directive education, must come the mental life of this new phase of scientific purposive organization towards which our species is at present moving.

And here perhaps is the place for a preliminary look upon certain types which we may lump together roughly under the name of entrepreneur. The mentality of the industrial and financial entrepreneur who has thus far been the immediate agent in carrying mankind over from localized and petty to large-scale and mondial production and trade, is best understood if we realize that he comes mainly from the urban variation of the peasant type, for whom property, money, and visible triumph over one’s neighbour are the criteria of success. The first exploitation of the gifts of invention and science was very largely an instinctive, unintelligent exploitation. And to this day the typical face of the big industrialist and the

* See R. H. Grettin’s The English Middle Class.

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big financier has a boorish quality.

But there is no innate necessity for this. As the organization of business increases in complexity, the importance and freedom of the individual owner may be dwarfed more and more by the necessity for directive assistants who will be trained and specialized men, essentially of the new innovating variety of the priestly-learned intellectual type, and with its inseparable inspiration of disinterestedness.

Here is an interesting field for some student of the social aspects of economics. It is a piece of work that has to be done. It will be profoundly interesting to explore novels, memoirs, interviews and reported utterances of all sorts to trace the progressive civilization of the entrepreneur during the last hundred years. Our investigator may even collect opinions directly from some of the more original outstanding industrial leaders of our time. The big business man as a powerful and irresponsible savage is probably quite a transitory phenomenon in the development of the new world-wide civilization. The rationalization movement is essentially the organized expression of his entry upon a new phase. The chaos of competition becomes the oligarchy of production and distribution; the erstwhile plunderer of profits becomes a ruling and responsible economic aristocrat.

With, of course, exceptions.

§ 6. The Idea of Property*

The three main types of human persona differ most widely in their attitude to property. The first type is acquisitive, tenacious and preservative; the second is rapacious and consumes; the third professes to be more or less aloof from possession and gain, and to carry on the service of the community for satisfaction of a quite different type. Let us now look a little into this idea of property which is manifestly a very primary idea in binding man to man in a common effort and a mutual servitude.

We live and breathe in a world of property, just as we live and breathe in air, and yet that idea is as little analyzed as air was three hundred years ago. We—the generality—have as little ordered and

* See Professor Laski's Grammar of Politics, chapter on "Property" and Tawney's Acquisitive Society for a good classification of types of property.
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explicit knowledge of its elements and pressures.

It is, for example, interesting to turn to the index of the latest edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica, that compendium of general knowledge and the current mentality, and note how far we are as yet from any understanding of the need for such an analysis. One finds a reference to certain legal articles thus:

Property: see Compensation, Conveyancing, Personal Property, Real Property.

Property, Devolution of: see Intestacy, Legitim, Will.

Property, Law of: see Real Property and Conveyancing.

And finally one little article, a column and a third long, on Primitive Property, in which alone is any realization of the fundamental significance of property ideas apparent. This is in a work which gives seventy-four columns of letterpress and forty-one page plates to Pottery and Porcelain!

The article upon Primitive Property is compressed, but does recognize something of the subtlety and variety underlying the apparent simplicity of this fundamental concept of social ideology. Rivers, Laveleye, Malinowski and other explorers of this neglected territory are mentioned. Indeed, in spite of the silences of the Encyclopædia Britannica, there is already available a considerable amount of work which converges upon the problem we are suggesting. But it is dispersed in all sorts of books and publications. For example, we have the work of such a writer as Lowie (Primitive Society), the material gathered for us by Malinowski, piquant suggestions from that psychological genius Jung, and the Yerkes' focussing of simian behaviour, a mass of such work indeed, ali ready to be assembled in a larger synthesis. That assembling waits to be done by some competent and industrious student, but we may, with a certain confidence, throw out some general anticipations of its conclusions.

The idea of "mine" seems to be of much earlier origin than the idea of "me." Some birds, many predatory animals and gorillas, for example, seem to have very definite territorial ideas. Possessive jealousy is manifestly interwoven into the very substance of many mammals. Man, as he began to discover himself, discovered himself an owner. The linkage between himself and certain objects,
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places and persons must have appeared as something obvious and
necessary to him. And not only was there a "mine" in his awaken-
ing and clarifying consciousness to keep him snarling warnings at
his brothers and sisters, but also there was an "ours"—all sorts
of other larger things that rallied the pack to a common defensive.

These primitive appropriations were already becoming definite
and recognized in the very earliest societies to which our knowledge
or imagination extends. The establishment of taboos, on which,
as we have shown, human social life rests, concerned not merely
sexual ownership but many other forms of ownership, varying with
the nature and use of the thing owned. The ownership of weapons
and adornments must have always been very personal and
thorough. The ownership of a strip of meat still on the body of the
tribe's last kill was not nearly so well defined. Many sorts of
ownership, and particularly the ownership of one's own body and
life, were very precarious and may have been largely dependent
on the will of the tribal chief.

People write and talk of "primitive communism" and "primit-
ive individualism." But both communism and individualism are
highly abstract ideas, too abstract for my taste altogether, and
with a little mental slovenliness either can be applied to savage
conditions. Dr. Frith, in the Encyclopædia article I have cited,
very properly dismisses both these "labels." The statement I
have italicized above and to which I return as the cardinal pro-
position in the matter, is that originally the significance of own-
ership was dependent altogether upon the nature and use of the
object under consideration. In the development of savage ideas,
as in the development of language, the particular came before the
general. "My" meant what I have now or what I mean to mono-
polize: woman, axe, bead, sunny corner or cave. Certain things I
might covet but dared not touch because they were taboo to the
headman or to someone else. And, as the common use of language
testifies, "my" went beyond the idea of property altogether when
one talked of my master or my enemy.

