CHAPTER II

THE MILNER MISSION: AN ATTEMPT TO APPLY THE NEW POLICY OF SELF-DETERMINATION

At the close of the first volume the Milner mission had just arrived in Egypt. Its members disembarked in December 1919, in the face of almost universal hostility.

The Mission’s terms of reference were as follows: “To enquire into the causes of the late disorders in Egypt and to report on the existing situation in the country and the form of the Constitution which, under the Protectorate, will be best calculated to promote its peace and prosperity, the progressive development of self-governing institutions, and the protection of foreign interests.” It was a body well selected for its purposes. Experience of Egypt was provided by its President, Lord Milner, who had had first-hand knowledge of administration of the country during the last decade of the nineteenth century, and had written a book which had become an acknowledged work of reference in regard to the difficulties and achievements of the British occupation in its early years. Among his colleagues also were Sir Rennell Rodd, who at the beginning of a highly distinguished diplomatic career had served under Cromer; and General Sir John Maxwell, who was well known to and much regarded by a later generation of
Egyptians, while his administration of martial law during the early war years had enhanced an already great reputation. Sir Cecil Hurst was specially chosen to advise in regard to the important legal aspect of the Mission's problems from the point of view of international law. Sir Owen Thomas represented the British Labour Party, and Mr. J. A. Spender was well known for his steady advocacy of the Liberal point of view in international affairs and for his professions of sympathy with small nations. The Egyptian extremists eagerly attacked the appointment of Lord Milner as President of this Mission, in particular they seized upon and publicly criticised any passage in his book upon Egypt which might be said to show a "reactionary" attitude towards the problems of the country. But the fact remains that alike by his intense devotion to the true interests of Great Britain, by his wide experience of kindred problems, by the commanding position which he had achieved, and by the natural attainments which had raised him there, Lord Milner was pre-eminently fitted for the task entrusted to him.

The arrival of the Mission coincided with the most intense point of the agitation for independence. In addition to the series of attempted murders of Englishmen, attacks were made upon the lives of Egyptians and the Prime Minister himself had a narrow escape on December 15. At the same time the boycott of the Mission had been organised to a pitch at which it was for all practical purposes complete. The report of the Mission tells the story in detail. The Sultan and his Ministers were the only Egyptians who entered into relations with the Mission on their arrival, and even they held an attitude of marked reserve and refused to express opinions. The rest of
Egypt, some because they would not, but most because they dared not do otherwise, held themselves entirely aloof: strikes of protest, telegrams of protest, processions of protest, bitter protesting articles in the Press, followed one another in an unending stream. The heads of the El Azhar University published a letter to the High Commissioner demanding the withdrawal of the British from Egypt. Six princes of the family of Mahomed Ali published a similar communication, which they sent to Lord Milner. "The headquarters of the Mission were constantly watched by unostentatious pickets. The visit of any Egyptian of note was at once communicated to the Press and became the subject of minatory comment. "Moreover the offender was liable to be subjected to a domiciliary visit in his own house from a group of students, demanding an explanation of his conduct, which generally ended in his making a profuse profession of his Nationalist faith and affirming that in his conversation with the Mission he had been careful in no wise to depart from it. . . . Meantime the movements of members of the Mission were carefully followed, especially when any of us went into the provinces. Emissaries would be immediately despatched from Cairo to dog our footsteps, to try to prevent our getting into touch with the local people, especially the fellahin, and to arrange demonstrations calculated to impress us with the solidarity of Egyptian opinion. The visit to Tanta of one member of the Mission led to serious riots, which continued for many days and were only quelled by the intervention of the military." In fact the organisation of the extremists had been triumphantly successful; they had been given time to organise a boycott of the Mission, they had availed themselves of it and their domina-
tion over Egypt was complete. It was merely an academic consolation that the Mission derived from reporting that "they (the extremists) certainly failed in their main object, for it was impossible not to come to the conclusion that, if the Egyptians were really so unanimous as we were intended to think, we should have been left to find that out for ourselves by going about the country without let or hindrance". The conclusion was accurate enough but it was not one upon which either the Mission or His Majesty’s Government felt at all inclined to act at this moment.

Now, however, the situation had become abundantly clear. On the one side His Majesty’s Government had quite definitely announced their intention to maintain the Protectorate. The Secretary of State had said so unequivocally in Parliament, the High Commissioner had said so in the Residency at Cairo. He had been asked by a non-official British deputation whether it was intended to give up the Army of Occupation and had replied that not even the Protectorate was to be abandoned. The Milner Mission’s own terms of reference were "to report on... the form of the Constitution which, under "the Protectorate, will be best calculated, etc., etc."

On the other side Zaghlul Pasha and his party had refused to recognise the Protectorate, had demanded independence, and by the surrender of the previous April had been allowed to gain an almost complete control over Egypt.

Here was a deadlock which could only be ended by a partial retreat upon one side or the other. The Mission did not hesitate, but began to retreat at once. On December 29 they issued a declaration, which stated that "The Mission has been sent out by the "British Government, with the approval of Parlia-
ment, to reconcile the aspirations of the Egyptian people with the special interests which Great Britain has in Egypt and with a maintenance of the legitimate rights of all foreign residents in the country? This was, of course, a complete misstatement of the position, as a glance back at the terms of reference will show. The real fact was that the Mission had been sent out to reconcile Egyptian aspirations, not with the special interests of Great Britain but with a maintenance of the British Protectorate. That maintenance, however, was creating a deadlock and it was therefore to be surrendered by this declaration of December 29.

The Declaration was in fact an enormous concession to Egyptian demands: after two weeks in Egypt the Mission tore up its own terms of reference and committed the British Parliament to the abandonment of the Protectorate which until that moment had been solemnly declared to be a cardinal point of British policy. Vast as it was, the concession did not have the desired effect. "This declaration certainly had some effect in mitigating hostility, but it did not get over the reluctance of Egyptians generally to enter into formal relations with the Mission." There was nothing for it, therefore, but to fall back upon the material—valuable and comprehensive as it was—which could be collected from official and from non-Egyptian sources. Armed with this material, the Mission at the beginning of March 1920 returned to England.

Before we follow them there it is necessary briefly to review the general state of affairs existing in Egypt in the early months of 1920. Political crimes of violence were still taking place: on December 26, 1919,

1 Official Journal, December 29, 1919.
two British soldiers were attacked in Cairo and severely wounded. The serious riots at Tanta have already been referred to: they took place on January 20 and following days. At about the same time a bomb was thrown at Sirri Pasha, a prominent member of the Cabinet, and a similar attack was made in February upon Shafik Pasha, the Minister of Agriculture. By these attacks the nerves of the Prime Minister and his colleagues were seriously shaken, and it was feared that they might resign their posts. Their task was indeed difficult enough without the constant threat to their lives. One of the strongest weapons in the hand of the political agitator at this time was the economic position. There was a serious shortage of wheat supplies, which was sending up the price of bread in the towns and causing much hardship among the poorer classes. The British wheat supplies Commission was coping efficiently with a difficult situation, but this remained anxious and uncertain in spite of the Commission's assistance, and there was always the possibility that the area under cotton would have to be restricted—a step which would be universally unpopular, both in Egypt and elsewhere. It was in fact the high price of cotton which was causing the difficulty. By it and by the general dislocation of post-War supplies a situation was being created which is in Egypt naturally very dangerous—in which the fellahen were financially prosperous and therefore restless, while at the same time they were unable to obtain the commodities they needed.

Another serious difficulty was brought about by the failure to conclude peace with Turkey. The negotiations dragged on despairingly, and the uncertainty thus created had a very damaging effect upon the
mind of Egypt. Lord Milner, at the head of the Mission, was extremely anxious to know how the terms of peace would affect the status of Egypt: and upon this point a penetrating and decisive suggestion was made by Lord Allenby: "If it has not already been done", he wrote, "I would suggest that, in addition to Turkish recognition of the Protectorate over Egypt, she should at the same time be required to cede to H.M.G. all prerogatives and authority over this country formerly enjoyed by the Sultan as suzerain... such a stipulation seems to be a natural result of victory over Turkey, and a right of suzerainty based on conquest would have considerable moral authority and would fortify our position here". It is quite impossible to understand why this brilliantly simple and logically decisive suggestion was never taken up. "If it has not already been done", wrote the High Commissioner, as though apologising for suggesting the obvious. In 1914 we had had our first opportunity of putting our occupation of Egypt upon a sound basis. We had thrown that opportunity away in a moment of weak foolishness, yet here was a generous providence offering us the second chance which so seldom comes to the foolish. This second chance, beautifully simple and complete, we never regarded at all. It was perhaps the most perfect example of the uncoordinated methods by which the treaties of peace were too often negotiated.