From such indefinite beginnings, which indeed signified hardly
more than that a thing could focus on "me," the intensification
of "mine" progressed. The idea of "mine" tended to generalize.
But the generalization of property was never perfect. From the
beginning there seem to have been these plain divisions between,
first, the crude absolute property of a man in his nose-ring or beads; 
secondly, claims on services and particularly sexual property with 
certain customary reciprocities and limitations; and, thirdly, 
property in which there was manifestly a communal interest, such 
as hunting rights and collective cultivation.

Sexual property we will not discuss at this point. It does not 
concern this review of human activities very greatly, and the 
points where it does come in may be conveniently deferred for a 
special chapter on woman. The progressive emancipation 
of women and the social protection of children, seem likely, as we 
shall see, to relegate it, at no very distant date, to the world of 
private feeling altogether.

But with regard to the other two categories of property there 
have always been in the human make-up two conflicting dis-
positions: the first, the disposition of the primitive ego-centred 
human animal to make “mine” as absolute and extensive as possible, 
and the second, the more or less lucid realization of the frequent 
incompatibility of absolute property with the general welfare. 

The craving for absolute property is perhaps the most vigorous 
survival of the primitive savage in modern life. His lust, for 
example, is far more under control. He even wants to own his 
property when he is dead, and resents any interference with his 
freedom of bequest.

Confronting this excess of primordial egotism is the law. The 
lawyer is the property-tamer. It is time the lawyer came into our 
picture. He defines property. Let us consider at what point he 
comes in. He is a specialization from the clerical type. Lawyer and 
judge are essentially men of the literate and devoted tradition, 
with an element of authoritative aristocracy. No class has been so 
bitterly satirized and reviled, but the very bitterness of the abuse 
reveals a recognition that from this class it is natural and reasonable 
to demand a conscientiousness and self-suppression beyond the 
normal limits. The peasant who curses the lawyer for selling justice 
and making all he can by it sells his own produce without com-
punction and makes all he can by it though other people starve. 
When every iniquity of the lawyers of the past has been admitted, 
we still find that there were abundant gentlemen of the long robe, 
haunted, even if they were not inspired and pervaded, by the spirit 
of righteousness. The illumination they shed may not always have
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been a beacon, but at any rate the wick never ceased altogether to
glow, and down the centuries we see a succession of these unloved
men boring away in their tedious frowsty courts, really struggling
in that dim mediaeval light to import some semblance of justice,
some thought for the commonweal, into the limitless greed of robber
barons, the unqualified imperatives of feudal chiefs and the grasping
cunning of the baser sort. And they are still working to-day towards
the satisfaction of this permanent social need—the exact definition
of proprietary rights.

There has been, as we have just remarked, an age-long recognition
of at least two varieties of property; that economic property in
which the family, tribe, or other community had an intervening
interest, and particularly land, real property; and that other more
intimate type of possession, absolute property, personal, the bead,
the spear, the dog, that was part of a man and was often made to
"die" and be buried with him. These two main divisions still rule.
But it is manifest they are not comprehensive. Copyright and
patent rights are instances of a third variety of property, an ex-
piring property of a peculiarly intimate character. Nor is either
division, real or personal, more than a miscellany. There are in
practice a great number of kinds of property which develop species
and subspecies as the complexity of society increases, and every
species and variety has its particular limitations of hold, disposition
and use.

The law does in theory recognize at least two sorts of personal
property, though the distinction has disappeared from the thought
of the average man. To a lawyer a chattel, which may be owned
absolutely, differs from a "chase in action," such as a copyright, in
respect of which one merely has rights. Even in regard to salable
property, an owner may have more or less power. Before property
in human beings disappeared it was gradually modified until, from
the right to kill and torture slaves, we arrived at the present posi-
tion, when a man may not grossly injure even his own children, but
controls them only for their benefit. Our property in animals has
been limited quite recently by humanitarian legislation.

According to the law of England, all land is the property of the
king, and its "owners" are his tenants. They have succeeded in
establishing absolute rights against the spirit of the law, but the
idea that land is held on trust is not deeply buried. During the
privations of the last war public opinion supported public interference with owners who neglected to get all the food they could out of their land, and if similar action of this sort were proposed to-day it would be attacked not so much by lawyers as an infringement of elementary rights as by allegations that it would not work.

Indeed, against the whole range of individual rights, both in property and conduct, the law holds up the notion of public policy:—a man may not act in a manner contrary to the public good. And the operation of this idea is not limited or governed by precedent, but varies freely with the moral and economic ideas of the age. On grounds of public policy judges have recently upset decisions relating to cruelty to wives, freedom of bequest and the doctrine that agreements to fix prices are illegal conspiracies. In the days of reverence for “economic laws” price-fixing was condemned because it checked their operation. With the passing of the school of economists who held this opinion the decision has been reversed. This attrition and modification of property is always going on. The lawyer knows it is going on, and his conception of property is of a very modified and graded ownership.

But in the thinking of the ordinary man—which is what concerns us most here—this is not clearly and habitually recognized. There is a discord between the existing legal realities of property and popular thought which still holds that “a man may do what he likes with his own.”