To return now to the activities of the Mission. Their report tells us that by the time they left Egypt they had come to certain conclusions accepted by all the members, and these conclusions are set out in Section II. of the report itself. Dealing first with the causes of the recent unrest, this section points out

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that the position which England occupied in Egypt had never been legalised. "We have never honestly faced the Egyptian problem, and our neglect to do so is in a measure responsible for the present situation." The history of the status of the British in Egypt is then summarised, and of this summary the key sentence runs as follows: "It appears to be frequently assumed in current talk and writing in this country that Egypt is a part of the British Empire. "This is not and never has been the case." This very definite and unqualified assertion forms the principal foundation of the Mission's recommendations of our subsequent policy; it is therefore of extreme importance, yet it is a statement which in such a form seems by no means easy to justify. From the practical point of view there is hardly one argument to be adduced in its favour. From 1904 onwards there had been as a matter of hard fact, apart from the Khedivial position, only one difference between the state of affairs in Egypt and in similar parts of the British Empire. That difference had been the existence of the capitulations, which all authorities had agreed must be terminated in the interest of Egypt, but which could only be terminated if our occupation were maintained. The British Government had in practice controlled the internal and external affairs of Egypt, and that control had in no way been limited by considerations of legal status. Our policy had been the gradual education of Egypt to a self-governing status under our aegis—the same policy, in fact, which governed our treatment of other Eastern dependencies within the Empire. In theory, of course, the affair stood upon a different footing—owing to our failure, noted by the Mission, to face the facts squarely. But even on the battlefield of theory the Mission's statement
of the case had to meet, and did not attempt to meet, a very considerable weight of argument: for, however true the Mission's statement might have been of the situation before 1914, in that year a British Protectorate had been declared and the situation had thereby been completely transformed.

However ambiguous and insecurely based that declaration had been, its intention was at least perfectly clear. The reader has only to turn to Chapter XIV. of the earlier volume to remind himself that the desire and the purpose underlying the declaration of a Protectorate were definitely that Egypt should become part of the Empire. There was no wish or intention to keep her outside the Empire, but there was unfortunately a weak attempt to camouflage the position and to maintain the fiction that she was not losing her individual status. It had been a feeble compromise, but the intention which underlay it had never been disguised. Moreover, it was an accepted canon of international practice that a protected nation became part of the Empire of the protecting power. And finally we have the statement of no less an authority than Cromer himself to show us how the Protectorate was regarded by English authorities. "After hanging in the balance for a period of 33 years", he writes in 1915, "the political destiny of Egypt has at last been definitely settled. The country has been incorporated into the British Empire. No other solution was possible. Provided that the statesmanship be skilful and that there is no undue haste, "the adoption of this measure, far from hindering, will "tend to facilitate the execution of that rationally "Liberal policy to which Great Britain is wedded in "dealing with its outlying dependencies." 1

1 Abbas H., preface, p. xvii.
To assert, in the face of these facts, that Egypt never had been part of the British Empire was to surrender not only the policy of 1914 but also the whole series of arguments by which the continued evolution of our persistent intentions could be justified. At a blow the Mission wiped out the work of many years and returned to a position which was no longer tenable except in disregard of a large part of recent history. It was a preface as unfortunate as it was unsupported.

The remainder of Section II. of the report is concerned with the circumstances which had been the immediate cause of the disorders, with a review of events after the War, with an account of the Nationalist movement, and finally with the ideas of the Mission in regard to future policy. In regard to the first of these subjects—the discontents created by the War—there seems to be one important omission in the review given in the report. The grievances which were created by the exigencies of war are fully detailed, but nothing is said of the complete security and the very large measure of prosperity which the whole country had enjoyed as a result of the War. Resources calculated conservatively at £100 million had been accumulated during the War, and of these about £13 ½ million had been used to purchase Egyptian securities held abroad, and so to lighten very considerably the burden of foreign debt. For the period of 1914–21 the Treasury could show a revenue of £177 million as against an expenditure of £179 million, which meant that during that period, while other countries were pouring away their income and capital, nearly 99 per cent of Egypt’s expenditure had been met out of current revenue, and the reserve had only been drawn upon to the
extent of £2 million. Egypt had emerged from the most destructive war in world's history with immensely increased national resources, and with no adverse balance in the operation of her public finances and a negligible increase in taxation. Her only economic loss was constituted by the arrears in upkeep and development of public works. This prosperity was not only an important feature of the picture of wartime Egypt—counterbalancing, as it did to a large extent, the grievances so often described—it was also a ponderable cause of the disorders, owing to the peculiar attribute of Egypt, that her people must wax fat before they will kick.