Just as, long after Dalton and the discovery of the elements, my education began at the “fire-air-earth-and-water” stage of chemistry because of the lag of popular education, so in spite of current legal thought the ideology of the ordinary man begins with the idea of absolute property. And generally speaking it stays there. For the ordinary school teaches nothing about sorts of property. And the normal teacher knows very little of any property whatever. The ordinary man therefore is continually acting upon the idea that what he owns he owns absolutely, and he is continually being pulled up by restrictions and limitations which are discordant with this crude ideology.

Perhaps the nearest approach to absolute ownership—the complete power to do what one likes with one’s own—lies in the change a man carries in his pockets and (provided it is not an heirloom) the ornamental ring he wears upon his finger. Next comes the money
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he has within reach or within call. The shadow of debt may lie on, that, but otherwise his ownership is very complete. Beyond the range of such immediate property, his ownership could very well be treated as non-existent, and his relationship to its object, whatever it was—home, land, stock or share—treated as a personal claim or right to do merely this, that and the other definable thing with the object in question. It would work out to practically the same results. But it would work through a rather different mental process in the mind of the owner.

When we have grasped this fact, which is in the habitual thought of every lawyer, that property is a limited, definable, alterable claim, varying with the object concerned, a claim either upon a passive object or a debt or other claim for service upon a person or persons, we are in a position to measure the reality of such phrases as the “abolition of property” and the “abolition of private property” which played so large a part in the socialist and communist movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. At what were these phrases really aimed, if it is true that we are always changing, abolishing and sometimes even extending property rights? Because, as we are showing, we might “abolish” property almost altogether and still leave things working very much as they do now.

We could quite easily call the owner of anything, “the person in charge,” the official responsible for it. This would be a change of terminology, but it would not be a social revolution. It would be like the League of Nations device of calling tropical possessions “mandatory territories.” We should by a verbal substitution turn owners into mandarins. We should “abolish property” in theory while retaining it as a working method of dealing with things and people until—if ever—a better way could be devised. By so doing we should open the mental door to a scientific revision of legal controls that would in the end reconcile all that is reasonable in socialist and communist theory with the utmost personal freedom that is socially permissible, and that is all we should do. The governments of the world might “abolish” all private property to-morrow by a series of declarations, and until they had devised that better way, those declarations would have about as much effect upon the everyday business of life, as the Kellogg Pacts have had upon the naval and military establishments of the world.

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Let us make this clearer. The reality of property is this, that an individual called the owner, possesses rights of enjoyment, use and disposal over a thing owned, or he possesses certain claims for service or supply upon a debtor. Now the abolition, the destruction, of such rights and claims, as distinguished from their transfer to some other ownership, can mean only that the thing owned or the service claimed, if it is at all desirable, is flung out to be scrambled for, and that in the end someone else or something else will be found in possession, which, as Euclid says, "is absurd" because plainly you have not abolished anything if it reappears.

But if you cannot abolish property altogether, you can abolish the property of this man or that—on condition. The condition, the only way in which the property of any individual or class can be abolished, is that there exist a competent receiver for the property in question. This has always been the weak point in communist proposals, that they do not clearly indicate a competent receiver. And they do not indicate a competent receiver because in relation to most types and varieties of property there is no competent receiver. They are the first to denounce the national State as a competent receiver, or the parliamentary politician as a proper administrator of the confiscated spoils. A large part of the constructive task before mankind consists in the invention and creation of a competent receiver which will embody the commonweal. The Socialists' and the Communists' criticism of the working of private ownership in our economic life is often sound and very penetrating, but from that their transition to impossibly premature receivers is entirely too rapid. They mistake their statements of guiding principles for practicable working plans.

At the beginning of this section we asserted that we live and breathe in a world of property as we live and breathe in air, but, as we have shown throughout this chapter, the way in which the property motive works varies very widely. You may be induced to work in order to get and hold; you may get and spend without working, or you may work without wanting to get. Now this third alternative we have stressed, and to it we shall return again. We have shown that throughout the ages the proper conduct of human affairs has been very largely due to the continued existence of the educated devoted type of persona, in which the property motive is secondary or suppressed. To this type we must look for the organiza-
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tion and control of a competent receiver whenever we consider the removal of any sort of social activity from the spontaneous direction of private owners. And what the Socialist or the Communist is really after when he uses such phrases as the "abolition of property" is, in fact, the abolition of the property motive in economic life; that is to say, the abolition of the two most fundamental social types in favour of the third, the trained and educated type. The world has to become a world of men and women working to serve and not to own. To that possibility we shall return later. Here let it suffice to point out that the socialist idea is really the idea of a universal education for service, and that if it does not mean that, it means nothing at all of the slightest practical value.

At present an entirely educated world is no more than a speculative possibility. At present this world is a world of getting. The ordinary man works for himself primarily, and he works for others only in so far as he wants and needs to get from them.

§ 7. The Education of the Lawyer

The lawyer, we have said, is the property-tamer, and here, if we were being fully encyclopaedic, we should give a lengthy description of the legal organization of the world. We should take the reader into law courts from China to Peru, discuss the legal procedure of the Moslem world, and the reason why the British barrister wears a wig, while his French confrère is adorned with a peculiarly shaped hat. We should glance back to the courts of Greece and Rome. But here again our convenient fiction of the Science of Work and Wealth must relieve us. It would be all there, and if it was there, the really interested reader would merely glance at it and then return to the main discussion. Here we will consider the legal organization only in the most general terms and think of it mainly in the forms it has assumed in the Atlantic civilizations.

What is the rôle of the legal organization in the social complex? In many respects the legal profession is one of the most antiquated types of activity in the world. It was one of the earliest to be detached from the primary priestly calling. It is still of very great importance indeed, though that importance is diminishing with the diminution of the traditional element in law and the establishment of codes. With the growth of civilization it will probably continue
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to diminish relatively to other fields of activity.

In his greater past, when law was a compromise between the will of rulers and the customs of a tribe or people, the lawyer was the sole repository of the law. At his best he upheld the rights of the common man against the encroachments of chiefs and kings. And his record is not a bad one. If his “bit of parchment” terrified the peasant, it often baffled the lord. He alone could state with authority what a man’s rights were; it was his tradition to defend them; indeed, he had no raison d’être if he supported absolute power; and his skill subdued the hearts of rulers towards the current conceptions of mercy and justice. In those days, if the courts abandoned a man he was lost indeed.

Nobody is now in that position of dependence. We can read, we can write and argue to the point. Printing, popular education, representative assemblies and newspapers have made knowledge of the law accessible, and they have provided anyone who can attract attention with powerful if capricious defenders. The Public Trustee sets a standard for solicitors, judges may complain from time to time of the encroachments of, say, Civil Service regulations, but the battle thus started is no longer fought out in the courts of law but in Parliament. The lawyers have not so much to expound a common law known only to themselves as to administer word for word the statutes handed to them. Perhaps nine-tenths of the cases which come before the courts now are matters of statute law.

This is a limitation of the lawyer’s function, and on the whole it is a change for the better. There is no such room in the administration of justice for individual beliefs and difference of culture as there used to be. An enlightened man, free to adjust the law to his own conceptions, would do more harm than good. For in most spheres of legal action what matters (within limits) to the members of a community is not so much how rights and obligations are parcelled out between them as that their rights shall be the same in this court as in that, next month as last month, and that they shall be enforced without fear, favour or distinction between persons. This is not so true of criminal law, but criminal law is only the sensational relief of the calling.

The lawyer, then, must know and follow precedent, and to this is doubtless due the wholly irrational scheme of his own professional arrangements. The modernization of the legal organization lags
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behind that of the medical services, lags behind the reform of the educational system. This is disastrously true of legal education. The barrister is a specialist. He influences the common life at few points; his general education, unless he becomes a judge, is of value chiefly to himself. Fortunately, for social reasons, it is the custom to give him what is considered the best education the country can offer. Solicitors, on the other hand, wield enormous influence. Now that clerical advice is less often sought than it was, we call on our solicitors to advise us at all those moments of crisis—death, marriage, disaster—when momentous personal decisions have to be made. The flow of inherited wealth, the employment of savings, our practical handling of all the vexed social questions, lie largely in the hands of our solicitors. No body of men stands so much in need of the widest and most generous equipment of ideas. And yet it is the custom to take them from school at the age when the mind should expand most rapidly and confine them to routine work in traditionally dusty offices, as though we were anxious to secure for our intimate counsellors men of stunted and dingy mental growth. Happily most of us are able to find men in the profession who have transcended these limitations. A day may come when the Incorporated Law Society will insist upon a modicum of social biology, psychology and modern economics for the professional qualification of a solicitor. It may even demand some elements of literary culture. Until that day arrives the adjustment of legal and social practice to modern knowledge will remain imperfect at many points.

§ 8. "Scientific" Property

We may recall here that brief history of human mental development we traced in the opening sections of Chapter II. We have shown how recent are abstractions, generalizations, and directed thinking in the development of society. We have reminded the reader how children and untrained minds are disposed to personify and to ascribe everything to agents and doers and deal with everything as a personal matter. They think not only of powers and inanimate objects as persons, but they think of tribes and communities as persons. They abstract with difficulty. We shall see presently (in Chapter X) into what difficulties human affairs have been brought by the inability of people to think of money except in
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terms of gold-bartering. Here we have to consider how recent and under-developed is the idea of common property, of any property, that is, not private and personal.

In the old civilizations two great personifications owned all the property that we should now consider collective, the God (administering through the temple priesthood) and the king. When tribal gods gave place to a universal God, he owned the earth and the fullness thereof. That conception of personal ownership came down to quite modern times. The road eighteenth-century Englishmen travelled on was the king’s highway, the ships that defended them were the king’s navy, anything otherwise ownerless, like treasure trove or an intestate’s estate, was the king’s. There was no difficulty then in proposing to expropriate an owner or a class of owners. God and the king were thought of as receivers of unlimited competence. And whatever restriction there was upon a man “doing what he liked with his own” was imposed in the name of the super-owner.

“For everything a personal owner,” has been almost a necessary principle of human thought, until the spread of socialist and communist views. Outside human interests, of course, were the things of the wild, wild beasts and birds and fish and the like, but they could only come into human affairs by being annexed and owned. They were owned so soon as they mattered. The feudal king owned the forests. Not even the seas were masterless; the Carthaginians warned the Romans off the western Mediterranean and, as Britons sang, Britannia ruled the waves.

But after a century of socialist discussion, after a century of thinking over such declarations as Proudhon’s that property is robbery, we find ourselves released to take quite another view of property. We find it possible to start from a point absolutely opposite to that from which our grandfathers started. Instead of assuming the need for an owner for each individual thing, we can begin now with an absolute communist proposition, that everything belongs to all mankind, and try what result we can get by asking: To what persons or groups of people would it be best to assign the responsibility for protecting, controlling, exploiting or enjoying this, that, and the other division of everything? We can work downward from the conception of one human commonweal instead of upward from the basis of nineteen hundred million individual appropriations. We can do so now because the shock of that phrase, “the
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abolition of property," reverberating for a hundred years, has released our minds. We can do now, with all the freedom of a scientific enquiry, what the lawyers through the centuries have been doing with an industrious elaboration, by instinct and rule of thumb, and attempt a really scientific treatment of the apportionment of duty, control and consumption over ownerable things.