As to the events subsequent to the War, the Mission came to the conclusion that "The consequences of deporting the Nationalist leaders were not rightly estimated, and the revoking of that measure, after serious disturbances had taken place, necessarily gave the impression that British policy was wavering and liable to quick changes under the pressure of agitation". Agitation had in fact achieved over the local authorities the same success that the boycott was now about to win over the Mission who wrote these words. In view of the manner in which major concessions of principle were made to the extremist boycott in this very report, it is interesting to read the conclusions which the Mission formed in regard to the Nationalist movement. "It has been said", runs their report, "that every Egyptian worth his salt is at heart a Nationalist. This is only true of the educated and semi-educated classes, who constitute less than 10 per cent of the fourteen million inhabitants of Egypt. It would be meaningless as applied to the 92 per cent of illiterates, and especially to the fellaheen, who are two-thirds of the whole people. The small upper
and middle classes were strongly Nationalist; the large masses of the fellaheen not at all so. Even among the upper classes a large number of individuals were misled by unjustified apprehensions and by deliberately false propaganda. Any chance of success there might be for the Mission’s policy lay therefore in the possibility of conciliating these moderate elements among the educated.

How such conciliation could, in the view of the Mission, be successful is demonstrated in the paragraphs which deal with future policy. “We gradually came to the conclusion that no settlement could be satisfactory which was simply imposed by Great Britain upon Egypt, but that it would be wiser to seek a solution by means of a bilateral agreement—a Treaty—between the two countries.” Unfortunately the further conclusion was inevitably reached that the only way to negotiate such an agreement was not with the moderate elements, but with Zaghlul and his extremists, who were already committed to a fanatical policy of no compromise with England’s claims. Zaghlul Pasha was in Paris, and no persuasion could yet avail to make him return to Egypt and meet the Mission (not unnaturally in view of the extreme standpoint he had all along taken up in regard to the Mission). Nothing remained, therefore, but to return to England with the material so far collected. The Mission arrived in London about the middle of April, but at the same time their unofficial emissary, Adly Pasha Yeghen, arrived in Paris and put himself into communication with Zaghlul Pasha. The latter must by this time have begun to tire of his ineffectual sojourn, which, however, he could hardly terminate without any tangible result. He must already have been anxious to return to Egypt, yet how could he
profitably return empty-handed? In these circumstances, the opportunity offered to him by Adly Pasha of meeting the Mission, and securing from them some proof of the profitable nature of his activities, must have been by no means unwelcome. He allowed himself to be persuaded, and on June 7, with several other members of his self-constituted Delegation, he arrived in London. From that date commenced a series of conversations with the Mission which continued until August, and a series of concessions on the part of the Mission which altered the whole British position in Egypt.

The story of these conversations, as told in the Report, is interesting and illuminating. "There was never any doubt in our minds that our visitors were as sincerely anxious as we were ourselves to find a way out of the difficulties of the situation. But they were to some extent hampered—and this is specially true of Zaghlul Pasha himself—by the uncompromising line which they had taken in the recent past. . . . Over and over again they declared that it was impossible for them to accept some proposal or other made by us, the fairness of which they did not directly dispute, because it was inconsistent with the mandate which they had received from the Egyptian people." It was the story, newer perhaps then, which we have since heard so often, of the unwillingness of the Oriental politician to accept responsibility. Zaghlul Pasha had created the policy and had imposed it upon his countrymen: now when it came to taking action he wished to shuffle out of the responsibility and shift the burden from his own shoulders to others. The same difficulty cropped up at every stage. "The idea of a treaty between Great Britain and Egypt was readily accepted. That was our starting-point,
and without it we should have made little progress.

But when it came to discussing those terms of the Treaty which embodied the few, but essential, safeguards for British and foreign interests, the Egyptians were always extremely apprehensive of agreeing to something which might conflict with their ideal of independence. As a matter of fact, our proposals did not conflict with that ideal—reasonably interpreted—as the Egyptians themselves, or at any rate some of them, were ready to admit. But there was always the fear in their minds that their countrymen would not take the same view, and that they would be regarded in Egypt as having betrayed the national cause. These accusations of treachery which are so freely employed by Nationalist agitators and form so large a part of their stock-in-trade generally end by threatening their own creators. Those who teach others to throw stones increase their own chances of being stoned. The fear of it hangs over them always and takes away from them the courage to assume responsibility. But the knowledge of this fact did not discourage the Mission in their efforts at conciliation, and at last the stage was reached of drafting terms.