It was pointed out at the end of § 6 that it would be possible to "abolish property" to-morrow without any hindrance to our present occupations. But having done so we should then be in a position to ask each and every holder of property in the world to show reason why he should continue to administer that property, enquiring further whether his administration was the best possible for the human commonweal, and if not, by what means it could be transferred, with as little social disturbance as possible, to a better administration.

As a matter of fact, and with certain obscurities and indirectnesses, that is what is being asked in the world now, in a great variety of forms and phrases. What in any particular instance is the better administration? The first people indeed to imply this question by running into the arena with an answer to it were Herbert Spencer's Individualists, of whom Sir Ernest Benn is the foremost living British representative. They broke out in the middle of the nineteenth century replying, to an unspoken challenge, that the best social results, the greatest wealth, the greatest happiness, would result in leaving private property as it now exists, and as free, as untaxed, as uncontrolled as possible. Half of Herbert Spencer's writings were an indictment—a fairly sound one—of the contemporary State as a competent receiver. But by defending personal property as an institution they admitted that the institution of personal property could be called to account, and prepared the way for the world-wide discriminating and exhaustive enquiry that is now proceeding. They did good work in showing how incomplete, to the pitch of futility, was the socialist project until competent receivers could be indicated, but they satisfied no one by these instances of State stupidity that competent receivers were generally impossible.

Very much of this present work is, at its level, a contribution to the scientific conception of property. From first to last, indeed, it is a treatise on the management of the human estate, a balance
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sheet and report on current business, an account of the working of
the world as a going concern. In this chapter upon motives we are
concerned with property mainly because its acquisition is a social
motive. The insistence of the Individualist upon the beneficent
effect of a competitive struggle for acquisition, with private personal
ownership as full, free and wide as possible, has to be taken into
account. He tells us that men have a land hunger, a planning and
management hunger, a passion for “founding a family.” In a
manner which he never fully explains, these base orientations of the
egotistic drive, will, he assumes, work together for good, provided
they are not thwarted and restrained.

But are any of these dispositions instinctive and ineradicable in
the human animal? The social analysis we have made regards their
domination over conduct as entirely the outcome of educational
circumstances; they are great and powerful in the peasant and least
so in the priest. The ideal “economic man” of the Individualist is
simply the peasant, bathed and in control of a business. The Indi-
vidualist approaches this complex question of human incentive too
exclusively from the point of view of the prosperous nineteenth-
century Protestant business man. Mr. John Galsworthy has devoted
a large part of his career as a novelist to the meticulous study of the
motives of a family of this type, the Forsyte family, and more
particularly to the life history of Soames Forsyte, the Man of
Property, and even nowadays, while practically a contemporary,
the reader is left wondering whether any real human beings were
ever so rigid and impenetrable as this constellation of meanly
discreet and discreetly respectable beings who figure in the Forsyte
Saga.

The thesis of this chapter is that both the peasant’s craving for
land and tangible property generally, and the motive that made
Soames Forsyte want to own pictures, estate, wife, and everything
else that was seemly, is not a fundamental motive. The human
animal wants a feeling of security, and it wants freedom and the
feeling of power. Those wants are truly fundamental. The ideology
into which the peasant and business man and other developments
of the peasant have been born, has moulded these natural, funda-
mental and ineradicable motives into the form of tangible property,
which carries with it to them the assurance of satisfaction for these
essential desires. Their persona is that of the struggling or successful

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owner, and they can see themselves comfortably in no other rôle. But the experience of the "educated" series of types shows that the satisfaction of these desires (security, freedom and the desire for power) can be guaranteed in quite other forms. And just so far as it is guaranteed in other forms, so does the desire to possess tangible property evaporate as a social motive.

This is well shown in the preference so many people display for irresponsible property, the preference for being creditors rather than owners. We shall study the genesis of the "investing public" in Chapter X, and the characteristics of the modern rich in Chapter XI, and then it will become manifest how profoundly and extensively the idea of property is being changed from an array of material possessions to entries in a bank account. The Individualist's picture of the modern rich man as a property owner, owning, cherishing, increasing, extending his estate and possessions, is already a dream of past conditions. Soames Forsyte was behind his own times. Even the French peasant now, instead of hoarding, cleaning and counting his precious coins, sends his money to the bank and buys "bons." The disposition to disencumber oneself of property so soon as the human values it stands for, security, freedom and the sense of power can be got in some other way, seems to be well-nigh universal. "Do it for me," says the modern successful man, working away at his own special task, and is only too careless of the competence of the receiver to whom he hands his gains.

The objective of any theory of Scientific Property must be just this release of successful people from their present obligation to own irrelevant property they do not want to administer or watch over, and conversely to release property from the absentee owner and the hands of those who do not want to administer it to the best advantage for the community.

We have said that the sub-man began the accumulation of wealth when he kept and carried a stone in his hand, and that our species tied itself to locality when it had accumulated more gear than it could conveniently carry all the time. There are many ways of viewing history, but from one angle it is to be seen as the piling up of more and more encumbering stuff. At last man is seen tied to the fields he has ploughed, the trees he has planted and the house he has built. We have written of his enslavement to toil and his present hopes of release. His personal release from his maximum
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encumbrance with property has also been going on—with inter-
missions—for a considerable time. He has gradually been freeing
himself from tangible burthensome ownership by a process of mone-
tyary abstraction. To understand how that has come about we must
begin with some elementary considerations about money.

§ 9. The Complexities and Mutations of the Money Idea

We will begin our exploration of this process of the "dematerial-
ization," shall we call it? of property by a sketchy and generalized
consideration of Money, of the money idea and suggestion, which
becomes in abnormal cases the money passion. We are dealing here
with a variable intricate complex. "Money" means in a thousand
minds a thousand subtly different, roughly similar, systems of
images, associations, suggestions and impulses. And this variety is
disregarded in almost all our discussion of monetary questions. The
general disposition is to treat it as something simple—if a little
difficult to define.

Two convenient ways of discussing money present themselves.
The first, the traditional, is to treat money as the development of a
particular type of portable property and trace its progressive
specialization as an intermediary in barter. The second is to con-
sider money as the medium through which the general economic life
of mankind is now being conducted and to criticize the laws and
conventions determining its use from the point of view of the racial
welfare. The convergence of the two methods brings tradition to
the test of the creative idea.

A large amount of the literature of finance fails to distinguish
clearly between these two different ways of approach or to realize
that there are still imperfectly explored gaps between the current
conclusions attained by one process and those reached by the other.
In these still unmapped gaps lie the psychological processes by
which money has achieved its present cardinal importance in
economic life.

In our historical introduction we have glanced already at the
onset of money. A sort of money of account seems to have preceded
real money. A shield was worth so many head of cattle, and so on;
the need for a numerical standard by which to envisage barter was
early recognized. It is quite possible that debts were remembered
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in terms of such "proto-money," as soon as, or even sooner than, the time when metals—weighed at first and later stamped—began to be used as a convenient intermediary in trade. The tally conception of money, that is to say, may be older than the precious, portable, hoardable commodity conception. Gold and silver, copper and iron, became first the most convenient and habitual and then the standard materials for meeting the demand of the tally. With coinage they became the realized tally. But quite early in the story we hear of the Carthaginians using "leather" money, tokens or parchment bills; that is to say, the valuable metals were not handed about but set down somewhat in security, while the tally element of the money circulated by itself.

In a preceding section we pointed out that the idea of property is a simplified idea, that primitive man, with no general terms and no habits of generalization, thought of each thing and variety of thing according to its uses and conditions and had no general concept of material property at all. We noted that down to the present the law has always struggled with an apprehension that property is classifiable and should be classified. But the effect of money, even of money of account, was to help man very far towards an unsound simplification of the property notion. He was able to get out of sight of its variety by abstracting it as a monetary value. He began to think of everything as vendible, interchangeable and divisible. How far that extravagant extension of this idea of vendibility has been carried in human thought can be measured by the fact that such things as the crown (kingship) of Poland, wives, the command of regiments, the cure of souls, the caliphate, have on occasion been reduced to monetary values and sold and purchased.

And this simplification of property favoured also the extension of the idea of absolute ownership to all things. What you could buy and sell you could surely give, change or destroy. You could buy a slave—and break him. You could buy a picture by Holbein and burn it.

Further, crude conception of money undermined the feeling of joint and collective ownership and responsibility. It was easy to step from the idea that a collective property could be estimated in monetary terms to the authentic division of the total into the vendible shares. So that in both the ages of money, that is to say, under the Roman republic and empire and from the Middle Ages
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down to the present time, money ideology, by the facilities and enhancement it has afforded absolute individual ownership, has been potent in breaking up communal and collective systems and detaching customary owners from contact with and responsibility to the soil. In both the First (the Roman) and the Second (the Modern) Money Age there have been parallel changes that did not occur in any preceding phase of civilization. Debt was less restrained, it was incurred with great ease, usury assumed fantastic dimensions, and taxation developed to an unprecedented degree. The “poor” appear in the denunciations of the prophets; the proletarians take their place in the Roman constitution. For the first time “estates” arise from the selling up of dispossessed men. The accumulation of capital and the concentration of production in large enterprises become possible. The Roman process was already in its dégringolade before partnership developed into shareholding. Joint-stock enterprise and power-driven mechanism are two essential differences between the First and the Second Money Age.

We turn from the historical study of money, as the development of a system of conventions, simplifications and disregards, to its second aspect, to its study as a method of carrying on the work of the world. And that means beginning not with money as the measure of property, but with money as wages, conferring “purchasing power.” At the outset of this second enquiry we must ask what is required of money. Just as man takes the horse and without much discussion of how that animal reduced its toes to one and what its life on the steppes and prairies of prehistoric times was like, castrates it and sets it to dragging carts, so those who approach the money idea from the second point of view seek to reduce this growth of conventions and acceptances, to the service of our economic life with as few concessions as possible. And just as the horse, because it is not a simple ad hoc machine but the product of a long organic evolution, has to be taken at times to the veterinary surgeon, driven with caution, fed with care, and sometimes put out to grass, so the money complex, which has never been a simple ad hoc contrivance, needs wariness and watchfulness in its economic use, or it may fail and fall or bolt with or overset the machine. Essentially both horse and money complex were evolved without human premeditation and are only partially subjugated to their functions.