This result was only achieved by considerable concessions on the part of the Mission. This was indeed a mild statement of the case. The Protectorate had been discarded, the policy of trusteeship for the masses and for anything except foreign interests had been tacitly but completely dropped; and now even in regard to British interests concessions were beginning to be made, not to the reasonable claims of Egypt, but to the violent hostility of extreme agitation.

Even then the Mission, as might indeed have been anticipated, did not achieve the object which it sought. When the heads of agreement had been
drawn up, Zaghlul Pasha and his colleagues refused to commit themselves to any definite support of them. "They were evidently still nervous of being repudiated by a considerable number of their followers in Egypt. They accordingly kept on suggesting further modifications of the terms so far agreed to, mainly on points of form, with a view of making them more acceptable to Egyptian opinion." The Mission, however, could go no further for the moment in the way of concession. "We seemed, therefore, after all to have reached an impasse." 

A way out was, however, found. The position was that a general agreement had been reached between the "Delegation" and the Mission. The Mission were prepared to support this agreement in public and to recommend the acceptance of its principles to the British Government. The "Delegation," on their side, were not prepared to shoulder responsibility. They were afraid: afraid of their own public and afraid to commit themselves. In these circumstances it was suggested that some members of the "Delegation" should visit Egypt and explain "to the public of that country the nature of the settlement which the Mission was disposed to recommend, and the great advantages which Egypt would derive from it. If, as they hoped, they met with a favourable reception, this would constitute a 'mandate' from the people which would justify the 'Delegation' on the return of the emissaries, in pledging itself to give our proposals an unconditional support." This exit took the negotiators out of their impasse, but it took them no further than that. They were now deep in the maze of Oriental bargaining, from which Egypt and ourselves have not yet emerged. Public opinion in Egypt was non-existent without a lead, and Zaghlul Pasha
was afraid of public opinion and had not the courage to give it a lead. However, "a memorandum was ac-
"cordingly drawn up" and communicated to Zaghlul Pasha and his friends, of which they were to make
free use in public discussion in Egypt. This memo-
randum was published immediately after it came
into Zaghlul’s hands, without the consent of Govern-
ment—and apparently without the knowledge of
Lord Milner. The British authorities expressed
themselves as horrified, but what else did they ex-
pect? They had presented Zaghlul with a golden
opportunity of committing them to large concessions
while he himself remained committed to nothing.
It is hardly credible that their simplicity or ignor-
ance really permitted them to hope that this oppor-
tunity would not be instantly seized.

The rest of the story is soon told. In September
four members of the Delegation, Mohamed Pasha
Mahmoud, Ahmed Lutfi Bey el Said, Abdul Latif
Bey el Mukabati, and Ali Bey Maher, returned to
Egypt for the purpose of testing public opinion in
regard to the suggestions now made. Had Zaghlul at
the same time publicly expressed even a small mea-
ure of enthusiasm for the suggestions, there is little
doubt that they would have had, in the first flush of
excitement, a good chance of acceptance. Instead he
published a long manifesto in which he very carefully
refrained from committing himself to any expression
of opinion, but stated merely that the result of the
recent discussions would now be submitted to Egypt
for consideration. The four delegates arrived at Alex-
andria on September 7 and were accorded a hearty
and enthusiastic reception. The Local Committee of
the "Wafd" were at first extremely enthusiastic in
regard to the proposals which the delegates brought
vote for complete independence. Seeing that the truth was probably exactly the contrary, the motive behind this daring suggestion could not but be suspect. It was a fine field for intrigue and agitation, but unlikely to be productive of definite results. In the end the four delegates returned to England and reported to the Milner Mission that the Egyptian people were favourably disposed towards the proposals: but here they added, in the best Oriental tradition, that there were certain points of which further modification was desired. By this time, however, the Mission had had enough. They felt perfectly rightly that it was not for them to bargain further. The so-called principles upon which discussion could take place had been outlined and to some extent agreed. The details of the Treaty which might eventuate could not be negotiated with the Mission—it was not their province—but with accredited representatives of His Majesty’s Government. Negotiations with the Mission accordingly came to a somewhat indeterminate conclusion in November 1920, and the next step would have to be taken by means of official negotiations between representatives of His Majesty’s Government on the one hand and of the Egyptian Government on the other.

The British were not very strongly placed for entering upon such negotiations. From the position which they had held in the previous autumn they had already retreated so far that it was no longer in sight. They stood committed to far-reaching concessions, whereas Egypt stood committed to nothing. In the previous year she demanded independence, and in all the negotiations with the Mission the “Delegation” had never conceded any public qualification of that demand. From the bargaining encounter we had emerged as very distinctly the losers. We had
surrendered a great deal and gained nothing—not even tranquillity; the Egyptian extremists had gained much and surrendered nothing—not even disorder.