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Primarily money was a tally for property; it arose out of the needs of barter, but for the purposes of this second discussion money can be considered as primarily wages and salary; as the sure and reasonable reward of labour, the check for so much purchasing power. How far it can be, and how far it really is that, we must enquire. Here, at any rate, we can say that it is at present sufficiently that, to keep the great world machine of production going. Because of their confidence in this check, the workers pour into the shops, mines, fields and factories we have surveyed in our earlier chapters. Destroy that confidence absolutely, and the machinery will stop dead.

Our generation has seen in two big human communities the practical loss of that confidence, and has some measure of the effect. I wish I could give statistics and photographs of scenes in Berlin during the final slump of the mark in 1922. Berlin was a terrible city then; never had I been before in a city where nearly every human being was visibly dismayed and broken-hearted—except in Petrograd in 1920. The German collapse was due to very complex causes; the Russian state of affairs was mainly due to a frank and deliberate attempt to abolish money. It was to be made utterly worthless by the unlimited printing of paper money, and then it was to be replaced by cards with tear-off coupons like the rationing cards issued in Great Britain during the Great War. Every citizen was to receive a card periodically, with tear-off coupon for milk, meat, wine, clothing, transport, fuel, books, furniture, theatre, all his needs, and these coupons he was to exchange for these necessities at the communal stores. It was an entirely needless and clumsy experiment to make upon a population already sorely distressed. One insurmountable obstacle was that there were practically no goods worth talking about in the stores. There was a shortage even of flour. It had been quite impossible to improvise the organization of supply and distribution upon the new lines, and everyone was attempting evasions of the law against old-fashioned buying and selling. When I was in Russia at that time I found money still had value; ten thousand roubles was considered rather a better tip than a hard-boiled egg—I had provided myself with both forms of money—and there were still individuals who were not in urgent need of an egg, who did not want it to decay on their hands, and preferred the reserve purchasing power of money even though it might be difficult
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to exercise. Furtive trading was going on in the north in spite of an iron régime of suppression, and in Moscow and at wayside railway stations there was open selling. The distinctive quality of money is the freedom of choice it gives its possessors, and this those tickets destroyed altogether. A certain peddling of coupons presently arose between people anxious for more of one thing and less of another, and after a time the complexity of supplying goods to meet coupon demands became so great that the whole experiment was abandoned. What the worker needs, if you would keep him working, is plainly a check for “anything money can buy” in return for his services rendered.

Our modern economic organization, our whole modern human society, has grown upon the assumption, the colourable pretence at least, that the money distributed in wages does give that, and I cannot conceive of it carrying on now in any other fashion without becoming almost unrecognizably different. Our civilization can as little give up the use of money now, as our bodies can the use of blood. The practical problem is to ensure the best blood possible—to keep out poisons and contagions and avoid anaemia.

To these matters we will return in greater detail in Chapter X. Within the limits of this present chapter we consider money only in so far as it is a motivating idea.

§ 10. *A Résumé of the Co-ordinating Motives in a Modern Community*

Let us now recapitulate this chapter and state in general terms the psychological essentials of modern economic and social co-operation. In the first place, as we have pointed out, it is, at bottom, co-operation against the grain. The human being, when fully adult, is still fundamentally a highly individualized and ego-centred animal, and his social life is based on subjugation and education. In the past subjugation and the retardation of the fiercer adult qualities, have been the prevailing factors in the process.

Compared with the male gorilla, *Homo sapiens* never really grows up. We have already pointed this out in § 5 of Chapter I. In every man a war is continually going on between the gregarious instincts he has retained from immaturity, his innate desire to conform to the opinion about him, to be liked and respected by his
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fellows, on the one hand, and on the other his egoism, his desire to
do the best for himself, to express himself fully and to dominate and
prevail over others. This conflict is not so apparent in many of the
savage communities, as it is in contemporary life. It reveals itself
with the development of privacy and private property and with
opportunities for individual enrichment. Civilized social life is
based on the fact that the second, the egoistic system of ideas, can
be mastered and modified by and subordinated to the first. Where
the community accepts an ethic those individuals who disregard it
can be forced to conform. The ethic itself can be changed by
education. There has been an immense amount of mere subjugation
in the past. In the future, we are going to suggest, education may
largely replace subjugation. We may replace the broken and
retarded individuality by a directed and self-disciplined
individuality.

As we have seen, three main strands of tradition mingle in the
process of breaking-in man to society. There is the peasant tradition
with its exaltation of toil and its desperate clutch upon property, its
fear, its political submissiveness, and its great power of passive
resistance. There is the nomad tradition with its rapacity and
handsome spending. There is the priestly tradition, the tradition of
the trained and educated man with its repudiation of mercenariness,
its conceptions of service and disinterestedness. How these strands
interwove and interacted to constitute medieval society is a matter
of history. The civilized aristocrat touched thought and learning
with a quality of enterprise, and the clash of cultures, of Latin
Christendom with Arabic-Greek knowledge, released the scepticisms
and enquiries that opened the way to the modern world. All these
traditions still mingle in us and about us. Out of them we build our
personas, our conceit of ourselves, our conception of our rôles and
of what becomes us. But the proportionate influence of these three
factors changes.

As we have seen, the new world-wide economic system that has
been coming into existence in the last century and a half is rapidly
superseding the independent small cultivator and the independent
town trader and town artisan, by large enterprises employing wages
—workers, foremen, managers and directors. With the diminution
of that peasant-small-townsman stratum which was until recently
the bulk of human society, goes the disappearance of the peasant-

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small-townsman type of persona. It is replaced by a complex of new ideals. Similarly the advance of social discipline has turned the aristocratic predatory type, partly in an instinctive effort for its self-preservation, to militarism and the maintenance of nationalist and monarchist institutions, and partly to a mercenary social mixture with the inflated entrepreneurs who have arisen from the peasant-townsman mass. The struggle for the new civilization with nationalist militarism is all about us—and is still indecisive. And meanwhile there has been an immense extension of education, with all the strands of disinterestedness it brings with it. The modern population is rapidly becoming a wholly literate one. The mentality of the learned clerk penetrates everywhere. Popular education has been recognized as necessary even by business entrepreneurs frankly anxious to keep the worker under. A machine civilization has no use for an illiterate citizen. The tradition-based mind is too inflexible for its varying and progressive needs.

The priestly-intellectual tradition has never set any value upon either the accumulation or the violent acquisition of property. Its disposition is to secure a position, through salary, savings or what not, in which it can operate freely, and then to take no more thought of money, but rather to get the work or service done. The satisfaction of good achievement is greater than the satisfaction of possessions. Our teachers arise out of this tradition and bring with them the same repudiation of accumulation and mercenary motives, which they instil into a larger and larger proportion of the population. The modern wages worker and that extending class, the salariat, do not even think of ever being wealthy; they are not in that competition; they want to be safe, comfortable and pleasant in their lives, free from anxiety, free from excessive labour, free to do their individual task well. For these ends they will be acquisitive of money. They do not want money for its own sake, and they do not want money for power. They want it to spend, they want it in the background for emergencies. They cannot do without it. When they come into the modern economic-social organization, this is the material end they have in view. This is the chief motive our developing modern economic organization has to reckon with. This search for security, comfort and liberty, is, as we bring consciousness into our review of human activities, the ruling motive which keeps the marionettes busy in our model industrial machine.
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People say that modern life turns wholly on getting money. But the getting of money either by trading or other forms of "making money," or as wages, salary, rent and interest is now only in a small minority of cases an end in itself. The satisfaction of the demands of the persona constitutes, now as ever, the guiding principle of human conduct, and the value of the money system in the machinery is to be judged entirely by its ability to satisfy those demands. By that criterion we shall go in our subsequent examination of the currency system and its conceivable developments. Suffice it here to repeat that the modern persona is being steadily modified by education in the direction of substituting service of some type, and generally now co-operative service, for the pure acquisitiveness and desire for dominance of the traditional social scheme.

Compared with the localized economic systems of the past, the new order which is developing about us, which makes a larger and larger part of the human population, employees, workers, officials and specialists, seems at the first glance to be abolishing freedom and making more and more people subordinated to a single world economic machine. But that is due to a common confusion between independence and freedom. Independence is no doubt being abolished by the synthetic forces at work, in the case of individuals just as in the case of sovereign states, but independence is not freedom. An "independent" peasant or small tradesman is tied, with scarcely a day's holiday, to his cultivation or his shop; he is the slave of local custom, and he must toil without surcease to the end of his days. An employee under generous modern conditions—dictated, be it noted, not by sentiment but by considerations of maximum efficiency—has daily leisure, holidays and an altogether greater need of personal freedom.

Large-scale production and distribution release human beings to self-respect and initiative at every point in its organization. Domestic service in the past was practically personal slavery; the servant was at the beck and call of the employer from morning to night. Where mediævalism still prevails, as Lady Simon's admirable book on China has recently reminded us, domestic servants are still slaves. They are bought and sold. They are struck and beaten. In such backward countries as Italy servants are still beaten; I have seen a chambermaid beaten by the manageress of a hotel. But
under collective housekeeping and in any large establishment servants become a "staff" with clear rights and definite limits to their duties. A great deal of nagging, bullying and oppression may still occur in any staff where the housekeeper, the head waiter or house steward is under-educated and evilly disposed; the new age is not the immediate coming of the kingdom of heaven; but in a well organized concern there are powers above the tyrant and modes of resistance against tyranny. It is possible to appeal against ill-treatment, and in the closely observed business of the ultra-modern type, friction will be perceptible in the lowered quantity and quality of the work and will be made the subject of enquiry.

PERSONAL SERVICE

At many points in the economic social machine there is still and probably there will always have to be direct personal service. There is the valet or courier to a busy man; there are the devils, amanuenses and secretaries, who eke out the powers of some person of exceptional initiative; there are the "companions" of the old and isolated. But a society which is replacing conceptions of advantage and dominance by the idea of disinterested effort will change such relationships very substantially even when it does not abolish them. The old way was for the principal person to behave towards his seconds as a lord towards inferiors. He was their substitute for motive; theirs not to reason why he commanded this or that. But in the atmosphere of an educated community he will be recognized not as a lord but as a specialist, and his claim for assistance will be based not on his highmindedness but upon his insufficiency. The valet or courier does things for him because, having regard for his preoccupations and limitations, he is totally unable to do them himself; the secretary supplements, extends, clarifies and checks his efforts. The secretary or valet is a protector of his principal from petty distresses and details generally. The relationship rises therefore from the level of subjugation towards the level of sympathetic aid and friendship. Exceptional ability can be recognized on either hand, and respect can be mutual and complementary. Occasionally to the end of time, the secondary person will have to show loyalty to the principal. Loyalty one may define as personal obedience to the initiatives of another even when
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those initiatives are not understood or seem to be wrong, obedience because, on the whole, the secondary person believes in the general rightness of the initiatör, and in some distinctive unpredictable and inestimable quality that gives him or her the right to indisputable initiative.