It would be fair perhaps to say that the Mission had approached their problem in a spirit which was extremely generous towards Egypt. The defects of British policy, the faults of the administration during the War and subsequently were all described without any attempt at palliation or whitewashing. The services which Egypt had rendered during the War were acknowledged very handsomely and nothing was said of the substantial benefits she had received. The aims, temper, and behaviour of the Nationalist agitators were most sympathetically described. Their excesses were excused, and everything that could be said in their justification was carefully set down. With these generous preliminaries the Mission approached the crux of their problem: was there no middle course between a forceful domination of a hostile Egypt and evacuation? Yes, they replied: the problem could be settled by an entirely new method of treatment, the method of free bilateral agreement. This new method could find no basis in the policy which we had so long pursued towards Egypt. Under that policy we had a declared responsibility—the obligation was upon us, and was universally acknowledged, to ensure order and a stable and humane government. The Mission, however, made no reference to this responsibility and no attempt to prove that its object had been achieved. Instead they acknowledged the independence of Egypt and stipulated only that British interests and foreign interests must be safeguarded. They conceived that a mutual agreement was possible under which these interests could be safeguarded; but when we come to study
the memorandum containing their proposals—the so-called Milner-Zaghlul Agreement—we find that their hopes for the future are based upon nothing more solid than their own pious and rather sentimental aspirations. The proposal which the Mission make is supported by premises for which there was only the most slender justification in fact, and which were almost immediately falsified by events. "Would not "an orderly and friendly Egypt, in intimate association "with Great Britain, serve British purposes as well, or "even better [than a hostile Egypt], while removing "all sense of grievance and all spirit of revolt on the "Egyptian side?" Obviously the answer to this question must be affirmative. But to ask it in this form was to shirk a whole string of questions which had prior claims. Would any concessions at this stage render Egypt orderly? or friendly? or intimate? or free from all sense of grievance and all spirit of revolt? The statement simply assumes that all these advantages will result. It was in this dangerously optimistic spirit that recommendations for a Treaty were put forward. And it was in exactly the same spirit that the Mission made the series of special concessions which formed a large part of the "Milner-Zaghlul Agreement". The principles of these proposals—wrongly styled agreement—was a Treaty of Alliance in which England would recognise Egypt's independence, while Egypt would recognise England's need to protect her own special interests and her responsibility to safeguard the interests of foreign communities. England would support Egypt in defending herself, and in return would receive from Egypt all the assistance Egypt could give within her own borders, even when the integrity of Egypt was not affected. The treaty was to stipulate for the following special
points: (1) Egypt’s right to representation in foreign countries; (2) Great Britain’s right to maintain forces on Egyptian soil; (3) Great Britain’s concurrence in the selection of a Financial Adviser; (4) her concurrence in the selection of a Judicial Adviser; (5) Great Britain’s right to intervene to protect foreigners from the operation of laws which under the capitulations required foreign consent; (6) a special position for Britain’s representative; (7) the termination at will of the services of British and foreign officials within two years after the treaty comes into force.

Of these points the first was a very generous concession. The Mission were fully aware of its dangerous possibilities, but they assumed that their proposals would result in a friendly Egypt. “We rely on the “whole policy here proposed to have this effect.” Similarly with the seventh point—the right to dispense with the services of British officials. “The idea of any “Egyptian government, however free to do so, attempting to make a clean sweep of its foreign officials “is a chimera.” . . . “No sensible Egyptian seriously “wishes to dispense with foreign aid”; . . . “any general “or rapid displacement of the British and other foreign “officials is not to be anticipated.” . . . “It seems to us “very improbable that such an exodus [of officials] “will ever assume large dimensions.” All these assumptions—the basis of the concession—were, as we shall see, almost immediately shown to be wrong. All this generous sympathy was expected to secure the goodwill of Egypt. The Mission, apparently believing that they had worked a miracle on the heart of Pharaoh, recommended the speedy initiation of Treaty negotiations. Their spirit of optimism was shared by the Government at home and by Lord Allenby. Detailed correspondence was carried on
in regard to the personnel of the delegations which should conduct the negotiations and all was now hopefully assumed to be for the best. Through spectacles so thickly rose-tinted the authorities could hardly expect to see the troubles which were soon again to fall upon them.